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Security quotes of the week

Seriously your phone is like eleven billion times easier to infect than your TV is and you carry it everywhere. If the CIA want to spy on you, they'll do it via your phone. If you're paranoid enough to take the battery out of your phone before certain conversations, don't have those conversations in front of a TV with a microphone in it. But, uh, it's actually worse than that.

These days audio hardware usually consists of a very generic codec containing a bunch of digital→analogue converters, some analogue→digital converters and a bunch of io pins that can basically be wired up in arbitrary ways. Hardcoding the roles of these pins makes board layout more annoying and some people want more inputs than outputs and some people vice versa, so it's not uncommon for it to be possible to reconfigure an input as an output or vice versa. From software.

Anyone who's ever plugged a microphone into a speaker jack probably knows where I'm going with this. An attacker can "turn off" your TV, reconfigure the internal speaker output as an input and listen to you on your "microphoneless" TV. Have a nice day, and stop telling people that putting glue in their laptop microphone is any use unless you're telling them to disconnect the internal speakers as well.

Matthew Garrett

[...] there is a simple solution to the entire "smart TV as bug" category of concerns — don't buy those TVs, and if you have one, don't connect it to the Internet directly.

Don't associate it with your Wi-Fi network — don't plug it into your Ethernet.

Lauren Weinstein

In this paper, we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX [Software Guard Extensions] enclave targeting co-located enclaves. Our attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware, abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker containers. We perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication primitive. The attack works although in SGX enclaves there are no timers, no large pages, no physical addresses, and no shared memory. In a semi-synchronous attack, we extract 96% of an RSA private key from a single trace. We extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 minutes.
Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, and Stefan Mangard

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Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 9, 2017 13:08 UTC (Thu) by smitty_one_each (subscriber, #28989) [Link] (5 responses)

>there is a simple solution to the entire "smart TV as bug" category of concerns — don't buy those TVs

Suddenly viewing content via a relatively dumb DVD looks a little less dumb.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 10, 2017 13:50 UTC (Fri) by hkario (subscriber, #94864) [Link] (4 responses)

the problem is not having smart devices, the problem is when those smart devices are running decade old code and will never be updated

or in other words: Smart TV != HTPC + TV; or even Roku + TV

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 10, 2017 16:38 UTC (Fri) by excors (subscriber, #95769) [Link] (3 responses)

Even without the security concerns, it seems foolish to tie a large expensive piece of hardware that is going to be perfectly decent for a decade or more (a TV screen, a fridge, a car, etc) to a complex piece of software that needs to constantly evolve to keep up with current and future third-party services. Of course for TV manufacturers it's great, they can just stop updating the software and people will be pressured to buy entire new TVs.

I got a quite expensive Samsung Smart TV some years ago and it seems the smart software (which was fairly rubbish and painfully slow) has barely changed at all since it was released, apart from some of the apps disappearing. Samsung also helpfully sold an Evolution Kit, which was a piece of hardware you could plug into the back to upgrade it to the next year's version of the smart UI - but that was restricted to only the most expensive models of TV, not the merely quite expensive ones. And it cost around £250. (£250 for the Evolution Kit, not the TV). And that'd only extend the TV's useful life by about one year.

Alternatively you can get any TV with an HDMI input and add a Roku Streaming Stick or Fire TV Stick or Chromecast etc for under £40, which are decently designed and will probably be well supported for several years. When they become obsolete, or if they have unresolved security issues, you can easily and cheaply throw them away and get a new model, and you can keep the expensive TV screen forever.

So I kind of agree with the advice in Lauren Weinstein's post, except I think all the reasoning there is wrong:

> if you have one, don’t connect it to the Internet directly.

The leaked CIA wiki mentions USB installation of hacked firmware, not a remote exploit. Lack of internet won't stop it getting exploited, and once it's exploited it can silently connect to the wifi access point in the CIA van outside your house.

> "Well, what if the spooks are subverting both my smart TV and my external dongle?" [...] The solution though even for that scenario is simple — kill the power to the dongle when you’re not using it.

If they're both subverted, but (for some reason) the subverted TV isn't connected to wifi directly, it could simply buffer the recorded audio and send it over to the subverted dongle once it's powered on again.

> Buy a Chromecast or Roku or similar dongle that will provide your Internet programming connectivity via HDMI to that television — these dongles don’t include microphones [...]

