| From: |
| Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com> |
| To: |
| linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org |
| Subject: |
| [RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support |
| Date: |
| Tue, 4 Sep 2012 11:55:06 -0400 |
| Message-ID: |
| <1346774117-2277-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> |
| Cc: |
| linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org |
| Archive‑link: | |
Article |
The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a
user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS, even if that user has
administrative privileges. This is an initial attempt at a set of patches
to reduce root's ability to modify the kernel. We've done this with an
additional capability for a couple of reasons:
1) CAP_SYS_RAWIO already covers pretty much everything we want, but also
disables a lot of functionality that we don't want to lose. Following
the same model seems reasonable.
2) This capability may be more generically useful for some use-cases.
Adding a set of hardcoded is_secure_boot() checks in the same places would
prevent that.
Feedback welcome.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
