The future of the FUD mill
There's yet another Microsoft-funded analyst study out there; this one,
done by VeriTest, compares deployment times for Microsoft Windows Small
Business Server and Red Hat Enterprise Linux. No doubt everybody will be
surprised to hear that the study (available
in PDF
format) concludes that Windows is better. Four tasks were set out:
install the system with basic services, set up performance monitoring and
reporting, set up an intranet web site, and configure the network for
remote management. Doing these tasks with Windows took, they say,
4 1/2 hours and 125 steps. Linux required 7 1/2 hours and 555
steps.
It is not hard to poke holes in the study, of course. Somehow it was
possible to set up an intranet server on Windows with zero steps - but it
still took seven minutes. Somehow the report didn't comment on the
discouraging time per step required to accomplish this task on Windows.
Errors made by the (Microsoft-hired) consultants performing the Linux
installation were counted as steps. Tasks like checking the system with
nmap were also counted. Setting up remote administration took 100 steps;
we could suggest a shorter way of doing that:
- Enable sshd.
The VeriTest people, instead, set out on a series of tasks involving
installing the kernel source, setting up PPTP, and carrying out several
tasks on the Windows client - all of which counted as steps, of course.
One could go on about this report for a long time; see, for example, the
letter from Leon Brooks on this week's Letters
Page.
The more interesting development, however, is that Forrester Research has,
after having Microsoft trumpet one of its studies, issued this statement
on the integrity of its reports.
Recently, in two isolated and unrelated cases, we conducted
privately sponsored studies for two vendor clients. We stand by the
integrity of both studies. However, we erred in allowing those
clients to publicize the research findings. In response to these
two isolated events, Forrester has taken immediate steps to tighten
our internal process and clarify our Integrity Policy. As part of
this clarification, the company will no longer accept projects that
involve paid-for, publicized product comparisons. This move
revalidates and strengthens Forrester's research integrity.
Forrester, in other words, is getting out of the analyst-for-hire FUD
business. Given that this business can only be lucrative, Forrester's
decision to leave it behind is worthy of note.
FUD-for-hire has long been an important business tool in the technology
world. Analysts have been happy to have the business, and they have been
able to live with the fact that their output always seems to support the
sponsor's agenda. Technical journalists have long liked these reports;
they can easily be cast into a story without requiring much in the way of
creative or critical thought. The whole system worked smoothly as a way of
shaping public perception of technology products.
Something has happened over the last decade or so, however. The net has
made
it easy for interested parties to rip apart biased or poorly-done studies.
And the rise
of free software has greatly increased the number of people who feel some
sort of ownership interest in the systems they use. As a result, anybody
publishing a report critical of free software had better be very sure of
his ground, because that report will be subjected to intense
scrutiny. Some of the people performing that scrutiny will know far more
about the subject manner than the analysts who wrote the text, and they
will not be afraid to say, in public, what they think. Shoddy research and
skewed studies do not fare well in the modern environment.
It has been noted for years that FUD attacks on Linux tend to backfire;
even Microsoft has commented on this
fact. The combination of the net and the Linux community has managed to
neutralize - or at least strongly diminish the effect of - FUD. Analyst
companies which are seen as taking part in outright FUD attempts have seen
their own credibility suffer; remember MindCraft? Now some analyst
companies, concerned about the perception of their integrity, are realizing
that the FUD business is a poor place to be in the long run. That is a
victory for the Linux community, and for the level of technology industry
discourse in general.
Comments (5 posted)
An Evening with Bruce Perens
Bruce Perens was in Denver this week for
IBM's Linux strategy briefing and offered to speak to the
Colorado Linux Users and Enthusiasts (CLUE) Linux User Group the night before the IBM event.
The talk was billed as "The Future of GNU/Linux and Free Software," but
Perens talked a great deal about the history of free software as well.
After covering his history with Linux and the open source movement,
Perens turned to current events. He talked a little bit about how many
companies doing Linux-related business suffer from multiple personality
disorder. On the one hand companies like HP are looking to push Linux
and are trying to embrace Linux and do the right thing for the Linux
community. On the other hand, these companies have to maintain
relationships with companies like SCO and Microsoft and participate in
groups like CompTIA that actively
work against open source. Perens cautions the community to pay attention
to everything a company does, not just its support for open source.
We know that both Hewlett-Packard and the other members of CompTIA were
sponsors of the so-called Software Choice Initiative, which works
against open source. So, it's important to watch our friends.
Perens also noted that the next likely legal attack against open source
would be via software patents, and said he thinks its unlikely that
corporations like HP or IBM would help the community in that event.
Though Perens says he hasn't made up his mind yet, he indicated he was
thinking seriously about trying to form a community-driven answer to Red
Hat's enterprise products.