Many versions of Roku and Fire TV have voice search via a microphone in the remote. (And the remotes are battery powered so in theory they could also record audio while your dongle is unpowered (though in practice they only have a tiny amount of storage)). Chromecast's 'remote' is your phone, which also has microphones (and at least two cameras, and a couple of internet connections, and a load of storage and local processing power, and known-insecure years-old software).

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 10, 2017 18:28 UTC (Fri) by rgmoore (✭ supporter ✭, #75) [Link]

The leaked CIA wiki mentions USB installation of hacked firmware, not a remote exploit. Lack of internet won't stop it getting exploited, and once it's exploited it can silently connect to the wifi access point in the CIA van outside your house.

Maybe that will happen if you're a target of a powerful nation state's intelligence service, but that's not the threat most of us should really be worrying about. The typical person is at far more risk of having their TV hacked by script kiddies who want to add it to their botnet, or to spy on random people for the thrill of it. You'll probably be able to dodge that threat by not connecting your TV directly.

For the people who are targets of powerful security agencies, shutting down any particular avenue of attack is really just playing whack-a-mole. If the CIA is really targeting you, they aren't going to let your lack of a smart TV stop them; they'll just use one of their numerous other tools to do the job. The only way to avoid that kind of really dedicated spying attempt is by traditional tradecraft.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 10, 2017 19:55 UTC (Fri) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

CIA can just as well use a laser to pick up sounds from your window pane. Or just install a smallish (USB-powered) wireless microphone.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 16, 2017 8:50 UTC (Thu) by oldtomas (guest, #72579) [Link]

> to the wifi access point in the CIA van outside your house.

This would be for the CIA's premium customers. For the rest of us, access is via the neighbour's open (possibly also hacked[1]?) WiFi.

I always thought: "I trust my WiFi router, so my TV won't go to the Internet". Until I realized that. Now, I'll have to look into my TV... gah, I hoped I could ignore it.

[1] Endless possibilities, like DNS spoofing, offering your TV better firmware upgrade opportunities. Unless the firmware engineers got everything right (HAH!)...

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 9, 2017 22:07 UTC (Thu) by andrey.turkin (guest, #89915) [Link] (4 responses)

> Anyone who's ever plugged a microphone into a speaker jack probably knows where I'm going with this. An attacker can "turn off" your TV, reconfigure the internal speaker output as an input and listen to you on your "microphoneless" TV.

Ok, let's assume the attacker can reconfigure codec chip so that PCM output becomes PCM input or something. What about power amplifier sitting between the codec and the speakers? It can't be reconfigured to pass audio the other way, can it? Methinks not. Maybe there are some codecs with embedded amplifiers for laptops (and maybe they CAN be reconfigured that way) but I really doubt anything like that can work on TV.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 14, 2017 6:49 UTC (Tue) by jmspeex (subscriber, #51639) [Link] (3 responses)

Yeah pretty much. A lot of these "attacks" like turning a speaker into a mic make a nice paper, but are often not practical. In this case, the amplifier is indeed the thing that would kill the idea in practice. At least until the power amps are on the SoCs, which I don't think is the case right now if only because of thermal issues.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 14, 2017 14:40 UTC (Tue) by farnz (subscriber, #17727) [Link] (2 responses)

Choosing a random reconfigurable codec shows that you have a 2.3W per channel amp embedded in the codec. So, you've got "jack detection" (which means that it can reconfigure pins to select whether they're mic in, line in, line out, headphone out or speaker out pins), plus a 2.3W per channel amplifier for the speaker out.

That type of chip can easily be reconfigured to use a speaker as a microphone from software - it won't be as good as a dedicated digital microphone, but it'll be as good as any cheap analog microphone.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 15, 2017 11:10 UTC (Wed) by cladisch (✭ supporter ✭, #50193) [Link] (1 responses)

Such HDA codecs are designed specifically for PCs; the corresponding HDA controller can be found only in PC chipsets.

And while it could be imagined that someone builds a TV on top of PC hardware, it would not be possible to rely on the built-in amp (2.3 W is "for mini-speakers").

Security quotes of the week

Posted Mar 15, 2017 15:23 UTC (Wed) by farnz (subscriber, #17727) [Link]

I've found equivalent reconfigurable I2S codecs in the past, inside smart TVs, driving the speakers directly. It's just that even getting a feature list for the I2S codec version is next to impossible if you haven't already already signed an NDA with the codec maker, whereas the HDA codec makers will give out a feature list but not a datasheet without NDA.


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