Iceweasel for Fedora?
Mozilla's plan to require all extensions (also known as add-ons) to be signed by Mozilla before they can be installed in Firefox may lead Linux distributions down the same path that Debian has taken—a name change to avoid the Firefox trademark. The problem is that some distributions currently ship extensions that it will be difficult or impossible to get signed. The requirement can also be seen as a form of control over what users can install in their browser, which some see as running counter to the philosophical underpinnings of free software.
A Fedora Engineering Steering Committee (FESCo) bug report has called
out the issue for Fedora. Kevin Kofler filed the bug, which calls for
blocking any update to Firefox 44 (which will remove the about:config
option for signature checking) in fairly strident terms (e.g. the bug is
entitled "Software
packaged in Fedora should not be allowed to implement DRM schemes that
cannot be disabled
"). He described the problem this way:
There is a mechanism provided by addons.mozilla.org (which is the site for Firefox extensions as well as for signing the packages) to automate the signing of existing extensions, but it would be quite cumbersome for Fedora to use. It would also leave users who want to install extensions they have built or have obtained in other ways out in the cold.
There are already two bug reports filed for Fedora packages (mozilla-adblockplus and mozilla-https-everywhere) that can't be installed in Firefox 43 without changing the value of xpinstall.signatures.required in about:config. When Firefox 44 comes along in late January, even that workaround won't suffice. But this requirement has been coming for some time; we covered the change back in February.
Others commented on the bug, mostly agreeing with Kofler's assessment. FESCo member Stephen Gallagher suggested that the committee communicate with Mozilla:
Kevin Fenzi, who is also a FESCo member, thought that it was important to include the Firefox package maintainer Martin Stransky into the discussion. As might be guessed, Stransky had a somewhat different view than many of the other commenters. He wondered about the value of Fedora packaging extensions. He also noted the Debian's rebranded Firefox (i.e. Iceweasel) is available in Fedora already, which might be an alternative for those who need it.
Several responded with reasons that Fedora wants or needs to package its own extensions, but there is more to it than that. For one thing, users may be willing to trust Fedora as a source for their extensions, but not Mozilla. There may also be distribution-specific changes that need to be made. As Gallagher put it:
[...]
All RPMs distributed by Fedora must be built in the Fedora infrastructure. This is also a trust issue, as it ensures that we are building and shipping a binary that matches the sources (there's no guarantee to our users that the public source matches the binary distributed by A.M.O.). Furthermore, compiled extensions may be built with different flags in order to match the system security policy and these may differ from the upstream build.
Fundamentally it comes down to a question of software freedom, Gallagher
concluded. In fact, Dominik "Rathann" Mierzejewski argued
that updating Fedora to Firefox 43 without disabling the signature
checking by default, as Stransky has done, is a violation of the update
guidelines. He suggested
updating the Firefox 43 package to disable signature checking and to
"NOT update to FF44 in F22 and F23 until this is resolved
".
The consensus in the bug is clearly to remove the signature checking by default one way or another. Gallagher suggested prompting users to decide if they want the checking, but even that requires changes to the Firefox code. And that will be the crux of the matter. Mozilla only allows using the Firefox trademark for modified versions of the browser if it approves of those changes. Concern about that trademark policy (and getting Mozilla's approval for every patch) is what led Debian to switch to Iceweasel. Kofler explicitly suggested that Fedora do the same.
Ultimately it will be up to Mozilla, as it can choose to allow
distributions to remove the signature checking (or provide a way
to disable it) or not. If it sticks to its guns and "forces" distributions
to leave that part of the Firefox code alone, it may well push more Linux
users into installing Iceweasel or the like, because that is what their
distribution provides. At some point, FESCo will undoubtedly discuss the
issue, but it is hard to see how the conflicts between the freedoms
inherent in free software and a lockdown regime such as that being pushed
by Mozilla (however well-intentioned) can coexist. Something has to
give—if it isn't Mozilla, then replacing Firefox in Fedora with Iceweasel
may not be far behind.
Posted Dec 24, 2015 0:36 UTC (Thu)
by josh (subscriber, #17465)
[Link]
I don't see anything wrong with Mozilla implementing a signing scheme by default for user-installed extensions, but I don't think that scheme should reject (or even gripe about) extensions installed system-wide on Linux systems. Installing such extensions requires root; if malware has root, you've lost already.
Posted Dec 24, 2015 3:14 UTC (Thu)
by Fowl (subscriber, #65667)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Dec 24, 2015 5:33 UTC (Thu)
by karath (subscriber, #19025)
[Link]
Posted Dec 24, 2015 14:29 UTC (Thu)
by javispedro (guest, #83660)
[Link]
This is a terribly misguided choice. First and foremost, extensions installed from a root-owned directory should be able to skip the verification (it's not like you couldn't already modify the firefox binary itself).
Second, there needs to be a way to enroll your own signatures. Otherwise, this is no better than a more draconian version of MS's Secure Boot, and I'm not willing to give Mozilla a free pass just because they're not MS.
Posted Dec 24, 2015 10:18 UTC (Thu)
by mokki (subscriber, #33200)
[Link] (7 responses)
Mozilla approves change to Firefox to load public verification keys from build time configured directory.
Result: all fedora built extensions work and user can install their own keys without modifying Firefox
As an extra: if the addons public key is also in that directory users/organizations can remove that trust if they want to
Posted Dec 24, 2015 13:12 UTC (Thu)
by alankila (guest, #47141)
[Link] (4 responses)
Posted Dec 24, 2015 14:24 UTC (Thu)
by javispedro (guest, #83660)
[Link] (1 responses)
If you allow for a way to load your own keys on the system and binaries loaded using these keys have the same privileges as binaries loaded using the Fedora key, then you do not need to distribute the Fedora private key.
But Firefox, currently, violates even that.
"[...] authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions [...]. The information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made."
Posted Dec 24, 2015 16:08 UTC (Thu)
by mjg59 (subscriber, #23239)
[Link]
Posted Dec 24, 2015 16:11 UTC (Thu)
by mokki (subscriber, #33200)
[Link]
Posted Jan 5, 2016 0:03 UTC (Tue)
by davidstrauss (guest, #85867)
[Link]
If you have Fedora's signing key, it's possible to compromise Fedora-based systems without any involvement by Firefox.
> It is necessary to provide these keys to everybody as part of the freedoms given to users of free software.
That is not the case.
Posted Dec 25, 2015 9:34 UTC (Fri)
by tzafrir (subscriber, #11501)
[Link] (1 responses)
* Currently: works well.
Posted Dec 30, 2015 13:10 UTC (Wed)
by tao (subscriber, #17563)
[Link]
See bugs #808228 and #800150.
Iceweasel for Fedora?
Iceweasel for Fedora?
Iceweasel for Fedora?
Iceweasel for Fedora?
Easy solution
Easy solution
Easy solution
Easy solution
Easy solution
Easy solution
Easy solution
* After the Mozilla "fixes" - it's impossible.
* With your suggestion: possible, but requires me to maintain a locally-built Firefox/Iceweasel package.
Easy solution