Examining an attack on the GPL
On November 21, a law firm called Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C saw fit
to issue
a
press release on the evils of the GPL. By the reckoning of Steve
Henry, a "senior intellectual property lawyer" with the firm, the GPL is
indeed scary:
This "time bomb" lurks because a popular license for open source,
the GNU General Public License, (GPL) is "viral." The license
attaches to any product with GPL-licensed code, including a
derivative work, he said. The entire software package becomes open
source and the company thus must distribute it freely and let
anyone copy it. A widely used open-source utility, for instance,
could "infect" hundreds of software products and destroy their
commercial value.
We found this reading of the GPL to be interesting, so we asked Mr. Henry
to explain his reasoning a bit. We thank him for getting back to us; for
the curious, we have put his full response
on a separate page. We'll
just look at the core of his claims here. What Mr. Henry tells us is:
Those who portray the GPL as an entirely innocent and voluntary
instrument take a simplistic view of the GPL itself as well as of
both copyright law and contract law. They often project onto
others the benevolent behaviors and actions they attribute to
themselves. The problem is that others are not always so benevolent
and if the GPL is an enforceable contract, then it may not only be
enforceable by the licensor, but also by third-party beneficiaries
(under at least some conditions).
So, if you see the GPL as a contract, those who have received GPL-licensed
software can enforce that contract's provisions against you. How could
that be a problem? According to Mr. Henry:
So, if a company downloads a GPL product, and incorporates it into
the company's product in such a way that the company's product is
considered a "derived" work or a work "containing" the downloaded
code, not only is the company obligated to use the GPL to
distribute its product, but also it is obligated not to charge. And
its licensees automatically receive a license under GPL terms for
the original code. If the company uses a different license (a) it
could be liable for copyright infringement, (b) it could be liable
for breach of contract, and (c) it could be subject to a court
order for "specific enforcement" of the GPL obligation to
distribute the derivative work under the GPL. The licensor of the
downloaded code could enforce the GPL, as might a licensee of the
company (as a third-party beneficiary).
Mr. Henry's point (a) is not controversial; if you use copyrighted work in
violation of the license that applies to that work, you are infringing the
copyright. There is nothing unique to the GPL there. Point (c) is the
crux of the matter: Mr. Henry claims that, if you distribute a product
containing GPL-licensed code, anybody receiving that code could sue to have
your proprietary code relicensed. The fact that nobody has ever
attempted to do this is irrelevant by this analysis; in the future somebody
could make a try at it.
One could argue that, even if this reasoning holds, there is no real
problem here. If a company does not wish to abide by the terms of the GPL,
it should simply avoid incorporating GPL-licensed code into its products.
Once again, the GPL does not differ from any other software license in this
regard: if you do not like the license, nobody forces you to use the code.
But the fact is that, by this argument, GPL-licensed code is more actively
dangerous than other code. If you get caught using somebody's proprietary
code, all you have to do is settle the copyright infringement claims and
get on with life. With GPL-licensed code, you still have the infringement
issue, but you could also be forced to give your proprietary products
away. That would be a heavy price for a company to pay just because one of
its employees slips some GPL-licensed code into its product.
But does this reasoning hold water? We dropped a note to FSF counsel Eben
Moglen to get his opinion on Mr. Henry's argument. His response was:
So far as "specific performance" is concerned, there is *no* legal
support for the claim. "Specific performance" is the name of a
contract remedy; the GPL is not a contract. In the event of
copyright infringement the relevant possible remedies are: (1)
damages, actual or statutory; and (2) an injunction to prohibit
infringing distribution.
If the GPL is not a contract, what is it? If you look at §106 of the
U.S. copyright code, it states:
Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; ...
One of the rights given to copyright holders is to authorize others to
create copies and derivative works. The GPL is that authorization: you
have the right to create certain kinds of copies and derived products from
GPL-licensed code. You have not signed a contract with the copyright
holder, and you have not paid any sort of consideration, which is a
required part of any legal contract. So you, as the recipient of
GPL-licensed code, do not have any contract rights against those who
distributed that code to you. Even the copyright holder lacks such rights,
though the holder does have the right to claim infringement if the
provisions of the GPL are not followed.
Mr. Moglen concluded with: "This talk about 'incorporating' GPL'd
code in a product leading to forcing the rest of the product open is
scare-mongering." We are inclined to agree. Anybody who is truly
concerned about such issues, however, should discuss it with their own
lawyer rather than taking our word for it.
Comments (55 posted)
Lawyers in charge
Anybody following the SCO Group story is aware that, in the last couple of
weeks, the company has issued a new set of threats. Among other things,
SCO claims that it will, soon, file suit against at least one Linux user.
