|
|
Subscribe / Log in / New account

splice() and the ghost of set_fs()

splice() and the ghost of set_fs()

Posted May 28, 2022 3:56 UTC (Sat) by willy (subscriber, #9762)
In reply to: splice() and the ghost of set_fs() by SLi
Parent article: splice() and the ghost of set_fs()

That's not the problem.

The problem is twofold. One is that while set_fs() is active, various security measures (like SMEP and SMAP) are defeated. The other is that (on some architectures and eg on a 4GB/4GB split x86-32), you may not actually be able to access userspace because accessing userspace actually accesses kernel space. On x86-64, you can tell from the high bits of the pointer whether it's userspace or kernel space, but that's not true eg on SPARC or PARISC.


to post comments

splice() and the ghost of set_fs()

Posted Jun 9, 2022 17:06 UTC (Thu) by stem (guest, #83810) [Link]

> One is that while set_fs() is active, various security measures (like SMEP and SMAP) are defeated.
Are you sure?
afaik, set_fs() has nothing to do with SM*P, it was abused wrt access_ok() - copy_*_user().


Copyright © 2025, Eklektix, Inc.
Comments and public postings are copyrighted by their creators.
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds