Design for security
Design for security
Posted Feb 21, 2019 2:50 UTC (Thu) by fest3er (guest, #60379)In reply to: Design for security by Wol
Parent article: Design for security
Linux's Traffic Control is poorly documented and leads to impossible expectations. I designed a nice JS-based configuration tool that I eventually abandoned because LTC just cannot do what the documentation says. However, once I really understood what it can do and what it cannot do, I was able to 'fix' traffic control so that, for the most part, traffic flows smoothly. LTC also cannot easily control multiple interfaces; for example, a gigE NIC might be able to 'block out' a 100Mb/s NIC when they both 'send' to a 10Mb/s internet link.
I haven't addressed buffer bloat. 'ls -lstr /' through an SSH connection results in ^C being unresponsive for 5-10 seconds. But dealing with that much output doesn't happen too often.
In short, there *are* Linux-based routers that do a nice job of enforcing bandwidth sharing. And some of them are free.
Posted Feb 22, 2019 15:22 UTC (Fri)
by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link]
Design for security
I haven't addressed buffer bloat.
These days, for wired Ethernet at least, just switching to fq_codel or CAKE on your bottleneck link with the default parameters (or default plus telling it what your ADSL encapsulation etc is) should be enough to fix that, as long as your NIC driver supports BQL, which most now do.
