Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
The Samsung kernel on the A50 contains an extra security subsystem (named 'PROCA', short for 'Process Authenticator', with code in security/proca/) to track process identities. By combining several logic issues in this subsystem (which, on their own, can already cause a mismatch between the tracking state and the actual process state) with a brittle code pattern, it is possible to cause memory unsafety by winning a race condition."
Posted Feb 12, 2020 18:10 UTC (Wed)
by Deleted user 129183 (guest, #129183)
[Link] (13 responses)
Posted Feb 12, 2020 18:48 UTC (Wed)
by pkern (subscriber, #32883)
[Link] (12 responses)
Posted Feb 12, 2020 20:12 UTC (Wed)
by clugstj (subscriber, #4020)
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Posted Feb 12, 2020 23:39 UTC (Wed)
by Deleted user 129183 (guest, #129183)
[Link] (10 responses)
They encouraged, or at least didn’t try to prevent, the Android fragmentation. They had the tools to discourage it: for example, they could have not allowed to use Android trademark by vendors who tried to add ‘device-specific code’ without contributing it to the upstream. So we ended with completely dysfunctional “ecosystem” where there’s no one “Android” system: instead, we have millions of incompatible forks, with all its implications, including security implications, as described in the article.
Posted Feb 13, 2020 1:23 UTC (Thu)
by pizza (subscriber, #46)
[Link] (7 responses)
As for upstream contribution, remember this is the same Google that replaced every GPL userspace with a more permissively licensed one. Meanwhile, they're working on doing that for the Linux kernel too.
Meanwhile, when Google attempts to attach conditions to the use of its trademarks have them up on antitrust charges in multiple jurisdictions.
Posted Feb 13, 2020 4:30 UTC (Thu)
by pj (subscriber, #4506)
[Link] (4 responses)
IMO "proprietary value add" belongs as apps or as a HAL with a standardized API (ala Project Treble), not in Android core. Requiring non-software companies to maintain their own fork of an OS is just insane.
Posted Feb 13, 2020 8:06 UTC (Thu)
by tuna (guest, #44480)
[Link] (3 responses)
Posted Feb 15, 2020 10:23 UTC (Sat)
by oldtomas (guest, #72579)
[Link] (1 responses)
Now this is one bold claim.
Based on experience, I'd say the results are very mixed, in both directions?
Posted Feb 15, 2020 11:50 UTC (Sat)
by tuna (guest, #44480)
[Link]
Posted Feb 18, 2020 10:24 UTC (Tue)
by immibis (subscriber, #105511)
[Link]
Posted Feb 13, 2020 8:01 UTC (Thu)
by ILMostro (guest, #105083)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Feb 14, 2020 9:24 UTC (Fri)
by dvdeug (guest, #10998)
[Link]
I think it's clear that Linux and the BSDs smoked commercial Unixes, and I think it's clear that's because they were open systems that both individual hackers and various companies could use and distribute. MacOS X is the major commercial Unix left, and they're playing a game that only Apple really successfully plays. The rest is legacy systems and possibly certain huge or specialized systems.
Posted Feb 13, 2020 13:32 UTC (Thu)
by tuna (guest, #44480)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Feb 18, 2020 10:23 UTC (Tue)
by immibis (subscriber, #105511)
[Link]
Posted Feb 13, 2020 8:58 UTC (Thu)
by bangert (subscriber, #28342)
[Link] (1 responses)
There is a huge disconnect between the top security researchers and the bulk of the IT Security industry - to the degree that they are actually saying the opposite of each other.
Posted Feb 15, 2020 7:10 UTC (Sat)
by xophos (subscriber, #75267)
[Link]
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too
Horn: Mitigations are attack surface, too