I'm wondering if it's time for a grass-roots enterprise Linux, and
the way I figured I would do this... is first of all take Debian,
why is there a Fedora
project when there's Debian, a ten-year-old project with all its
policies done...with over a thousand developers? That is what the
Fedora project should be. Take that, and get together the
community of enterprise users who depend on Linux and really want a
zero-cost enterprise distribution.
After the talk, we caught up with Bruce for a few minutes one-on-one
to ask about issues not covered during his talk, and to get further
information on the grass-roots enterprise Linux effort. The first
question was about the disagreement between the Free Software Foundation
and the Debian Project over the GNU Free Documentation License (FDL).
Perens has helped mediate between the groups, and says that they're on
their way to working it out.
I wanted to take the emotion out of the whole thing, and it looks like
we're succeeding at that. I'm not tremendously happy to have coverage of
Debian and FSF bickering, we have a lot more important things going on.
I think that it's going to take care of itself more or less now. You
probably will have some conference calls that are exciting... I'm not
asking either organization to compromise with each other, I'm asking
each organization to follow their own rules. I feel that it's not
permissible for Debian to compromise its ethos for FSF nor is it
permissible for the FSF to compromise its ethos for Debian and
resolution of this issue does not call for either.
Perens also clarified his thoughts on a possible "grass-roots"
enterprise-ready Linux distribution:
It's something I'm still thinking about. I think I will go ahead and do
a call for people to work on it. Obviously I'm open for people who want
to discuss it. The project is not yet announced. I really debated this
in my own head for weeks now, and part of the reason was that, I feel
that it's a big personal expense to me to do any large project. On the
other side every open source thing I've ever done has paid back much
more than I've put into it... I feel that I must participate because I'm
one of the few people in the community with the cachet to pull this off,
who can talk to all the people on the executive side and all the people
on the community side and has reasonable credibility with both of them.
That doesn't mean I have to run it, definitely doesn't mean I want to be
its CTO, it does mean I would be evangelizing it publically for quite
some time.
I'm thinking about whether it is time for the community... to provide
directly a Linux distro certified to LSB and to proprietary software
providers that are willing to do so, guaranteed to be free software and
free beer, free speech and free beer. A certified distribution that is
zero cost, free software... and I'm convinced that creating a Linux
distribution is a expense-sharing system rather than a profit-making
system, even Red Hat now admits this as they attempt to offload
production of their distribution to the community.
We also asked Perens how he felt about companies that use open source
software, but do not contribute substantially to the projects they use.
I have a scale for commercial collaborators with the community. It has
four points. It runs benefactor, partner, user, parasite. Benefactor:
NASA's a great example. They funded most of Linux's Ethernet drivers at
one time. At that time they were not able yet to make extensive use of
Linux, now they are. They put in more than they got out. Most companies
would not want to be benefactors, it looks bad to your stockholders.
Partner is what companies should be if they expect the cooperation of
the free software community. At Hewlett-Packard, we could not get them
to help us with the IA-64 kernel until we made the printers work. Very
good lesson for companies, we put out 60 printer drivers on Linux
because of that.
User is a company that makes use of Linux and open source that complies
with the licensing, but does not make any contribution unless they just
can't avoid it. The usual GPL. I put Linksys in the user category if
they finish resolving the issues they're working on with the FSF right
now. Linksys is a division of Cisco, a very big company, that's
important.
Parasite, SCO comes to mind. They're making fraudulent claims to get
value out of the Linux and open source community by kiting their stock
and you can quote me on "fraudulent," "libelous," "slanderous," no
problem with that. Other parasites, well who sold Linksys and Cisco that
wireless access point? A chip company with a "B"... a number of
engineering companies that seem to be in Taiwan and Korea, transfered
intellectual property that was not theirs to Linksys and Cisco, in ways
that did not comply with the licensing, leaving these companies whose
goodwill we want out of compliance with our licenses and they don't know
how to resolve the problem. So I don't like it because those Taiwanese
or Korean companies made us enemies with Cisco when we want those guys
to put Linux in their next product, we just want them to comply with the
licenses and they should have been given full directions for doing so
when they bought those WAP designs.
Finally, we asked Perens if he had any thoughts on Eric Raymond's prediction
that Sun is doomed.
Yeah, I wish Eric hadn't written that, actually. At least not quite the
way he wrote it, because first of all not having worked at HP as I have,
Eric doesn't understand how long a company can run on a legacy product
which is an extremely long time. And, secondarily, I think Eric was
angered by things Sun has been saying about Linux not belonging in the
data center and Sun's explicit collaboration with SCO spreading FUD.
