Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
The Tor project has now posted the first alpha builds of the soon-to-be-released Tor Browser Bundle 3.0, which provides a newer and faster anonymous-browsing experience from previous editions, but revamps a number of interface settings for simplicity. Tor's architecture can be on the confusing side for many people, so (in theory) improved ease-of-use translates into fewer accidentally-insecure browsing sessions. The project is also taking the first steps into other important features, like a means for verifying binary builds.
The browser at the heart of the Tor Browser Bundle is a derivative of Firefox; the 3.0 release will be based on Firefox 17 Extended Support Release (ESR). It incorporates several changes from the upstream Firefox, including settings and extensions that guard the user's anonymity and a pre-configured pipeline to the anonymizing Tor network. In addition to piping all browser traffic through Tor, the bundle includes the HTTPS Everywhere extension to force TLS/SSL connections to a wide variety of sites, NoScript to selectively disable JavaScript and other executable content, and Torbutton for one-click toggling of Tor transport.
The new bundles are available on the Tor site. There are packages for OS X and Windows as well as both 32-bit and 64-bit Linux systems, all in a variety of localizations. The Linux builds are compressed tar archives; they can be uncompressed to virtually any location and run with standard user permissions.
Previous releases of the bundle included Vidalia, a standalone Tor controller which allowed the user to start and stop the Tor network connection, as well as tweak its settings. In the 3.0 browser series, Vidalia has been replaced with a Tor Launcher browser extension, which performs the same basic function. Users who require more customization can still run Vidalia separately. As such, there is a tad less "bundle" to the new Tor Browser Bundle, but there is also less complexity to fret over.
This streamlining of the user experience is evidently a conscious decision on the project's part; it is mentioned first in the blog announcement of the alpha. But there is more. The new release also includes a new default home page, a local about:tor URI.
![[Tor Browser about:tor]](https://static.lwn.net/images/2013/06-torbrowser-about-sm.png)
This page provides Tor status information, a "secure search" bar utilizing the Startpage search engine, and links to some informational resources about both privacy and how to get more involved in the Tor project. Perhaps the biggest difference, though, is that this page reports whether or not Tor has been successfully started.
This has the potential to be an important change for users in the field; the old version of the browser was set to visit https://check.torproject.org/ as the default homepage. While it, too, checks that Tor is running, it has the drawback of doing so by immediately requesting a remote page, and that could be a security risk for those users who run the Tor browser to evade surveillance. After all, if Tor is not running for some reason when the browser launches, that information could be intercepted via the HTTPS request. In addition, although Tor has greatly improved its bandwidth in recent years, connecting to a remote site could be slow. The about:tor page performs a local test to ensure that Tor is in fact functioning, and check.torproject.org is still accessible as a link.
The Tor Launch extension also fires up a "first run" wizard the
first time it is run (obviously) that asks whether the user's
Internet connection is "clear of obstacles
" or is
"censored, filtered, or proxied
". Choosing the first
option launches Tor in normal mode without any special settings;
choosing the second provides a set of settings windows into which one
can enter proxy addresses, open firewall ports that Tor should use,
and bridge relay
addresses to which Tor should connect. Manually entering bridge
relay addresses is an added security layer; the addresses are not
published, so they are much harder for censors to monitor or block in
advance. On the other hand, one must obtain the addresses "out of
band" so to speak—usually by emailing the Tor project.
![[Tor Browser launcher]](https://static.lwn.net/images/2013/06-torbrowser-launcher-sm.png)
The first-run wizard is a nice feature, although it is puzzling why it is configured to only run one time. After all, surely it is fairly common for Tor Browser users to run the software from a laptop. The user can get to the wizard again by punching the "Options" button on the "Tor is starting up" window that appears when the browser is launched, but speed is required on anything resembling modern hardware. On my machine, the startup window only appeared for 1.5 seconds at most. Alternatively, resetting the extensions.torlauncher.prompt_at_startup preference to "true" in about:config brings it back as well; it is simply odd not to have a setting available.
There are other changes to the 3.0 alpha builds, including a "guided" extraction for Windows users, which assists the user to install the browser in a convenient and hopefully difficult-to-forget location on the system, and overall reductions in the sizes of the downloaded packages. All builds are now less than 25MB in size, a size chosen because it makes it possible to send the package as an attachment in GMail.
The announcement also highlights a change in the project's build
infrastructure. The Tor Browser Bundle is now built with Gitian trusted-build tool, which is
designed to allow independent developers to compile bit-identical
binaries, thus providing a means for verifying the integrity of a
binary package. The Tor Browser is not yet " As a browser, naturally, the Tor Browser is quite solid. The
update to Firefox 17 ESR brings with it a host of improved web
features—although one notable addition, Firefox's built-in PDF
viewer, was not introduced until Firefox 19, so its functionality in
Tor Browser comes via the official
add-on instead. The PDF reader extension is (like more and more
Mozilla projects) implemented in JavaScript. But users will
inevitably find using Tor Browser a somewhat frustrating affair simply
because of how many sites these days rely on JavaScript and
other potentially-privacy-harming techniques. There is no silver bullet for
that problem; the best one can do is delve into NoScript exception
rules to restore functionality for specific, trusted sites.
