Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of
perf_event_open
[Posted August 3, 2016 by jake]
| From: |
| Peter Zijlstra <peterz-AT-infradead.org> |
| To: |
| Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv-AT-google.com> |
| Subject: |
| Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open |
| Date: |
| Tue, 2 Aug 2016 11:52:43 +0200 |
| Message-ID: |
| <20160802095243.GD6862@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> |
| Cc: |
| kernel-hardening-AT-lists.openwall.com, mingo-AT-redhat.com, acme-AT-kernel.org, alexander.shishkin-AT-linux.intel.com, linux-doc-AT-vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org |
| Archive‑link: | |
Article |
On Wed, Jul 27, 2016 at 07:45:46AM -0700, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
> When kernel.perf_event_paranoid is set to 3 (or greater), disallow
> all access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> This new level of restriction is intended to reduce the attack
> surface of the kernel. Perf is a valuable tool for developers but
> is generally unnecessary and unused on production systems. Perf may
> open up an attack vector to vulnerable device-specific drivers as
> recently demonstrated in CVE-2016-0805, CVE-2016-0819,
> CVE-2016-0843, CVE-2016-3768, and CVE-2016-3843.
We have bugs we fix them, we don't kill complete infrastructure because
of them.
> This new level of
> restriction allows for a safe default to be set on production systems
> while leaving a simple means for developers to grant access [1].
So the problem I have with this is that it will completely inhibit
development of things like JITs that self-profile to re-compile
frequently used code.
I would much rather have an LSM hook where the security stuff can do
more fine grained control of things. Allowing some apps perf usage while
denying others.
