Keeping memory contents secret
Keeping memory contents secret
Posted Nov 18, 2019 18:49 UTC (Mon) by NYKevin (subscriber, #129325)In reply to: Keeping memory contents secret by wahern
Parent article: Keeping memory contents secret
If I had to pick between a best-effort, vague interface, or a specific interface that's tied to implementation details, I'm pretty sure the former is more future proof. In the best case scenario, we can opportunistically begin offering real guarantees as they become available, and in a worst case scenario, we can just deprecate the whole thing since it never offered any guarantees to begin with.
> Anyhow, no company would care whether an AWS hypervisor could read guest memory if they could absolutely expect AWS' software and hardware to work as designed. The desire for zero-trust only exists in the minds of geeks, techno-libertarians, and Hollywood studios.
Certain industries have a tendency to ask for guarantees that are perhaps unnecessary or impractical, but are nevertheless required by some combination of laws, regulations, and industry standards. See for example PCI DSS, HIPAA, FIPS, and so on. It is entirely fair to think that this is a foolish thing for those industries to do, but ultimately, it's their money, and they are choosing to spend it (indirectly via AWS et al.) on building these features into the kernel.
