Re: [capabilities] Allow normal inheritance for a configurable set of capabilities
[Posted February 10, 2015 by jake]
| From: |
| Andy Lutomirski <luto-AT-amacapital.net> |
| To: |
| Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-AT-ubuntu.com> |
| Subject: |
| Re: [capabilities] Allow normal inheritance for a configurable set of capabilities |
| Date: |
| Mon, 2 Feb 2015 12:37:54 -0800 |
| Message-ID: |
| <CALCETrXgodHNiEspXKbAm_xGfBtE6n4diESQzp5Rq8xyW14F2w@mail.gmail.com> |
| Cc: |
| Casey Schaufler <casey-AT-schaufler-ca.com>, Christoph Lameter <cl-AT-linux.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-AT-canonical.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet-AT-lwn.net>, Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones-AT-gmail.com>, "Ted Ts'o" <tytso-AT-mit.edu>, LSM List <linux-security-module-AT-vger.kernel.org>, "linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-linuxfoundation.org> |
| Archive‑link: | |
Article |
On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 10:08 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> wrote:
> Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com):
>> I'm game to participate in such an effort. The POSIX scheme
>> is workable, but given that it's 20 years old and hasn't
>> developed real traction it's hard to call it successful.
>
> Over the years we've several times discussed possible reasons for this
> and how to help. I personally think it's two things: 1. lack of
> toolchain and fs support. The fact that we cannot to this day enable
> ping using capabilities by default because of cpio, tar and non-xattr
> filesystems is disheartening. 2. It's hard for users and applications
> to know what caps they need. yes the API is a bear to use, but we can
> hide that behind fancier libraries. But using capabilities requires too
> much in-depth knowledge of precisely what caps you might need for
> whatever operations library may now do when you asked for something.
None of this could address the problem here, though: if I hold a
capability and I want to pass that capability to an exec'd helper, I
shouldn't need the fs's help to do this.
--Andy
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