An important set of stable kernel updates
An important set of stable kernel updates
Posted Oct 21, 2016 13:43 UTC (Fri) by pizza (subscriber, #46)In reply to: An important set of stable kernel updates by ppel512
Parent article: An important set of stable kernel updates
We have an expression for that sort of thing: Shit happens.
You deal with it, you move on.
> The answer is no. It's not acceptable.
Then perhaps you should demand a refund and/or switch software suppliers.
Posted Oct 21, 2016 13:46 UTC (Fri)
by ppel512 (guest, #111882)
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Quite frankly, this kind of attitude is how the cyber criminals of the world get to put food on the table at our expense.
Posted Oct 21, 2016 14:33 UTC (Fri)
by pizza (subscriber, #46)
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The details of that "unexpected problem" don't actually matter. You only know that *something* will go wrong, and try to architect mitigations into your systems and processes to handle it.
As already mentioned elsewhere, if you find the current status quo so unacceptable, why weren't you already running grsecurity/PaX/etc on those 45K instances? But even grsecurtiy/etc have flaws, to say nothing of the actual hardware it's all running on..
Posted Oct 21, 2016 20:12 UTC (Fri)
by patrick_g (subscriber, #44470)
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How was this avoidable? I thought even Grsecurity was vulnerable to this bug?
Posted Oct 22, 2016 11:19 UTC (Sat)
by Wol (subscriber, #4433)
[Link]
As pointed out elsewhere, people have concerns other than security. A hell of a lot of linux instances are supercomputers, where even a 1% performance impact on the kernel, has a massive impact on the performance of the computer as a whole.
Oh - and since I've been following the linux-raid list, I've come to the conclusion that kernel programming is like making sausages - if you like the end product, don't go looking at how it's made. That or actually get in there and get your hands dirty :-)
Cheers,
Posted Oct 22, 2016 7:26 UTC (Sat)
by Lionel_Debroux (subscriber, #30014)
[Link]
Let's just look at ASLR. It was invented by the PaX Team in 2001. ASLR broke a number of direct exploits based on predictable memory addresses. Even nowadays, it still raises the cost for attackers, who have to use infoleaks to get around it, so I'd say it's still an effective component of defense in depth. PaX has a plugin for sanitizing the kernel stack, as well as better allocated / freed memory sanitization, thereby removing a whole class of infoleaks, BTW.
In 2016, OpenBSD was trounced by kernel fuzzers, just like Linux, finding easy DoS and LPE.
Overall, deploying grsec-patched Linux kernels with MEMORY_UDEREF, KERNEXEC, RAP, CONSTIFY, RANDSTRUCT and the dozens of PaX/grsec goodies onto some of your many servers is pretty much the best you can do to protect them. None of the other *nix options come anywhere close to the level of protection offered by grsec. Obviously, there will be a performance hit.
An important set of stable kernel updates
An important set of stable kernel updates
An important set of stable kernel updates
An important set of stable kernel updates
Wol
An important set of stable kernel updates
* Linux grew PIE support in 2003 and other ASLR aspects in 2005. Even KASLR in 2014, but that barely provides any security in return for its complexity, as predicted by PaXTeam and spender from the get go, and as shown by the many KASLR bypasses of the past two years;
* OpenBSD implemented some ASLR features in 2003, but didn't implement PIE until 2008;
* NetBSD didn't enable ASLR by default until 2016 (!);
* FreeBSD still doesn't have ASLR because some of its maintainers refuse it because "it's not really effective". The HardenedBSD derivative has it, for good reason, though;
* for completeness, though it's not an option for your 45K Linux servers (cost): Solaris recently grew ASLR support, but it wasn't there in the discontinued OpenSolaris, and AFAICT, its derivatives don't have it;
* not an option either for you (special hardware requirements, cost): MacOS X (and iOS) got ASLR after Linux did.
OpenBSD reinvents a subset of PaX/grsecurity's wheels in NIH mode: look at what the PaX Team and spender wrote and said about W^X.
You should also consider buying (having management buy, I mean...) commercial support from grsecurity. For a corporation which has 45K Linux servers, it's a tiny drop in the ocean. All the more you'll save money (besides saving your sleep and sanity) every time you don't _have_ to reboot your servers *absolutely right now* (but can choose to do so tomorrow or on Monday) to fix yet another critical issue, thanks to the PaX/grsecurity defenses making an issue completely unexploitable, e.g. because the corresponding ops structures targeted by the exploit were constified, because the refcount overflow protection kicks in, or for other reasons.