However, Sun also helps us. Remember what I said about corporate
multiple personality disorders. They've done $70 million dollar investment in
OpenOffice, and I don't see where it paid off for them. They bungled the
strategic aspect of it, they need help with it, but it was a very large
contribution to Linux and open source. So, first of all, Sun's not going
away, they're not dying. If anything, they'll be acquired. They're still
a company with some value, and obviously their price is becoming more
attractive. Who will acquire them? I think it's either Microsoft or IBM.
We thank Bruce for taking the time to talk with us.
Comments (27 posted)
VeriSign backs down - for now
The
September 18 LWN Weekly Edition asked
"whose Internet is it?" in response to VeriSign's deployment of its
"SiteFinder" service. SiteFinder is an attempt to profit from mistyped
domain names; it is implemented as a set of wildcard entries in
.com and
.net which direct the user to VeriSign's paid
index pages. VeriSign's unilateral change broke a number of network
services, modified how DNS works with no input from anybody else involved,
and raised a great many privacy concerns. Nonetheless, VeriSign seemed
determined to weather the storm and keep its changes in place. That is not
a surprising position, given that the company expected SiteFinder to
generate a revenue stream in the millions of dollars.
Among other things, VeriSign had ignored a request from the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to suspend the service.
It would seem, however, that ICANN is not entirely without clout - or
value. On October 3, ICANN sent a
more strongly written letter to VeriSign:
In addition, our review of the .com and .net registry agreements
between ICANN and VeriSign leads us to the conclusion that
VeriSign's unilateral and unannounced changes to the
operation of the .com and .net Top Level Domains are not consistent
with material provisions of both agreements....
Given these conclusions, please consider this a formal demand to
return the operation of the .com and .net domains to their state
before the 15 September changes, pending further technical,
operational and legal evaluation. A failure to comply with this
demand will require ICANN to take the steps necessary under those
agreements to compel compliance with them.
In response, VeriSign grumbled a little, then removed its wildcard entries
and turned off the service. However, anybody who thinks that VeriSign has seen the
light and realized that, as the steward of a public resource, it needs to
act in a more responsible manner would be well advised to read this column by Mark
McLaughlin, a VeriSign VP.
ICANN appears to have bought into claims that the Internet has
broken or will break. Anyone who has used it in the last three
weeks knows that claim to be false. More likely, ICANN caved under
the pressure from some in the Internet community for whom this is a
technology-religion issue about whether the Internet should be used
for these purposes.
The company also had some strong words at the special ICANN
meeting held on October 7. Among other things, it said that it
may have other surprises to spring on the net in the future. VeriSign, in
other words, is absolutely unrepentant. This company's
history suggests that it will not give up on the SiteFinder idea anytime
soon. At the moment, it appears that the net's governance mechanisms have
brought about the right result. But it would be a mistake to assume that
this particular episode is over.
Comments (5 posted)
Quick SCO update
Many people have wondered how it could be that SCO's stock price continues
to increase even as the company's claims are publicly torn to pieces. A
partial answer to that question came to light this week, in the form of
this
SEC filing. It would seem that Royce & Associates, the manager of
the "Royce Technology Value Fund," now owns over 1.4 million shares of
SCO. That is, as it turns out, over 10% of all the outstanding shares in
the company, and almost 20% of the shares in active circulation. For
whatever reason, Royce has made a huge bet on SCO, and has managed to keep
the price high in the process.
This fund is managed by Jonathan Cohen; some information about Mr. Cohen
and SCO can be found on this
page. Among other things, he has been talking up SCO stock in a number
of forums; see, for example, this
posting on MSN/CNBC. "Cohen said the company's stock has done
well this year on the back of solid fundamentals. It has an enormous base
of intellectual property rights, he added." Solid fundamentals
indeed.
Meanwhile, more documents on the IBM case, and, in particular, the
pre-trial discovery process have come to light; they can be found on the
always useful Groklaw
site. There's some fun stuff there. Consider the following from
"Exhibit E," SCO's response to IBM's discovery demands:
Please identify, with specificity (by product, file, and line of
code, where appropriate) all of the alleged trade secrets and any
confidential or proprietary information that plaintiff alleges or
contends IBM misappropriated or misused...
...SCO notes that discovery has just begin and it has not yet
received responsive discovery from IBM that would allow it to fully
answer this question because part of this information is peculiarly
within the knowledge of IBM.
SCO responds to a number of questions in this way. One way of translating
this response into English would be something like "we don't know, we were
hoping IBM would tell us." It is hard to imagine a judge being impressed.
IBM also asked for information on "any person on whom plaintiff intends to
rely as a witness, declarant, or affiant in this action." SCO's response
was "None at this time." Could the company really have no witnesses at
all?