It is tempting to disregard these threats as just more bluster coming out
of the company. Threats against other Unix vendors have failed to come to
pass, the deadline for the company's "half-price Linux License" promotion
continues to recede, the flood of invoices they promised us never appeared,
etc. Why should things be different this time? When the weakness of SCO's
case and the fact that a copyright suit would require a rather more
straightforward unveiling of the company's evidence is considered, more
lawsuits may seem unlikely.
There is, however, a recent
Gartner Group pronouncement which is relevant here:
SCO has declared in filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission that its competitive position could decline if the
company can't obtain additional financing. The latest share issue
will dilute shareholders' investments about 3.5 percent. It comes
on top of a previously announced arrangement giving Boies, Schiller
& Flexner a 20-percent share in SCO if the company were sold. SCO
also received an investment of $50 million from BayStar Capital in
return for 17.5 percent of outstanding shares. We believe that
these moves compromise SCO's mission as a software
company. Increasingly, the legal and financial aspects of the
intellectual property infringement cases will absorb the company's
attention, and a law firm will be in an increasingly powerful
position to set the overall agenda for its compensation. Therefore,
SCO will likely pursue claims against Linux users quickly.
Of course, one could rephrase the above more succinctly: the company has no
revenue stream and the lawyers are running the show. SCO has no real
alternatives to income from litigation at this point, and its lawyers have
nothing to lose from filing more lawsuits.
Gartner could be right: SCO might indeed try to open up more legal
fronts in the near future.
If the company chooses its
targets carefully, it might just succeed in finding one that will decide to
settle rather than get involved in a long intellectual property case.
Or so SCO management must hope.
At this point, however, there is enough
information about the company's claims out there that any SCO target which
takes the time to research the situation may well turn out to be less of a
pushover than SCO might wish. In fact, as SCO carries out its search for
the softest targets, chances are good it will pass over any company which
makes it clear that it will fight back. Potential recipients of SCO
licensing claims would do well to bear that in mind.
Comments (7 posted)
The CAN-SPAM bill examined
The U.S. House of Representatives passed a version of the "Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003," on
Saturday. Commonly referred to as the "CAN-SPAM" bill, the House agreed on
a version of the bill very similar to the bill passed by the Senate in
October. This makes it likely (but not certain) that the U.S. will soon
have a national law governing unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) -- better
known as "spam" (or any number of less polite terms) by the rest of us.
Very few outside of the Washington beltway or the Direct Marketing
Association (DMA) seem convinced that the CAN-SPAM bill is going to put a
halt to spam. A number of people, including
several state Attorneys General have argued that CAN-SPAM will make
matters worse, rather than better. There is a fair amount of evidence to
support this opinion.
The CAN-SPAM bill actually has the effect of legitimizing spam so long as
it is non-fraudulent and provides the recipient with a means to "opt-out"
of future e-mails. This is a big win for the DMA, and a major loss for the
rest of us. Having to opt-out of receiving spam from each and every
"legitimate" source of spam is a burden that should not be placed on the
user. Given that there are thousands of legitimate businesses that will
seek to make use of e-mail marketing, users are going to be doing a lot of
opting out.
What about a "do-not-spam" list? The CAN-SPAM Act does contain a provision
to create a national "do-not-spam" list. This can only be seen as a
tactical error of gargantuan proportions. While a "do-not-call" list may
succeed in reducing or eliminating unwanted telemarketing calls, spammers
operating beyond U.S. borders are unlikely to be deterred by the CAN-SPAM
provisions. Indeed, getting a copy of the the "do-not-spam" list will
likely be a high priority for offshore spammers looking for a
roster of known-good e-mail addresses. Users who place their e-mail
addresses on a "do-not-spam" list may avoid spam from legitimate
businesses, but will still find themselves subjected to unwanted e-mail
from offshore spammers. Happily, the CAN-SPAM bill does not require the
Federal Trade Commission to create a "do-not-spam" list, it only permits
the creation of such a list. Given that the FTC has objected to this
provision, implementation seems unlikely.
Even worse, the bill overrides state legislation that may be more stringent
than the CAN-SPAM bill. This is presented as a solution to the difficulty
for "law-abiding businesses" to comply with anti-spam laws, but complying
with multiple state laws is a cost of doing business. This should not be an
excuse to shift the burden to users and organizations rather than
businesses seeking to advertise their goods or services. By overriding
state laws that require "opt-in" rather than "opt-out," the CAN-SPAM Act is
giving merchants free reign to send unwanted spam, at least until the user
asks to be left alone. While one may argue that any laws against spam are
unlikely to be effective, at least laws like those passed in California are
stacked in favor of the user rather than the spammers.
Some have claimed that the CAN-SPAM Act may make anonymous e-mails illegal
altogether. John Gilmore argues
that the bill would make it a crime "to use any false or misleading
information in a domain name or email account application, and then send an
email." However, this is a somewhat liberal interpretation of the bill,
which actually says:
Whoever, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly...
