OpenSSH 6.7 released
From: | Damien Miller <djm-AT-cvs.openbsd.org> | |
To: | openssh-unix-dev-AT-mindrot.org | |
Subject: | Announce: OpenSSH 6.7 released | |
Date: | Mon, 6 Oct 2014 17:16:40 -0600 (MDT) | |
Message-ID: | <11168654333636927008.enqueue@cvs.openbsd.org> |
OpenSSH 6.7 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the project. More information on donations may be found at: http://www.openssh.com/donations.html Changes since OpenSSH 6.6 ========================= Potentially-incompatible changes * sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to remove unsafe algorithms. In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are disabled by default. The full set of algorithms remains available if configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options. * sshd(8): Support for tcpwrappers/libwrap has been removed. * OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail when connecting with something that implements the specification correctly. OpenSSH 6.7 disables this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected versions. New Features * Major internal refactoring to begin to make part of OpenSSH usable as a library. So far the wire parsing, key handling and KRL code has been refactored. Please note that we do not consider the API stable yet, nor do we offer the library in separable form. * ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket. * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. * sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads. * ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is the same as the one sent during initial key exchange; bz#2154 * sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family; bz#2222 * sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option; bz#2160 * ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding miserly pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths; bz#2220 * sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199 * Added unit and fuzz tests for refactored code. These are run automatically in portable OpenSSH via the "make tests" target. Bugfixes * sshd(8): Fix remote forwarding with the same listen port but different listen address. * ssh(1): Fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed in ssh_config or on the commandline not to be preferred. * ssh-keygen(1): Fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format. Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted. * ssh(1): Reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status. Previously we were always returning 0; bz#2255 * ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247 * ssh-agent(1): Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal(); bz#2236 * ssh-add(1): Make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't); bz#2234 * ssh-keygen(1): When hashing or removing hosts, don't choke on @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers; bz#2241 * ssh(1): Don't fatal when hostname canonicalisation fails and a ProxyCommand is in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS behind a bastion) * scp(1): When copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised heap to the remote end. * sftp(1): Fix fatal "el_insertstr failed" errors when tab-completing filenames with a single quote char somewhere in the string; bz#2238 * ssh-keyscan(1): Scan for Ed25519 keys by default. * ssh(1): When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down- convert any certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey dialog by offering only certificate keys. * sshd(8): Avoid crash at exit via NULL pointer reference; bz#2225 * Fix some strict-alignment errors. Portable OpenSSH * Portable OpenSSH now supports building against libressl-portable. * Portable OpenSSH now requires openssl 0.9.8f or greater. Older versions are no longer supported. * In the OpenSSL version check, allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades. Debian bug #748150. * sshd(8): On Cygwin, determine privilege separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account. * sshd(8): Don't attempt to use vhangup on Linux. It doesn't work for non-root users, and for them it just messes up the tty settings. * Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly. bz#2228 * Add support for ed25519 to opensshd.init init script. * sftp-server(8): On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps} Checksums: ========== - SHA1 (openssh-6.7.tar.gz) = 315497b27a0186e4aef67987cfc9f3d9ba561cd8 - SHA256 (openssh-6.7.tar.gz) = /me/hPxDw9Tfd3siNKQubSQph84qiKwftiMsgj6nh5E= - SHA1 (openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz) = 14e5fbed710ade334d65925e080d1aaeb9c85bf6 - SHA256 (openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz) = svg5Tq6Fjau9732sELma7ADJVGJ1PoA0LlMLu29yVQc= Please note that the PGP key used to sign releases was recently rotated. The new key has been signed by the old key to provide continuity. It is available from the mirror sites as RELEASE_KEY.asc. Reporting Bugs: =============== - Please read http://www.openssh.com/report.html Security bugs should be reported directly to openssh@openssh.com OpenSSH is brought to you by Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, Kevin Steves, Damien Miller, Darren Tucker, Jason McIntyre, Tim Rice and Ben Lindstrom.