IBM has filed a motion with the court attempting to compel SCO to back up
its claims. The company has also asked for an oral argument before the
judge on the issue.
Good cause for oral argument exists because of the nature of the
discovery issued upon SCO and the significance of its refusal to
respond. SCO has the burden to prove the existence of a trade
secret or misappropriation by IBM of confidential or proprietary
information, and there is no presumption in SCO's favor in this
regard... As a result, SCO's apparent inability to respond to
IBM's interrogatories as required under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has potentially outcome determinative consequences.
In other words, if SCO can't back up its charges, it's time to call the
show over. Nobody ever thought IBM's lawyers would make it easy for
SCO.
Finally, Drew Streib is still trying to buy an
SCO "Linux license," but still has not succeeded. "I can't
believe that a sales force is this incompetent, or instead of that
possibility, that SCO could be so blatantly outright in their lying
about license availability." SCO also continues to state that it
will not be sending out invoices because the "response has been adequate."
One might conclude that the company is having second thoughts about its
licensing program.
Comments (1 posted)
Authors wanted
It has been the better part of a year since we first started taking
externally written articles for LWN. That effort has had its ups and
downs, but, overall, we have been pleased with the result. Externally
contributed material has allowed us to bring new content and viewpoints
to LWN. We have convinced ourselves that we can bring in more content and
maintain the quality of our publication.
So, the time has come to expand our external author program. Writing for
LWN will not be easy; as editors, we are fussy and difficult to please.
And it certainly will not be a path to riches, or even away from the day
job. But it is a way to get your byline out there and help us make a
better LWN. If you think you might be interested, please take a moment to
look at our author guide. If you're
still interested afterward, we would like to hear from you.
Comments (none posted)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Security
Security news
The EFF's report on trusted computing
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has released, to a fair amount of
fanfare, its
report on
trusted computing. The report's author (Seth Schoen) has concluded
that, while trusted computing architectures offer a number of security
benefits, there are also potential problems that need to be addressed.
The report mentions four different technologies that make up current
trusted computing efforts:
- Memory curtaining. Modern operating systems already go to
considerable lengths to keep one process from being able to mess with
another process's memory. Memory curtaining takes things further by
improving memory isolation support in the hardware, so that even the
kernel cannot modify one process's memory while working on behalf of
another process.
- Secure I/O is the creation of a data path from the keyboard (or
other input devices) to the application, and from the application to
the screen which cannot be seen or modified by other processes. It is
an attempt to stop software keystroke loggers, screen readers, and
other eavesdropping tools.
- Sealed storage works by hiding encryption keys within the
system hardware, so that encrypted data cannot be read anywhere else.
- Remote attestion is a hardware-supported mechanism for ensuring
that the software running on a system has not been modified. The
technology allows the generation of certificates that can allow a
remote application (a web server, say) to be sure of the software it
is talking to.
The report acknowledges that all of these technologies can help to improve
the security of computer systems. With a trusted computing architecture in
place, a worm which is able to exploit a hole in one program will find its
ability to do anything interesting on the system much reduced. The EFF
does not have any real problem with most of the technologies discussed.
That is not true, however, for remote attestation:
TCG attestation conspicuously fails to distinguish between
applications that protect computer owners against attack and
applications that protect a computer against its owner. In effect,
the computer's owner is sometimes treated as just another attacker
or adversary who must be prevented from breaking in and altering
the computer's software.
A few cases where the remote attestation feature could backfire on users
are mentioned. One is web servers which refuse to talk to anything other
than the One Chosen Browser. There are sites which do that now, but most
modern browsers are capable of masquerading as something else, so these
techniques are not effective. Remote attestion would change that. Other
examples include software interoperability (i.e. eliminating Samba
forevermore), forced upgrades, and forced use of digital rights management
schemes.
As a solution, the EFF suggests an "owner override" feature. The owner of
a system could, while physically present at the machine, force it to
produce an attestation for software that the owner has modified or
replaced, making it look like something else. This feature would solve the
problem for suitably capable users. It is hard to imagine users developing
a widespread ability to safely perform overrides, however.
The real conclusion to be taken from this report is that the owners and
users of computers need to maintain control over their machines.
When your own computer treats you like an attacker, it has ceased to be
truly yours, and it becomes a tool for controlling your behavior. Free
software users have understood this point for years, of course. We have
built a system that allows us to stay in control. But we need to be
careful that the hardware platforms of the future do not take that control
away from us.