(3) materially falsifies header information in multiple commercial electronic messages and intentionally initiates the transmission of such messages,
(4) registers, using information that materially falsifies the identity of the actual registrant, for 5 or more electronic mail accounts or online user accounts or 2 or more domain names, and intentionally initiates the transmission of multiple commercial electronic mail messages...
A close reading of this language indicates that merely sending an anonymous
e-mail or e-mail with a falsified header would not automatically be a
crime. The provisions only apply to those "in or affecting" commerce, which
would seem to exclude a user who sends an anonymous e-mail for
non-commercial purposes. It might be that the language could be abused to
include someone who has sent an anonymous e-mail that may have some impact
on a business, perhaps a whistleblower or disgruntled customer sending out
negative commentary about a company, but then the user would have to send a
relatively large number of e-mails. Further on, the bill classifies
"multiple" as "more than 100 electronic mail messages during a 24-hour
period," up to 10,000 during a 1-year period.
Unlike some of the state laws, which allow users to sue spammers directly,
the CAN-SPAM Act seems to put users at the mercy of others to take action
against spammers who do not comply. The Act explicitly addresses the
ability of state and federal agencies to prosecute spammers under the
provisions of the Act, and provides authorization for ISPs to bring action
against spammers.
There are a few good things about the CAN-SPAM Act. The bill specifically
states that nothing in the bill requires an ISP to carry or deliver
spam. This prevents spammers from claiming that an ISP is in any way
required to deliver spam, even if it is explicitly legal. The bill also
contains a provision that allows the court to force a spammer to pay legal
fees for the party that initiates proceedings. This may make it more likely
that prosecutors will take on spammers who violate provisions of the bill.
CAN-SPAM also makes it illegal to for spammers to use open relays or other
methods of hijacking computers to send spam, and requires a working method
to opt-out of e-mail. Again, these provisions are unlikely to deter
offshore spammers, but the provisions are welcome nonetheless.
Finally, the bill provides for vendor liability. This means that if a
vendor contracts with a third party to send e-mail on their behalf, the
vendor can be held liable for failure to comply with the CAN-SPAM
provisions. This prevents companies from contracting with offshore
spammers to escape legal liability.
In all, however, the CAN-SPAM Act is disappointing legislation. It fails to
affirm users' rights to consent to e-mail marketing, and instead burdens
them with the responsibility of opting out of unwanted marketing. The bill
will negate tougher state laws against spam that have the backing of the
general populace in favor of weakened provisions that are backed by
lobbyists. After more than six years of Congressional foot-dragging, we
will likely be stuck with a law that does little good, and may even serve
to exacerbate the problem. It may well be that the spam problem is not
solvable by legislation, but, even if it is, the CAN-SPAM act is not the
law we need.
(For those who are interested, the full text of the proposed law is
available in PDF
format.)
Comments (21 posted)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Security
Security news
Infrastructural attacks on free software
The recent compromise of several Debian servers has been well publicized.
It appears that the Debian archive was unaffected, and Debian users need
not be worried about malware entering their systems by that path.
Certainly this event, like the recent kernel backdoor attempt, has raised
awareness of the vulnerability of our software repositories. An attacker
who is able to slip a bit of evil code into the wrong place could
compromise many thousands of systems.
Less attention has been paid to the cost of having the Debian servers be
unavailable for the better part of a week. Your editor, waiting for a
working version of psycopg to be uploaded to unstable, was merely
inconvenienced. Other users, who may have planned significant
installations or upgrades, or who were trying to discuss problems with
Debian developers will have been rather more inconvenienced. Debian
developers, trying to get 3.0r2 out the door, were stopped dead for a
while. These consequences are costly enough by themselves, but consider
what could happen. Had a major
security incident broken out while the Debian servers were unavailable, it
would have been difficult or impossible for the project to respond
quickly.
Linux systems are living things; even the most stable systems need
occasional updates to stay secure. Linux users depend on the availability
of their distributions' supporting infrastructure to keep their systems up
to date. This sort of attack, by making that infrastructure unavailable,
hurts users worldwide, and could leave them unable to respond quickly to
serious security problems. Once again, we have been warned that our
infrastructure is too fragile and insufficiently secure.
