Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch
[Posted January 18, 2012 by jake]
| From: |
| Andrew Lutomirski <luto-AT-mit.edu> |
| To: |
| Casey Schaufler <casey-AT-schaufler-ca.com> |
| Subject: |
| Re: [PATCH PLACEHOLDER 1/3] fs/exec: "always_unprivileged" patch |
| Date: |
| Sun, 15 Jan 2012 14:07:32 -0800 |
| Message-ID: |
| <CAObL_7F4hEvdyJLNhodOOETTv-Dur8gEadLkzESQWFC2C57t7w@mail.gmail.com> |
| Cc: |
| Linus Torvalds <torvalds-AT-linux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie-AT-shareable.org>,
Will Drewry <wad-AT-chromium.org>, linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org,
keescook-AT-chromium.org, john.johansen-AT-canonical.com,
serge.hallyn-AT-canonical.com, coreyb-AT-linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore-AT-redhat.com, eparis-AT-redhat.com, djm-AT-mindrot.org,
segoon-AT-openwall.com, rostedt-AT-goodmis.org, jmorris-AT-namei.org,
scarybeasts-AT-gmail.com, avi-AT-redhat.com, penberg-AT-cs.helsinki.fi,
viro-AT-zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo-AT-elte.hu, akpm-AT-linux-foundation.org,
khilman-AT-ti.com, borislav.petkov-AT-amd.com, amwang-AT-redhat.com,
oleg-AT-redhat.com, ak-AT-linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet-AT-gmail.com,
gregkh-AT-suse.de, dhowells-AT-redhat.com, daniel.lezcano-AT-free.fr,
linux-fsdevel-AT-vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module-AT-vger.kernel.org, olofj-AT-chromium.org,
mhalcrow-AT-google.com, dlaor-AT-redhat.com, corbet-AT-lwn.net,
alan-AT-lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk |
| Archive‑link: | |
Article |
On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 1:32 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 12:59 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 15, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Casey Schaufler
>> <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 1/14/2012 12:22 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>>>>
>>>> And yes, I really seriously do believe that is both safer and simpler
>>>> than some model that says "you can drop stuff", and then you have to
>>>> start making up rules for what "dropping" means.
>>>>
>>>> Does "dropping" mean allowing setuid(geteuid()) for example? That *is*
>>>> dropping the uid in a _POSIX_SAVED_IDS environment. And I'm saying
>>>> that no, we should not even allow that. It's simply all too "subtle".
>>>
>>>
>>> I am casting my two cents worth behind Linus. Dropping
>>> privilege can be every bit as dangerous as granting privilege
>>> in the real world of atrocious user land code. Especially in
>>> the case of security policy enforcing user land code.
>>
>> Can you think of *any* plausible attack that is possible with my patch
>> (i.e. no_new_privs allows setuid, setresuid, and capset) that would be
>> prevented or even mitigated if I blocked those syscalls? I can't.
>> (The sendmail-style attack is impossible with no_new_privs.)
>
>
> I am notoriously bad at coming up with this sort of example.
> I will try, I may not hit the mark, but it should be close.
>
> The application is running with saved uid != euid when
> no-new-privs is set. It execs a new binary, which keeps
> the saved and effective uids. The program calls setreuid,
> which succeeds. It opens the saved userid's files.
If you don't trust that binary, then why are you execing it with saved
uid != euid in the first place? If you are setting no_new_privs, then
you are new code and should have at least some basic awareness of the
semantics. The exact same "exploit" is possible if you have
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE with either no_new_privs semantics -- if you have a
privilege and you run untrusted code, then you had better remove that
privilege somehow for the untrusted code.
IOW, *drop privileges if you are a sandbox*. Otherwise you're screwed
with or without no_new_privs.
Another way of saying this is: no_new_privs is not a sandbox. It's
just a way to make it safe for sandboxes and other such weird things
processes can do to themselves safe across execve. If you want a
sandbox, use seccomp mode 2, which will require you to set
no_new_privs.
--Andy
