Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Posted Sep 24, 2015 13:48 UTC (Thu) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630)In reply to: The Internet of criminal things by marcH
Parent article: The Internet of criminal things
Voting machines are a really terrible solution to something that isn't even a problem. Manual vote-tallying works just fine and scales extremely well; you only need O(log N) tallyers if you use a tree structure.
Posted Sep 24, 2015 20:00 UTC (Thu)
by tzafrir (subscriber, #11501)
[Link] (10 responses)
Posted Sep 24, 2015 20:06 UTC (Thu)
by marcH (subscriber, #57642)
[Link]
Yeah it's very much like "breaking" news: must choose between getting wrong information immediately versus waiting for some time.
Posted Sep 24, 2015 20:13 UTC (Thu)
by marcH (subscriber, #57642)
[Link]
With voting machines you: - either have to do the same thing in a possibly more technical and demanding way; - or you don't even have anything at all you can re-count.
From an counting mistake perspective ballot boxes are an "analog" system, meaning errors are negligible and don't matter except for the rare cases where the vote is very tight.
Posted Sep 24, 2015 20:41 UTC (Thu)
by raven667 (subscriber, #5198)
[Link] (2 responses)
What is the actual requirement for speed here? For example in the US Presidential election, the ballots are cast on November 8 but the results aren't absolutely required until inauguration on January 20 of the next year, a few hours (or days or weeks) in a 73 day window is not significant.
Posted Sep 25, 2015 3:51 UTC (Fri)
by edgewood (subscriber, #1123)
[Link] (1 responses)
But the bigger problem is that the US has a lot more separate elections per ballot than I think other places with parliamentary systems do. See http://v.gd/7cIVRX for the *front* of a recent election in North Carolina. There are 14 elections on the *front* of the ballot. I couldn't find a good image of the back, but I recall that many or more there.
Posted Sep 26, 2015 15:46 UTC (Sat)
by marcH (subscriber, #57642)
[Link]
Maybe an interesting trade-off could be "hardware assisted tallying", where a scanner operates slowly enough that anyone in the room can keep an eye on it.
Posted Sep 25, 2015 2:18 UTC (Fri)
by bfields (subscriber, #19510)
[Link]
(For some reason, I don't think that manual recount necessarily happens in the absence of a challenge. It's easy enough to do.)
You fill out the form by hand with a pencil. I haven't used one, but I seem to recall being told that the polling places also have electronic voting machines, but that all they do is produce paper ballots. That can be helpful for voters that have some disabilities (poor eyesight, or whatever). I suppose in theory you could compromise those but I think that would be easier to detect (and less rewarding) than a similar attack on a purely electronic system.
Posted Sep 25, 2015 12:25 UTC (Fri)
by NAR (subscriber, #1313)
[Link] (2 responses)
So I don't think counting is a bottleneck currently. However, if we'd have more complicated voting system like the Schulze method, then having the votes in a computer could be more useful.
Posted Sep 29, 2015 16:05 UTC (Tue)
by martin.langhoff (subscriber, #61417)
[Link] (1 responses)
In the USA there's been some odd media fabrication of "it can't be done unless we replace the paper vote with horridly unreliable computers". It is clearly not true, but it would take looking at how other countries do things... so... ;-)
Posted Sep 29, 2015 16:42 UTC (Tue)
by marcH (subscriber, #57642)
[Link]
Conversely: http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/08/chip-based-credit...
Posted Sep 27, 2015 18:57 UTC (Sun)
by debacle (subscriber, #7114)
[Link]
Posted Sep 25, 2015 7:44 UTC (Fri)
by jezuch (subscriber, #52988)
[Link]
To be fair, the current crop of voting machines is a terribly naive implementation of the concept, wasting an enormous opportunity for improvement. They basically do nothing more than the human tallyers can do, except faster - and with less auditability. But there are algorithms that [promise to][1] allow the vote to be both secret and auditable, by anyone who can count, not just the tallyers. But to do that you need to implement actual cryptography, not the half-arsed "add 1 to this variable" machines we are offered today.
[1] I'm not a cryptographer so me not being able to spot any flaws in such an algorithm doesn't mean anything, obviously :) Anything that wants to be used in actual elections need to be first exposed to intense scrutiny by the security community. Which is he opposite of the current state of affairs.
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
I think at the last Hungarian elections the counting was finished in 3 hours in the first round (where everybody had two votes) and maybe 1,5 hours in the second round (where voters had only a single vote). The political analyzers on TV barely had the time to speculate before the results were ready.
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)
Voting machines (was The Internet of criminal things)