Comments (17 posted)
New vulnerabilities
iproute: local denial of service
| Package(s): | iproute net-tools |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0856
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | December 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
The iproute utility is susceptible to spoofed netlink messages sent by local users, with the result that denial of service attacks are possible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
opera buffer overflows
| Package(s): | opera |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0870
|
| Created: | November 20, 2003 |
Updated: | November 24, 2003 |
| Description: |
The Opera browser can cause a buffer allocated on the heap to overflow under
certain HREFs when rendering HTML. The mail system is also deemed vulnerable
and an attacker can send an email containing a malformed HREF, or plant the
malicious HREF on a web site. Please see this
advisory for further details. These vulnerabilities are fixed in Opera
7.22. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Pan: denial of service
| Package(s): | Pan |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0855
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | December 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
Pan is a Gnome/GTK+ newsreader. A bug in Pan versions prior to 0.13.4 can
cause Pan to crash when parsing an article header containing a very long
author email address. This bug causes a crash (denial of service) but is
not further exploitable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
phpSysInfo directory traversal
| Package(s): | phpsysinfo |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0536
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | November 25, 2003 |
| Description: |
phpSysInfo contains two vulnerabilities which could allow local files to be
read or arbitrary PHP code to be executed, under the privileges of the web
server process. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
2.4 kernel - several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | 2.4 kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0461
CAN-2003-0462
CAN-2003-0464
CAN-2003-0476
CAN-2003-0501
CAN-2003-0550
CAN-2003-0551
CAN-2003-0552
|
| Created: | July 21, 2003 |
Updated: | December 23, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several security issues have been discovered affecting the Linux kernel:
-
CAN-2003-0461: /proc/tty/driver/serial reveals the exact character
counts for serial links. This could be used by a local attacker to infer
password lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password entry.
-
CAN-2003-0462: Paul Starzetz discovered a file read race condition
existing in the execve() system call, which could cause a local crash.
-
CAN-2003-0464: A recent change in the RPC code set the reuse flag on
newly-created sockets. Olaf Kirch noticed that his could allow normal
users to bind to UDP ports used for services such as nfsd.
-
CAN-2003-0476: The execve system call in Linux 2.4.x records the file
descriptor of the executable process in the file table of the calling
process, allowing local users to gain read access to restricted file
descriptors.
-
CAN-2003-0501: The /proc filesystem in Linux allows local users to
obtain sensitive information by opening various entries in /proc/self
before executing a setuid program. This causes the program to fail to
change the ownership and permissions of already opened entries.
-
CAN-2003-0550: The STP protocol is known to have no security, which
could allow attackers to alter the bridge topology. STP is now turned
off by default.
-
CAN-2003-0551: STP input processing was lax in its length checking,
which could lead to a denial of service.
-
CAN-2003-0552: Jerry Kreuscher discovered that the Forwarding table
could be spoofed by sending forged packets with bogus source addresses
the same as the local host.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache: buffer overflows in mod_alias, mod_rewrite
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0542
CAN-2003-0789
|
| Created: | October 28, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
André Malo discovered
buffer overflows in the mod_alias and mod_rewrite modules of the Apache
webserver. These occurred if a regular expression with more than 9
capturing parenthesis was configured. To exploit this, an attacker would
need to be able to locally create a carefully crafted configuration file
(.htaccess or httpd.conf).
CAN-2003-0542
Another buffer overflow in Apache 2.0.47 and earlier in mod_cgid's
mishandling of CGI redirect paths could result in CGI output going to the
wrong client when a threaded MPM is used.
CAN-2003-0789. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache2: Denial of Service vulnerability
| Package(s): | apache2 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | March 25, 2004 |
| Description: |
A problem was discovered in Apache2 where CGI scripts that write more than
4k to the standard error stream will hang the script's execution. This problem can lead to a
denial of service situation. See this bug
report for additional details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
CUPS: denial of service
| Package(s): | CUPS |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0788
|
| Created: | November 3, 2003 |
Updated: | March 4, 2004 |
| Description: |
Paul Mitcheson reported a situation where the CUPS Internet Printing
Protocol (IPP) implementation in CUPS versions prior to 1.1.19 would get
into a busy loop. This could result in a denial of service. In order to
exploit this bug an attacker would need to have the ability to make a TCP
connection to the IPP port (by default 631).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
epic4: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | epic4 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0328
|
| Created: | November 10, 2003 |
Updated: | November 25, 2003 |
| Description: |
Jeremy Nelson discovered a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in
EPIC4, a popular client for Internet Relay Chat (IRC). A malicious
server could craft a reply which triggers the client to allocate a
negative amount of memory. This could lead to a denial of service if
the client only crashes, but may also lead to executing of arbitrary
code under the user id of the chatting user. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
ethereal: multiple remote and local vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | ethereal |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0925
CAN-2003-0926
CAN-2003-0927
|
| Created: | November 10, 2003 |
Updated: | December 17, 2003 |
| Description: |
Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in
ethereal versions below 0.9.16. Remote attackers can craft
packets, and local users can build corrupt trace files,
resulting denial of service and remote code execution. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Filename disclosure vulnerability in fam
| Package(s): | fam |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0875
|
| Created: | August 19, 2002 |
Updated: | January 5, 2005 |
| Description: |
"fam" (file alteration monitor) watches files and directories for changes and lets interested applications know when something happens. This package has a flaw in its group handling that blocks some legitimate operations while, at the same time, exposing the names of files that should otherwise be invisible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fetchmail may crash on specially crafted message
| Package(s): | fetchmail |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0792
|
| Created: | October 16, 2003 |
Updated: | April 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
A bug was discovered in fetchmail 6.2.4 where a specially crafted email
message can cause fetchmail to crash.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fileutils/wu-ftpd: denial of service
| Package(s): | fileutils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0854
|
| Created: | October 22, 2003 |
Updated: | March 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
There is, it seems, an integer overflow vulnerability in "ls" which can be exploited via wu-ftpd to create a denial of service situation. See this advisory from Georgi Guninski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc - buffer overflow
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0689
|
| Created: | October 15, 2003 |
Updated: | November 25, 2003 |
| Description: |
The GNU C library contains a buffer overflow in the getgrouplist() function. If the user belongs to more groups than the calling application expects, the allocated storage will be overrun. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: local DoS vulnerability
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0859
|
| Created: | November 14, 2003 |
Updated: | November 18, 2003 |
| Description: |
Herbert Xu reported that various applications can accept spoofed messages
sent on the kernel netlink interface by other users on the local machine.