Comments (10 posted)
New vulnerabilities
cfengine: stack overflow
| Package(s): | cfengine |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | October 8, 2003 |
Updated: | October 8, 2003 |
| Description: |
Versions of cfengine prior to 2.0.8 contain a stack overflow in the network I/O code which can be exploited remotely. See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
2.4 kernel - several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | 2.4 kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0461
CAN-2003-0462
CAN-2003-0464
CAN-2003-0476
CAN-2003-0501
CAN-2003-0550
CAN-2003-0551
CAN-2003-0552
|
| Created: | July 21, 2003 |
Updated: | December 23, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several security issues have been discovered affecting the Linux kernel:
-
CAN-2003-0461: /proc/tty/driver/serial reveals the exact character
counts for serial links. This could be used by a local attacker to infer
password lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password entry.
-
CAN-2003-0462: Paul Starzetz discovered a file read race condition
existing in the execve() system call, which could cause a local crash.
-
CAN-2003-0464: A recent change in the RPC code set the reuse flag on
newly-created sockets. Olaf Kirch noticed that his could allow normal
users to bind to UDP ports used for services such as nfsd.
-
CAN-2003-0476: The execve system call in Linux 2.4.x records the file
descriptor of the executable process in the file table of the calling
process, allowing local users to gain read access to restricted file
descriptors.
-
CAN-2003-0501: The /proc filesystem in Linux allows local users to
obtain sensitive information by opening various entries in /proc/self
before executing a setuid program. This causes the program to fail to
change the ownership and permissions of already opened entries.
-
CAN-2003-0550: The STP protocol is known to have no security, which
could allow attackers to alter the bridge topology. STP is now turned
off by default.
-
CAN-2003-0551: STP input processing was lax in its length checking,
which could lead to a denial of service.
-
CAN-2003-0552: Jerry Kreuscher discovered that the Forwarding table
could be spoofed by sending forged packets with bogus source addresses
the same as the local host.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache2: Denial of Service vulnerability
| Package(s): | apache2 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | March 25, 2004 |
| Description: |
A problem was discovered in Apache2 where CGI scripts that write more than
4k to the standard error stream will hang the script's execution. This problem can lead to a
denial of service situation. See this bug
report for additional details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
autorespond: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | autorespond |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0654
|
| Created: | August 18, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Christian Jaeger discovered a buffer overflow in autorespond, an email
autoresponder used with qmail. This vulnerability could potentially
be exploited by a remote attacker to gain the privileges of a user who
has configured qmail to forward messages to autorespond. This
vulnerability is currently not believed to be exploitable due to
incidental limits on the length of the problematic input, but there
may be situations in which these limits do not apply.
CAN-2003-0654 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
bind buffer overflow vulnerability in DNS resolver libraries
| Package(s): | bind glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0651
CAN-2002-0684
|
| Created: | July 8, 2002 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
The BIND 4.9.8-OW2 patch and BIND 4.9.9 release (and thus 4.9.9-OW1)
include fixes for a libc related vulnerability which does not
affect Linux. Updates from
the Internet Software Consortium (ISC)
are available from here.
No release or branch of Openwall GNU/*/Linux (Owl) is known to be
affected, due to Olaf Kirch's fixes for this problem getting into the
GNU C library more than two years ago.
Unfortunatly that does not mean that Linux systems are not vulnerable.
Similar code, without Olaf Firch's fixes,
is in the glibc getnetbyXXX functions.
These functions are described in the SuSE alert as
"
used by very few applications only, such as ifconfig and ifuser,
which makes exploits less likely."
CERT Advisory: CA-2002-19
Buffer Overflow in Multiple DNS Resolver Libraries
CAN-2002-0651
CAN-2002-0684 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Canna server: exploitable buffer overrun
| Package(s): | canna |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1158
CAN-2002-1159
|
| Created: | December 10, 2002 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Canna is a kana-kanji conversion server which is necessary for Japanese
language character input.
A buffer overflow bug in the Canna server up to and including version 3.5b2
allows a local user to gain the privileges of the user 'bin' which could
lead to further exploits. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
(cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2002-1158 to this issue.
A lack of validation of requests has been found that affects Canna version
3.6 and earlier. A malicious remote user could exploit this vulnerability
to leak information, or cause a denial of service attack. (CAN-2002-1159)
See also
http://canna.sourceforge.jp/sec/Canna-2002-01.txt
CAN-2002-1158
CAN-2002-1159 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
eroaster: insecure temporary file
| Package(s): | eroaster |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0656
|
| Created: | August 19, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in eroaster where it does not take any
security precautions when creating a temporary file for the lockfile. This
vulnerability could be exploited to overwrite arbitrary files with the
privileges of the user running eroaster.