Posted Oct 7, 2014 13:32 UTC (Tue)
by pizza (subscriber, #46)
[Link] (18 responses)
This is one thing I *really* hope distros patch back in, at least until there's some equivalent replacement for denyhosts or fail2ban that's built around iptables. (which doesn't work quite so well for dynamic rules..)
Posted Oct 7, 2014 14:20 UTC (Tue)
by bersl2 (guest, #34928)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Oct 7, 2014 15:03 UTC (Tue)
by raven667 (subscriber, #5198)
[Link]
http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2014-...
It looks like the reason was that the Match keyword already covered this use case and it removes a dependency from the critical pre-auth code path, a library which is from a different era.
Posted Oct 7, 2014 14:33 UTC (Tue)
by raven667 (subscriber, #5198)
[Link]
Posted Oct 7, 2014 14:39 UTC (Tue)
by kh (guest, #19413)
[Link]
Posted Oct 7, 2014 14:53 UTC (Tue)
by kh (guest, #19413)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 7, 2014 15:17 UTC (Tue)
by raven667 (subscriber, #5198)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Oct 7, 2014 15:29 UTC (Tue)
by nybble41 (subscriber, #55106)
[Link]
Posted Oct 7, 2014 15:02 UTC (Tue)
by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 10:44 UTC (Wed)
by cjwatson (subscriber, #7322)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 14:54 UTC (Wed)
by nix (subscriber, #2304)
[Link]
Posted Oct 7, 2014 16:02 UTC (Tue)
by zuki (subscriber, #41808)
[Link]
What do you mean it doesn't work for dynamic rules? Try this config:
(Both fully dynamic and lightweight, and runs unprivileged too.)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 10:26 UTC (Wed)
by terom (guest, #55278)
[Link]
No regexping of syslog lines, and leave iptables to things like low-level packet rate-limiting to protect against actually DoS'ing behaviour.
Do your auth/access control in your PAM stack, which already provides a programmatic library interface that has all the required information (username, remote host, auth success/fail).
Posted Oct 8, 2014 10:50 UTC (Wed)
by cjwatson (subscriber, #7322)
[Link]
We (Debian) should probably consider ways to migrate people away from this more gently, though, as I don't know whether I want to carry this patch indefinitely. denyhosts has already been removed from jessie, which is a start.
Posted Oct 9, 2014 20:04 UTC (Thu)
by cdmiller (guest, #2813)
[Link]
Posted Oct 10, 2014 8:00 UTC (Fri)
by jsanders (subscriber, #69784)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 10, 2014 14:46 UTC (Fri)
by raven667 (subscriber, #5198)
[Link] (1 responses)
I'm not all that sure that automatic blacklisting actually does much for you except to reduce the amount of logging, if you are doing anything sensible for authentication (like key-based auth and/or two-factor) then none of the automated scans are going to work, ever, and you take on a new risk that your automatic blacklisting system will deny yourself service on your own machines. What might work better would be to audit _successful_ logins, and report on any which come from new and interesting networks, this can actually catch someone who has copied a key or passphrase, there is no point chasing after logins which you already know have been denied.
Posted Oct 10, 2014 16:08 UTC (Fri)
by JGR (subscriber, #93631)
[Link]
If a trusted machine is generating large numbers of failed authentications, then temporary blacklisting seems a perfectly valid response, even if it does stop you logging in from that machine.
Auditing successful logins is a good idea, this doesn't preclude also taking action for unsuccessful ones though.
Posted Oct 7, 2014 21:57 UTC (Tue)
by gdt (subscriber, #6284)
[Link] (3 responses)
Imagine a user with a /etc/hosts.allow of and a /etc/hosts.deny of The version of sshd moves from blocking most access to sshd to allowing all with no log messages or other warning of the change evident at run time. I'm finding it hard to think that this is an improvement in security.
Posted Oct 8, 2014 0:21 UTC (Wed)
by NightMonkey (subscriber, #23051)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 6:38 UTC (Wed)
by imitev (guest, #60045)
[Link] (1 responses)
Granted, one shouldn't blindly upgrade such packages, but if you have configured "automatic" updates, it will be interesting to see how distributions handle those (enterprise distros are usually stuck with one version, but users of a rolling distro might face this problem).