This could lead to a local denial of service attack. The glibc function
getifaddrs uses netlink and could therefore be vulnerable to this issue.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has
assigned the name CAN-2003-0859 to this issue. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: DNS stub resolvers contain buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1146
|
| Created: | November 7, 2002 |
Updated: | February 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
DNS stub resolvers from multiple vendors contain a buffer overflow
vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability appears to be limited to
denial of service. (See CERT Vulnerability Note
VU#738331)
The BIND 4 and BIND 8.2.x stub resolver libraries, and other libraries such
as glibc 2.2.5 and earlier, libc, and libresolv, uses the maximum buffer
size instead of the actual size when processing a DNS response, which
causes the stub resolvers to read past the actual boundary ("read buffer
overflow"), allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gnupg: key validation
| Package(s): | gnupg |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0255
|
| Created: | May 15, 2003 |
Updated: | November 17, 2003 |
| Description: |
A key validation bug was discovered in the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) which
would cause keys with more then one user ID to trust all user ID's with the
amount of trust given to the most-valid user ID. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash
| Package(s): | gtkhtml |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0133
CAN-2003-0541
|
| Created: | April 14, 2003 |
Updated: | April 18, 2005 |
| Description: |
GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.
GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug
when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed
messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
hylafax: remote code execution
| Package(s): | hylafax |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0886
|
| Created: | November 10, 2003 |
Updated: | November 20, 2003 |
| Description: |
Hylafax is an Open Source fax server
which allows sharing of fax equipment among computers by offering its
service to clients by a protocol similar to FTP. The SuSE Security Team
found a format bug condition during a code review of the hfaxd server. It
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code as root. However, the bug
can not be triggered in hylafax's default configuration. The
"capi4hylafax" packages also need to be updated as a dependency where they
are available. Upgrading to version 4.1.8 fixes the problem; see this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
KDE: Two issues in KDM
| Package(s): | kde, xfree86 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0690
CAN-2003-0692
|
| Created: | September 16, 2003 |
Updated: | December 19, 2003 |
| Description: |
According to this advisory two issues have
been discovered in KDM:
- CAN-2003-0690: Privilege escalation with specific PAM modules. The XDM display manager that ships with XFree86 prior to 4.3 is also vulnerable.
- CAN-2003-0692: Session cookies generated by KDM are potentially insecure
All versions of KDM as distributed with KDE up to and including KDE 3.1.3
are affected. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel-utils: setuid vulnerability
| Package(s): | kernel-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0019
|
| Created: | February 7, 2003 |
Updated: | January 21, 2005 |
| Description: |
The kernel-utils package contains several utilities that can be used to
control the kernel or machine hardware. In Red Hat Linux 8.0 this package
contains user mode linux (UML) utilities.
The uml_net utility in kernel-utils packages with Red Hat Linux 8.0 was
incorrectly shipped setuid root. This could allow local users to control
certain network interfaces, add and remove arp entries and routes, and put
interfaces in and out of promiscuous mode.
All users of the kernel-utils package should update to these packages that
contain a version of uml_net that is not setuid root.