CAN-2003-0656 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
ethereal: security problems in Ethereal 0.9.12
| Package(s): | ethereal |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0428
CAN-2003-0429
CAN-2003-0431
CAN-2003-0432
|
| Created: | June 23, 2003 |
Updated: | November 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several security problems have been found in Ethereal
0.9.12. "It may be possible to make Ethereal crash or run
arbitrary code by injecting a purposefully malformed packet onto the wire,
or by convincing someone to read a malformed packet trace file." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
exim: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | exim exim-tls |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0743
|
| Created: | September 4, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
A buffer overflow exists in exim, which is the standard mail transport
agent in Debian. By supplying a specially crafted HELO or EHLO
command, an attacker could cause a constant string to be written past
the end of a buffer allocated on the heap. This vulnerability is not
believed at this time to be exploitable to execute arbitrary code.
CAN-2003-0743 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Filename disclosure vulnerability in fam
| Package(s): | fam |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0875
|
| Created: | August 19, 2002 |
Updated: | January 5, 2005 |
| Description: |
"fam" (file alteration monitor) watches files and directories for changes and lets interested applications know when something happens. This package has a flaw in its group handling that blocks some legitimate operations while, at the same time, exposing the names of files that should otherwise be invisible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fdclone: insecure temporary directory
| Package(s): | fdclone |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0596
|
| Created: | July 23, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
fdclone creates a temporary directory in /tmp as a workspace.
However, if this directory already exists, the existing directory is
used instead, regardless of its ownership or permissions. This would
allow an attacker to gain access to fdclone's temporary files and
their contents, or replace them with other files under the attacker's
control.
CAN-2003-0596 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fetchmail: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | fetchmail |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1365
|
| Created: | December 17, 2002 |
Updated: | October 20, 2003 |
| Description: |
Versions of fetchmail prior to 6.2.0 have (yet another) buffer overflow vulnerability which can be exploited remotely via a suitably crafted message. See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
freesweep: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | freesweep |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0828
|
| Created: | October 1, 2003 |
Updated: | October 1, 2003 |
| Description: |
freesweep contains a buffer overflow vulnerability which may be exploited by a local user to obtain access to the "games" group. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: DNS stub resolvers contain buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1146
|
| Created: | November 7, 2002 |
Updated: | February 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
DNS stub resolvers from multiple vendors contain a buffer overflow
vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability appears to be limited to
denial of service. (See CERT Vulnerability Note
VU#738331)
The BIND 4 and BIND 8.2.x stub resolver libraries, and other libraries such
as glibc 2.2.5 and earlier, libc, and libresolv, uses the maximum buffer
size instead of the actual size when processing a DNS response, which
causes the stub resolvers to read past the actual boundary ("read buffer
overflow"), allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gnupg: key validation
| Package(s): | gnupg |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0255
|
| Created: | May 15, 2003 |
Updated: | November 17, 2003 |
| Description: |
A key validation bug was discovered in the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) which
would cause keys with more then one user ID to trust all user ID's with the
amount of trust given to the most-valid user ID. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash
| Package(s): | gtkhtml |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0133
CAN-2003-0541
|
| Created: | April 14, 2003 |
Updated: | April 18, 2005 |
| Description: |
GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.
GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug
when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed
messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
KDE: Two issues in KDM
| Package(s): | kde, xfree86 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0690
CAN-2003-0692
|
| Created: | September 16, 2003 |
Updated: | December 19, 2003 |
| Description: |
According to this advisory two issues have
been discovered in KDM:
- CAN-2003-0690: Privilege escalation with specific PAM modules. The XDM display manager that ships with XFree86 prior to 4.3 is also vulnerable.
- CAN-2003-0692: Session cookies generated by KDM are potentially insecure
All versions of KDM as distributed with KDE up to and including KDE 3.1.3
are affected. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel-utils: setuid vulnerability
| Package(s): | kernel-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0019
|
| Created: | February 7, 2003 |
Updated: | January 21, 2005 |
| Description: |
The kernel-utils package contains several utilities that can be used to
control the kernel or machine hardware. In Red Hat Linux 8.0 this package
contains user mode linux (UML) utilities.
The uml_net utility in kernel-utils packages with Red Hat Linux 8.0 was
incorrectly shipped setuid root. This could allow local users to control
certain network interfaces, add and remove arp entries and routes, and put
interfaces in and out of promiscuous mode.
All users of the kernel-utils package should update to these packages that
contain a version of uml_net that is not setuid root.
Alternatively, as a work-around to this vulnerability issue the following
command as root:
chmod -s /usr/bin/uml_net |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libpam-smb: exploitable buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libpam-smb, pam-smb |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0686
|
| Created: | August 26, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
libpam-smb is a PAM authentication module which makes it possible to
authenticate users against a password database managed by Samba or a
Microsoft Windows server. If a long password is supplied, this can cause a
buffer overflow which could be exploited to execute arbitrary code with the
privileges of the process which invokes PAM services. See this advisory for more information.