Posted Oct 8, 2014 10:43 UTC (Wed)
by lucke (guest, #58819)
[Link]
Perhaps this news message also in a way supports the decision of OpenSSH to remove tcp_wrappers support.
Posted Oct 7, 2014 23:03 UTC (Tue)
by NightMonkey (subscriber, #23051)
[Link] (5 responses)
If something as 'complex' as sshuttle can work its magic with iptables rules alone, I'd think fail2ban and friends can work with just iptables. :)
Posted Oct 7, 2014 23:56 UTC (Tue)
by Trelane (subscriber, #56877)
[Link] (4 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 0:00 UTC (Wed)
by rahulsundaram (subscriber, #21946)
[Link]
Posted Oct 8, 2014 4:35 UTC (Wed)
by lucke (guest, #58819)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 4:38 UTC (Wed)
by NightMonkey (subscriber, #23051)
[Link]
Posted Oct 8, 2014 7:37 UTC (Wed)
by BlueLightning (subscriber, #38978)
[Link]
Posted Oct 8, 2014 0:56 UTC (Wed)
by josh (subscriber, #17465)
[Link] (14 responses)
Posted Oct 8, 2014 6:57 UTC (Wed)
by lkundrak (subscriber, #43452)
[Link]
Posted Oct 8, 2014 8:10 UTC (Wed)
by pbonzini (subscriber, #60935)
[Link] (12 responses)
Posted Oct 9, 2014 8:08 UTC (Thu)
by grawity (subscriber, #80596)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 9, 2014 14:59 UTC (Thu)
by dd9jn (✭ supporter ✭, #4459)
[Link]
Given that not all file systems support sockets, the plan is to allow a pseudo socket file to redirect to the real socket. If you post your use-case to gnupg-devel or -users, we can see now we can help you out.
Posted Oct 10, 2014 9:57 UTC (Fri)
by pbonzini (subscriber, #60935)
[Link]
Posted Oct 9, 2014 9:06 UTC (Thu)
by cortana (subscriber, #24596)
[Link] (8 responses)
Posted Oct 9, 2014 15:04 UTC (Thu)
by dd9jn (✭ supporter ✭, #4459)
[Link] (6 responses)
Posted Oct 10, 2014 7:21 UTC (Fri)
by kleptog (subscriber, #1183)
[Link] (2 responses)
Does such a dialog exist for ssh-agent?
Posted Oct 10, 2014 8:37 UTC (Fri)
by dd9jn (✭ supporter ✭, #4459)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Oct 11, 2014 10:51 UTC (Sat)
by kleptog (subscriber, #1183)
[Link]
Posted Oct 10, 2014 10:56 UTC (Fri)
by cortana (subscriber, #24596)
[Link] (2 responses)
Posted Oct 10, 2014 13:37 UTC (Fri)
by dd9jn (✭ supporter ✭, #4459)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Oct 13, 2014 8:53 UTC (Mon)
by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167)
[Link]
1. Add option to disable, but default enabled for existing installs
Posted Oct 10, 2014 9:56 UTC (Fri)
by pbonzini (subscriber, #60935)
[Link]
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
It seems very puzzling to drop something so well tested, minimal, and in such wide use to me also...
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
https://github.com/fail2ban/fail2ban/blob/master/config/a...
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
Even if a scanner will never successfully login, there's no need to humour it by accepting silly numbers of authentication attempts, which have their own costs in bandwidth, CPU time, etc.
If nothing else being blacklisted will signal to you/the users of a trusted machine that something seems dubious, in the absence of anyone bothering to read the logs.
OpenSSH 6.7 released
sshd: 1.2.3.0/24
ALL: ALL
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
Unfortunately, GnuPG 2.1 now hardcodes the socket path, which makes this a little bit less convenient – can't have different sockets per session anymore (as a result, if you close the 'forwarding' session, all other sessions break), and can't even use forwarded and locally-running gpg-agent from different sessions.
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
OpenSSH 6.7 released
2. Add warning when user has not made explicit choice to enable / disable
3. Change default to disabled
4. Remove warning
OpenSSH 6.7 released