Alternatively, as a work-around to this vulnerability issue the following
command as root:
chmod -s /usr/bin/uml_net |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libnids: remotely exploitable buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libnids |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0850
|
| Created: | October 29, 2003 |
Updated: | January 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
libnids (a NIDS plugin which emulates the Linux 2.0 IP stack) contains a buffer overflow vulnerability which can be exploited remotely. Version 1.18 fixes the problem. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libpng, libpng3: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libpng, libpng3 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1363
|
| Created: | December 19, 2002 |
Updated: | July 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
Glenn Randers-Pehrson discovered a problem in connection with 16-bit
samples from libpng, an interface for reading and writing PNG
(Portable Network Graphics) format files. The starting offsets for
the loops are calculated incorrectly which causes a buffer overrun
beyond the beginning of the row buffer. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mikmod: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | mikmod |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0427
|
| Created: | June 16, 2003 |
Updated: | June 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Ingo Saitz discovered a bug in mikmod whereby a long filename inside
an archive file can overflow a buffer when the archive is being read
by mikmod. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
minimalist: unsanitized input
| Package(s): | minimalist |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0902
|
| Created: | November 17, 2003 |
Updated: | November 18, 2003 |
| Description: |
A security-related problem has been discovered in minimalist, a mailing
list manager, which allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary
commands. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mpg123: heap overflow
| Package(s): | mpg123 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0865
|
| Created: | November 12, 2003 |
Updated: | February 19, 2004 |
| Description: |
Versions of mpg123 through 0.59s contain a heap overflow which may be exploited remotely (by a hostile server). See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mplayer: remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | mplayer |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0835
|
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | April 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability was found in
MPlayer. A malicious host can craft a harmful ASX header, and trick MPlayer
into executing arbitrary code upon parsing that header. Read the full advisory
for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Nessus NASL scripting engine security issues
| Package(s): | nessus |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 27, 2003 |
Updated: | August 12, 2004 |
| Description: |
Some some vulnerabilities exsist in the Nessus NASL scripting engine. To
exploit these flaws, an attacker would need to have a valid Nessus account
as well as the ability to upload arbitrary Nessus plugins in the Nessus
server (this option is disabled by default) or he/she would need to trick a
user somehow into running a specially crafted nasl script. Read the full
advisory for additional information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug
| Package(s): | nfs-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0252
|
| Created: | July 14, 2003 |
Updated: | March 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
Linux NFS utils package contains remotely exploitable off-by-one bug.
A local or remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending
specially crafted request to rpc.mountd daemon. See this BugTraq post for more details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openssh: timing attack leads to information disclosure
| Package(s): | openssh |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0190
|
| Created: | May 2, 2003 |
Updated: | November 30, 2004 |
| Description: |
From the advisory:
"During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable
with PAM support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This
bug allows a remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems,
through a simple timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and
may have high severity, if combined with poor password policies and other
security problems that allow local privilege escalation." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
postfix: denial of service vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | postfix |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0468
CAN-2003-0540
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | May 27, 2004 |
| Description: |
The postfix MTA, versions through 1.1.12 (but not 2.0) is subject to two remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerabilities; see this advisory from Michal Zalewski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
proftpd: remote root shell
| Package(s): | proftpd |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0831
|
| Created: | September 24, 2003 |
Updated: | January 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
The ASCII translation mechanism in ProFTPD 1.2.8 contains a vulnerability which will provide a remote attacker with a root shell - if the attacker is able to download a specially-crafted file. See this ISS advisory for more information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (2 posted)
pstack: Buffer overflow
| Package(s): | pstack |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | November 13, 2003 |
Updated: | November 18, 2003 |
| Description: |
pstack dumps a stack trace for a process, given the pid of that process.
Versions prior to 1.2.3 contain a potential buffer overflow vulnerability. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Multiple-use vulnerability in Safe.pm
| Package(s): | Safe.pm |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1323
|
| Created: | October 9, 2002 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
usePerl has a
description of a vulnerability in the Safe.pm Perl module. It seems
that if a Safe compartment is used more than once, it ceases to be safe.
The problem is fixed in Safe 2.08. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
sane-backends: several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | sane-backends |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0773
CAN-2003-0774
CAN-2003-0775
CAN-2003-0776
CAN-2003-0777
CAN-2003-0778
|
| Created: | September 11, 2003 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
Alexander Hvostov, Julien Blache and Aurelien Jarno discovered several
security-related problems in the sane-backends package, which contains
an API library for scanners including a scanning daemon (in the
package libsane) that can be remotely exploited. These problems allow
a remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitrary
amounts of memory. The attack is successful, even if the attacker's
computer isn't listed in saned.conf.
You are only vulnerable if you actually run saned e.g. in xinetd or
inetd. If the entries in the configuration file of xinetd or inetd
respectively are commented out or do not exist, you are safe.
