Toward a more approachable Rust

C buffer overflows weren't responsible for 1 billion Yahoo accounts having their credentials compromised. They weren't responsible for the multiple point-of-sale compromises that were responsible for my credit cards being revoked three times in a single calendar year (including one actual fraud attempt) Buffer overflows weren't responsible for the Federal OMB's compromise of literally millions of highly sensitive personnel files. They aren't responsible for the Classified info leaked by Snowden or Manning. More down to earth, Buffer overflows weren't responsible for the Murai botnet with upwards of half a million webcams compromised by a fixed backdoor that yielded total access. Buffer overflows have nothing to dow with folks [re]using weak passwords on every online acount. Buffer overflows don't matter at all to [spear] phishing that deliberately targets folks with keys to the kingdom, or systems with "special managment exceptions" because executives can't be bothered to abide by the same security procedures as their underlings.

...And so on.

Sure, at an individual level those overflows can (and do) suck, and we should absolutely fix them. But let's not delude ourselves into thinking that getting rid of C sill have _any_ effect on piss-poor system design and the utter fallibility of the person sitting between the keyboard and the chair.