State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
Posted Sep 3, 2016 7:01 UTC (Sat) by mb (subscriber, #50428)In reply to: State of the Kernel Self Protection Project by spender
Parent article: State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
The proper way to avoid "ripoffs" would be to upstream your code by yourself.
You don't do that? Well, in the Open Source world somebody else will possibly do it then.
Posted Sep 3, 2016 13:09 UTC (Sat)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link] (20 responses)
Posted Sep 3, 2016 13:59 UTC (Sat)
by rahulsundaram (subscriber, #21946)
[Link] (7 responses)
That's the rub. People are getting paid to do that. It just so happens to be people who have a history of doing it.
Posted Sep 3, 2016 14:32 UTC (Sat)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Sep 3, 2016 15:04 UTC (Sat)
by rahulsundaram (subscriber, #21946)
[Link] (1 responses)
You aren't pushing for that code to be directly upstreamed. That isn't necessarily a pleasant process and it is time consuming but since you aren't interested in doing that, you do end up losing control over how it is done.
Posted Sep 3, 2016 15:12 UTC (Sat)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link]
i guess you've successfully concluded an infinite loop now: https://lwn.net/Articles/699300/
Posted Sep 3, 2016 15:36 UTC (Sat)
by Lionel_Debroux (subscriber, #30014)
[Link] (3 responses)
As mentioned previously on LWN, e.g. https://lwn.net/Articles/662907/ , Linus himself repeatedly refuses some of the most powerful PaX defenses. Not only the hardware protections of recent high-end x86, x86_64 and ARMv7 processors he's mentioning aren't as powerful as PaX's (partially) software protections - see e.g. https://lwn.net/Articles/617945/ - but also, MEMORY_UDEREF and KERNEXEC work on processors about a decade older, and less expensive parts, which means that they could protect the vast majority of existing computers, rather than a tiny minority.
Fortunately, the number of distros packaging grsec kernels is growing, and programs are slowly being improved / fixed - depending on one's POV - to work on PaX/grsec kernels (e.g. Docker wrt. grsec chroot hardening), which means that it's getting easier for users to get most PaX/grsec benefits. RANDSTRUCT is nullified by shared builds, but the other benefits, spanning a wide range of defenses, remain.
Posted Sep 3, 2016 15:49 UTC (Sat)
by rahulsundaram (subscriber, #21946)
[Link] (2 responses)
True but the politics here is unhelpful. The developers involved are not exactly pleasant folks to work with.
Posted Sep 3, 2016 16:25 UTC (Sat)
by spender (guest, #23067)
[Link] (1 responses)
-Brad
Posted Sep 4, 2016 0:59 UTC (Sun)
by rahulsundaram (subscriber, #21946)
[Link]
On either sides.
Posted Sep 4, 2016 15:14 UTC (Sun)
by mina86 (guest, #68442)
[Link] (11 responses)
It's free software, anyone can upstream it in any way they want regardless of being paid or not.
Posted Sep 4, 2016 16:10 UTC (Sun)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link] (10 responses)
Posted Sep 4, 2016 18:01 UTC (Sun)
by ssmith32 (subscriber, #72404)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Sep 4, 2016 18:42 UTC (Sun)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link]
Posted Sep 5, 2016 0:43 UTC (Mon)
by mina86 (guest, #68442)
[Link] (7 responses)
But notice that in the past, people developing free software in their free time without being paid for it was the norm. To this day this in not out of ordinary. IIRC unaffiliated contributors are still single group involved in Linux.
Lastly, as far as I understand, a lot of the hard work has already been done (and PaX and grsecurity teams are to be thanked for that) so now pushing the code upstream is the easiest part.
There may be political reasons why it’s hard for the PaX and grsecurity teams to do that, but complaining about someone who puts up with Linus et al. to get the code into Linux is just childish.
Posted Sep 5, 2016 17:39 UTC (Mon)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link] (5 responses)
Posted Sep 5, 2016 18:16 UTC (Mon)
by mina86 (guest, #68442)
[Link] (4 responses)
> the proper way to upstream our code would be for somebody to pay for that time.
This sounds to me that you’re claiming current upstreaming efforts are not proper because no one is paying for the time. Is that what you’re saying?
Posted Sep 5, 2016 19:15 UTC (Mon)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link] (3 responses)
Posted Sep 5, 2016 21:11 UTC (Mon)
by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link] (2 responses)
This is sounding less and less high-minded by the minute.
Posted Sep 5, 2016 21:15 UTC (Mon)
by PaXTeam (guest, #24616)
[Link]
Posted Sep 6, 2016 10:13 UTC (Tue)
by paulj (subscriber, #341)
[Link]
E.g., every seems to be agreed PaX et al have done some good work on security. Wouldn't it be nice if some of the money going into hardening the kernel helped that work?
The question is whether the inter-personal issues at play can be overcome to make that possible. Whether PaX et al can co-operate, tackle the nits and implement review comments (which sometimes do no more than help give the reviewers a shared sense of participation and value - but we socio-insensitive techies often don't perceive the soft, socio-politics, sigh), etc. Whether the other side(s) could get over their hostility, etc. ?
Shame really for everyone, inc. the users.
Posted Sep 9, 2016 14:13 UTC (Fri)
by thestinger (guest, #91827)
[Link]
Lack of known affiliation doesn't mean they aren't being paid to do the work. It can still be part of their full-time work or a contract. They may also be self-employed in a way that they earn money from landing code upstream. A subset are certainly volunteers but there aren't meaningful numbers on that.
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
Emese Revfy once spent time, probably a significant amount thereof, making a large patch series constifying lots of needlessly writable, and therefore ripe for abuse, mostly "ops" structures in the kernel. The fact is that relatively few maintainers picked up the pieces.
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project
State of the Kernel Self Protection Project