Try "telnet localhost 6566" on the server that may run saned. If you
get "connection refused" saned is not running and you are safe.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the
following problems:
-
CAN-2003-0773: saned checks the identity (IP address) of the remote
host only after the first communication took place (SANE_NET_INIT). So
everyone can send that RPC, even if the remote host is not allowed to
scan (not listed in saned.conf).
-
CAN-2003-0774: saned lacks error checking nearly everywhere in the
code. So connection drops are detected very late. If the drop of the
connection isn't detected, the access to the internal wire buffer leaves
the limits of the allocated memory. So random memory "after" the wire
buffer is read which will be followed by a segmentation fault.
-
CAN-2003-0775: If saned expects strings, it mallocs the memory
necessary to store the complete string after it receives the size of the
string. If the connection was dropped before transmitting the size,
malloc will reserve an arbitrary size of memory. Depending on that size
and the amount of memory available either malloc fails (->saned quits
nicely) or a huge amount of memory is allocated. Swapping and OOM
measures may occur depending on the kernel.
-
CAN-2003-0776: saned doesn't check the validity of the RPC numbers
it gets before getting the parameters.
-
CAN-2003-0777: If debug messages are enabled and a connection is
dropped, non-null-terminated strings may be printed and segmentation
faults may occur.
-
CAN-2003-0778: It's possible to allocate an arbitrary amount of
memory on the server running saned even if the connection isn't dropped.
At the moment this can not easily be fixed according to the author.
Better limit the total amount of memory saned may use (ulimit).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
sendmail: remotely exploitable buffer overflow
| Package(s): | sendmail |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0694
CAN-2003-0681
|
| Created: | September 17, 2003 |
Updated: | November 18, 2003 |
| Description: |
Michal Zalewski has reported a buffer overflow in sendmail. This overflow, apparently, may be exploited remotely, but only in certain (non-default) configurations. Sendmail 8.12.10 has the fix. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
stunnel: signal handler reentrancy DoS
| Package(s): | stunnel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1563
|
| Created: | July 25, 2003 |
Updated: | November 25, 2003 |
| Description: |
Stunnel is a wrapper for network connections. It can be used to tunnel an
unencrypted network connection over a secure connection (encrypted using
SSL or TLS) or to provide a secure means of connecting to services that do
not natively support encryption.
When configured to listen for incoming connections (instead of being
invoked by xinetd), stunnel can be configured to either start a thread or a
child process to handle each new connection. If Stunnel is configured to
start a new child process to handle each connection, it will receive a
SIGCHLD signal when that child exits.
Stunnel versions prior to 4.04 would perform tasks in the SIGCHLD signal
handler which, if interrupted by another SIGCHLD signal, could be unsafe.
This could lead to a denial of service. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
File overwrite vulnerability in tar and unzip
| Package(s): | tar unzip |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2001-1267
CAN-2001-1268
CAN-2001-1269
CAN-2002-0399
|
| Created: | October 1, 2002 |
Updated: | April 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
The tar utility does not properly filter file names containing
"../", meaning that a hostile archive can, if unpacked by an
unsuspecting user, overwrite any file that is writable by that user. GNU
tar versions 1.13.19 and earlier are vulnerable; unzip through version 5.42
has the same vulnerability. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Multiple vendor telnetd vulnerability
| Package(s): | telnet Telnet netkit-telnet-ssl kerberos telnetd netkit-telnet nkitb/nkitserv/telnetd krb5 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 20, 2002 |
Updated: | October 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
This vulnerability,
originally thought to be confined to BSD-derived systems, was first covered
in the July 26th Security
Summary. It is now known that Linux telnet daemons are vulnerable as
well.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
vim - modeline vulnerability
| Package(s): | vim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1377
|
| Created: | January 16, 2003 |
Updated: | February 10, 2004 |
| Description: |
VIM allows a user to set the modeline differently for each edited text file
by placing special comments in the files. Georgi Guninski found that these
comments can be carefully crafted in order to call external programs. This
could allow an attacker to create a text file such that when it is opened
arbitrary commands are executed. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (4 posted)
webmin: session ID spoofing
| Package(s): | webmin |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0101
|
| Created: | June 13, 2003 |
Updated: | November 18, 2003 |
| Description: |
miniserv.pl in the webmin package does not properly handle
metacharacters, such as line feeds and carriage returns, in
Base64-encoded strings used in Basic authentication. This
vulnerability allows remote attackers to spoof a session ID, and
thereby gain root privileges. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
wget: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | wget |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-1565
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | December 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
The wget utility contains a buffer overflow which, when exploited with an over-long URL, can enable arbitrary code execution. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
XFree86 4.3.0 integer overflows in font libraries
| Package(s): | XFree86 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0730
|
| Created: | September 12, 2003 |
Updated: | November 25, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several vulnerabilities were discovered by blexim(at)hush.com in the font
libraries of XFree86 version 4.3.0 and earlier. These bugs could
potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code or a DoS by a remote user
in any way that calls these functions, which are related to the transfer
and enumeration of fonts from font servers to clients. See the
advisory for additional details.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
zebra: denial of service vulnerability
| Package(s): | zebra |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0795
CAN-2003-0858
|
| Created: | November 13, 2003 |
Updated: | January 7, 2004 |
| Description: |
Zebra an open source implementation of TCP/IP routing software.