There does not appear to be a full list of the preferences that Tor
Browser changes from the upstream Firefox release, although there are
several (e.g., it is set to never record browsing history or save
passwords). It is also a bit strange that the bundled extensions do
not include a cookie-management tool, but perhaps this is in the
interest of simplicity for the user. Finally, it is also surprising
that the builds offer no tools for finding Tor hidden
services. Hidden services are not directly related to anonymous
access to the Internet, but the project does use the browser bundle to
promote other efforts, like SSL Observatory, which is
included in the HTTPS Everywhere Extension. Still, perhaps providing
any sort of hidden service index would simply be crossing into
services best left to others.
So far there are few known issues to report, but there will
certainly be some during the alpha and beta testing cycle. The only
real caveat for power users is that the increased simplicity of the
bundle means less flexibility. The absence of Vidalia has already
been mentioned; one can also run the browser with an existing
transparent Tor router (a feature that in previous releases was
explicitly presented to the user) by jumping through some hoops.
Using the browser with a transparent router now requires setting the
TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH environment variable to 1. Of course, with a
Tor router already running, adding the Tor Browser to the mix
essentially just gives the user Firefox with fewer extensions and
plugins, but perhaps that is desirable from time to time. Then again,
where anonymity is concerned, maybe you can't be too careful.quite at the point
where you always get a matching build
", the announcement says,
but it is getting closer. Gitian is already in use by a handful of
other projects like Bitcoin.
Index entries for this article Security Internet/Tor
Posted Jun 20, 2013 6:08 UTC (Thu)
by intrigeri (subscriber, #82634)
[Link]
The author seems to be under the mistaken belief that the TBB ships with JavaScript disabled by default. This is not the case: NoScript is installed for the various other kinds of protections it provides, but is set to allow JavaScript globally by default.
Posted Jun 20, 2013 10:42 UTC (Thu)
by rswarbrick (guest, #47560)
[Link] (1 responses)
It turns out that these are quite difficult hoops to jump through. You need to do more than just change the proxy settings on your connection. You will also want to turn off the "safe browsing" feature, for example, since that reports all the websites you're visiting. And there is a list of about 10 other steps you have to take. Basically, setting things up like this turns out to be really error-prone. This is why Tor have switched from the TorButton model to bundling up an entire browser.
I should say that at first when I looked at this I was aghast at how wasteful it was: "We can't write an extension, so we decided to make you install a server and a browser". But now I understand a bit better and it looks like they are doing the right thing.
Posted Jul 2, 2013 11:29 UTC (Tue)
by robbe (guest, #16131)
[Link]
As you elaborate in your post, this makes a lot of sense if you already have Tor running. Nates statement that the TBB's browser is just a version with less extensions and safer config *is* a bit of an understatement.
Posted Jun 20, 2013 18:02 UTC (Thu)
by jimparis (guest, #38647)
[Link] (2 responses)
There's definitely a solution for that problem: remove the ability of JavaScript to disclose any private information. For network and IP address privacy, use something like a VM with NAT and appropriate firewalling, so that the browser won't see anything except a LAN IP address, and so that all packets are necessarily routed through Tor. And if you're concerned about maintaining privacy between sites and tabs, run multiple isolated browsers.
It seems to me that running https://tails.boum.org/ inside a VM would be much more trustworthy than a browser bundle from this point of view. Even other barely-sensitive stuff like computer model or screen resolution will be better hidden inside a VM.
Posted Jun 26, 2013 13:08 UTC (Wed)
by njwhite (guest, #51848)
[Link] (1 responses)
Things like screen resolution, installed fonts etc can add up to quite a reasonable way of tracking when taken together; see https://panopticlick.eff.org/
You're right a VM would be a way to combat this, but it would take a lot more resources, be harder to get right cross platform, and certainly push things way over the nice 25MB limit. Better would be to have a firefox addon which just misreports this stuff, and maybe regularly changes it, as you're getting at above.
Posted Jul 2, 2013 11:25 UTC (Tue)
by robbe (guest, #16131)
[Link]
Posted Jul 2, 2013 11:22 UTC (Tue)
by robbe (guest, #16131)
[Link]
More is done in patches to firefox.
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
Tor peels back Browser Bundle 3.0 alpha
> Browser changes from the upstream Firefox release,
I think it is no more than
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/HEAD:/b...
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/tree/HEAD:/s...
looks like a good high-level overview.