CAN-2003-0686 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
libpng, libpng3: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libpng, libpng3 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1363
|
| Created: | December 19, 2002 |
Updated: | July 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
Glenn Randers-Pehrson discovered a problem in connection with 16-bit
samples from libpng, an interface for reading and writing PNG
(Portable Network Graphics) format files. The starting offsets for
the loops are calculated incorrectly which causes a buffer overrun
beyond the beginning of the row buffer. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
lsh: remotely exploitable buffer overflow
| Package(s): | lsh |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0831
|
| Created: | October 1, 2003 |
Updated: | October 1, 2003 |
| Description: |
lsh (an ssh implementation) 1.5.2 and prior has a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability; see this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
lynx: CRLF injection vulnerability
| Package(s): | lynx |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1405
|
| Created: | November 19, 2002 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
If lynx is given a url with some special characters on the command line, it
will include faked headers in the HTTP query. This feature can be used to
force scripts (that use Lynx for downloading files) to access the wrong
site on a web server with multiple virtual hosts.
CAN-2002-1405 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
marbles: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | marbles |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0830
|
| Created: | October 1, 2003 |
Updated: | October 1, 2003 |
| Description: |
The 'marbles' game contains a buffer overflow in its processing of the HOME environment variable. A local user can exploit this vulnerability to obtain access to the "games" group. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mikmod: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | mikmod |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0427
|
| Created: | June 16, 2003 |
Updated: | June 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Ingo Saitz discovered a bug in mikmod whereby a long filename inside
an archive file can overflow a buffer when the archive is being read
by mikmod. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mindi: insecure file creations
| Package(s): | mindi |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0617
|
| Created: | September 2, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Mindi versions prior to 0.86 creates files in /tmp which could allow local
user to overwrite arbitrary files.
CAN-2003-0617 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mplayer: remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | mplayer |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0835
|
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | April 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability was found in
MPlayer. A malicious host can craft a harmful ASX header, and trick MPlayer
into executing arbitrary code upon parsing that header. Read the full advisory
for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mysql: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | mysql |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0780
|
| Created: | September 15, 2003 |
Updated: | October 9, 2003 |
| Description: |
Frank Denis
reported a vulnerability in MySQL affecting MySQL3 versions 3.0.57 and
earlier and MySQL4 versions 4.0.14 and earlier. Passwords of MySQL users
are stored in the "Password" field of the "User" table, part of the "mysql"
database. The passwords are hashed and stored as a 16 characters long
hexadecimal value. Unfortunately, a function involved in password checking
misses correct bounds checking. By filling a "Password" field a value
wider than 16 characters, a buffer overflow will occur. The Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2003-0780 to the problem. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Nessus NASL scripting engine security issues
| Package(s): | nessus |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 27, 2003 |
Updated: | August 12, 2004 |
| Description: |
Some some vulnerabilities exsist in the Nessus NASL scripting engine. To
exploit these flaws, an attacker would need to have a valid Nessus account
as well as the ability to upload arbitrary Nessus plugins in the Nessus
server (this option is disabled by default) or he/she would need to trick a
user somehow into running a specially crafted nasl script. Read the full
advisory for additional information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
netris: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | netris |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0685
|
| Created: | August 18, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Shaun Colley discovered a buffer overflow vulnerability in netris, a
network version of a popular puzzle game. A netris client connecting
to an untrusted netris server could be sent an unusually long data
packet, which would be copied into a fixed-length buffer without
bounds checking. This vulnerability could be exploited to gain the
priviliges of the user running netris in client mode, if they connect
to a hostile netris server.
CAN-2003-0685 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
net-snmp: denial of service vulnerability
| Package(s): | net-snmp |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1170
|
| Created: | December 17, 2002 |
Updated: | November 7, 2003 |
| Description: |
The SNMP daemon included in the Net-SNMP package versions 5.0.1 through
5.0.4 can be caused to crash if it is sent a specially crafted packet. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug
| Package(s): | nfs-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0252
|
| Created: | July 14, 2003 |
Updated: | March 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
Linux NFS utils package contains remotely exploitable off-by-one bug.
A local or remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending
specially crafted request to rpc.mountd daemon. See this BugTraq post for more details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openssh: multilple PAM vulnerabilities in Portable OpenSSH versions 3.7p1
and 3.7.1p1
| Package(s): | openssh |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | September 23, 2003 |
Updated: | October 1, 2003 |
| Description: |
Portable OpenSSH versions 3.7p1 and 3.7.1p1 contain multiple
vulnerabilities in the new PAM code. At least one of these bugs is remotely
exploitable (under a non-standard configuration, with privsep disabled).