Jonny Robertson reported that Zebra can be remotely crashed if a Zebra
password has been enabled and a remote attacker can connect to the Zebra
telnet management port. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
(cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0795 to this issue.
Herbert Xu reported that Zebra can accept spoofed messages sent on the
kernel netlink interface by other users on the local machine. This could
lead to a local denial of service attack. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0858 to
this issue. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Resources
Quarterly CERT Summary
The quarterly CERT Summary - which describes the security issues being most
actively exploited - is out. Of the nine vulnerabilities, six affect only
Windows systems. The summary does, however, point out ongoing problems
with OpenSSL, OpenSSH, and sendmail.
Full Story (comments: none)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Kernel development
Release status
Kernel release status
The current development kernel is 2.6.0-test10, finally
released by Linus on November 23. This
patch contains a month's worth of accumulated fixes for serious bugs, and
not a whole lot else. Linus notes that there is still a problem associated
with preemption out there; the kernel preemption code itself is likely not
at fault, but some subsystem or driver out there somewhere is not being
entirely preempt-safe. That problem had not been tracked down as of this
writing.
The long-format changelog contains the
details for the patches incorporated in this release.
Incidentally, -test10 has been dubbed the "stoned beaver" release.
Linus also laid out his thinking for the future:
I'm planning/hoping on basically turning this over to Andrew, and
let him decide to make the final 2.6.0 or not. Timing-wise Andrew
is apparently going to be off for a few weeks, so regardless of
whether this turns out to be rock solid or not, we'll have a few
weeks of final testing before that were to happen. Which means that
I might still end up making a test11 if Andrew hasn't come back and
we find something that warrants it.
Linus's BitKeeper tree holds a small number of additional fixes.
The current stable kernel is 2.4.22, but its time is coming to an
end. Marcelo released 2.4.23-rc3 on
November 21, with the idea that it would become the final release.
Reality dictated otherwise, with the result that 2.4.23-rc4 came out on the 24th, and 2.4.23-rc5 on the 25th. The idea, of course,
is that this one will become the final release; stay tuned.
Comments (none posted)
Kernel development news
BSD security levels for Linux
The Linux Security Module (LSM) patch was intended to enable the creation
of a wide variety of security regimes for Linux systems. So far, the main
user of the LSM functionality has been the NSA SELinux module. But there
are signs that other security-oriented developers are beginning to make use
of LSM to implement different approaches.
The latest such is the BSD Secure Levels
patch posted by Michael Halcrow. This patch is intended to create
something resembling BSD's secure level capability for Linux. Thus it
implements an integer security level, which has useful values of zero to
two. At level zero, the system functions as always - as if the module were
not present at all. Zero is the default level, but the level can be raised
(but not lowered) by writing the new value to /proc/seclvl.
At level one, a number of actions become disallowed, including:
- Tracing the init process.
- Modifying an immutable file.
- Anything involving raw I/O to a device.
- Network administration tasks.
- Changing the user ID of a process.
- Loading or unloading modules.
- Writing directly to a mounted block device.
- Writing to /dev/mem or /dev/kmem.
- Changing the setuid or setgid bits of a file.
At security level two, a few additional actions are prohibited:
- Changing the system time - but only if you are trying to set it
backward.
- Writing to any block device, whether mounted or not.
- Unmounting a filesystem.
The "secure level" patch is thus a way of raising the bar for any potential
attacker. At the higher levels, even a process with root privileges cannot
make certain kinds of changes to the system. Normally, higher levels are
forever; the only way to lower the secure level is to reboot the system.
Note, however, that this module allows the administrator to include a small
back door by specifying an executable that, when run, causes the secure
level to be reset to zero. This feature may be useful for administrators
who are converting a system over to secure level operation. Leaving the
"emergency reset" option enabled permanently would be dangerously
counterproductive, however.
Comments (4 posted)
Review: Linux Kernel Development
Writing books about the Linux kernel is hard. The subject matter is vast,
complex, and highly technical. It also is very much a moving target;
![[Book cover]](/images/ns/linux-kernel-development.jpg)
today's kernel book becomes obsolete in a short period of time. So kernel
authors have to pick their subject matter carefully, time things well, and
enjoy their fifteen minutes of fame before somebody merges a patch and
their words begin the inevitable slide into obsolescence.
The latest kernel book to hit the shelves is Linux K