See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
openssh: timing attack leads to information disclosure
| Package(s): | openssh |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0190
|
| Created: | May 2, 2003 |
Updated: | November 30, 2004 |
| Description: |
From the advisory:
"During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable
with PAM support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This
bug allows a remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems,
through a simple timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and
may have high severity, if combined with poor password policies and other
security problems that allow local privilege escalation." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
OpenSSH: buffer management error
| Package(s): | OpenSSH |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0693
|
| Created: | September 16, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
All versions of
OpenSSH's sshd prior to 3.7.1 contain a buffer management error. It is
uncertain whether these errors are exploitable. Note that most distributors have issued two updates, since the first fix was found to be incomplete.
See the second advisory for details.
CAN-2003-0693 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openssl: vulnerabilities in ASN.1 code
| Package(s): | openssl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0543
CAN-2003-0544
CAN-2003-0545
|
| Created: | September 30, 2003 |
Updated: | November 4, 2003 |
| Description: |
Vulnerabilities have been found in OpenSSL ASN.1 code. This advisory contains details of 4 separate
problems in versions of OpenSSL up to and including 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b and
all versions of SSLeay.
An attack against other applications that use OpenSSL could result in a
Denial of Service. See
CAN-2003-0543 and
CAN-2003-0544.
It may be possible for an attacker to exploit this issue to execute
arbitrary code. See
CAN-2003-0545.
CERT has an updated OpenSSL advisory
identifying additional OpenSSL vulnerabilities. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
pam-pgsql: format string vulnerability
| Package(s): | pam-pgsql |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0672
|
| Created: | August 11, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Florian Zumbiehl reported a vulnerability in pam-pgsql whereby the
username to be used for authentication is used as a format string when
writing a log message. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to
execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the program requesting
PAM authentication.
CAN-2003-0672 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
perl: cross site scripting vulnerability in CGI.pm module
| Package(s): | perl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0615
|
| Created: | July 29, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
obscure@eyeonsecurity.org reported a
cross site scripting vulnerability in the CGI.pm perl module. This module
is used to facilitate the creation of web forms and is part of the
perl-modules RPM package.
CAN-2003-0615 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
PHP: vulnerability in mail function
| Package(s): | php |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0985
CAN-2002-0986
|
| Created: | November 13, 2002 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Two vulnerabilities exists in the mail() PHP function. The first one allows
the execution of any program/script bypassing safe_mode restriction, the
second one may give an open-relay script if the mail() function is not
carefully used in PHP scripts. See this Bugtraq
report for more details. Note that this is a different vulnerability than the previous PHP mail() problem, which affected versions through 4.1.0.
CAN-2002-0985
CAN-2002-0986 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
phpgroupware - cross-site scripting and other exploits
| Package(s): | phpgroupware |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0504
CAN-2003-0582
|
| Created: | July 16, 2003 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several vulnerabilities were discovered in all versions of phpgroupware
prior to 0.9.14.006. This latest version fixes an exploitable condition in
all versions that can be exploited remotely without authentication and can
lead to arbitrary code execution on the web server. This vulnerability is
being actively exploited.
Version 0.9.14.005 fixed several other vulnerabilities including cross-site
scripting issues that can be exploited to obtain sensitive information such
as authentication cookies.
See this
Security Corportation report for more information.
CAN-2003-0504
CAN-2003-0582 |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
postfix: denial of service vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | postfix |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0468
CAN-2003-0540
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | May 27, 2004 |
| Description: |
The postfix MTA, versions through 1.1.12 (but not 2.0) is subject to two remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerabilities; see this advisory from Michal Zalewski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
PostgreSQL - more buffer overflows
| Package(s): | postgresql |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | February 12, 2003 |
Updated: | November 7, 2003 |
| Description: |
A new set of buffer overflows has been discovered in PostgreSQL 7.2.2; they affect the circle_poly(), path_encode(), and path_addr() functions. Exploiting these overflows requires that the attacker first obtain a connection to the PostgreSQL server. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
proftpd: remote root shell
| Package(s): | proftpd |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0831
|
| Created: | September 24, 2003 |
Updated: | January 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
The ASCII translation mechanism in ProFTPD 1.2.8 contains a vulnerability which will provide a remote attacker with a root shell - if the attacker is able to download a specially-crafted file. See this ISS advisory for more information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (2 posted)
Local arbitrary code execution vulnerability in Python
| Package(s): | python |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1119
|
| Created: | August 28, 2002 |
Updated: | September 30, 2003 |
| Description: |
Zack Weinberg discovered that
os._execvpe from os.py uses a predictable name which could lead
to execution of arbitrary code. According to the Debian
advisory, the problem
was present in Python versions 1.5, 2.1 and 2.2.
|