Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
Posted Nov 20, 2009 15:14 UTC (Fri) by drag (guest, #31333)In reply to: Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation by hppnq
Parent article: Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
> And you seriously prefer that over sudo or configuring it properly? Am
I
missing something?
I usually prefer to at least try to make something better rather then just
shrugging and keeping it insecure because it's easier that way.
> In the corporate environments where I work security and functionality
are
not at all tied to the desktop,
In most places security on desktops is rather important because that is
were people get most of their work done and they use desktops to access
everything else on the network. This is because they use things like
passwords and kerberos tickets as access controls.. if the desktops the
people are using is insecure then so is their access to everything else on
the network.
They'll use single sign on and things of that nature because the #1 (by a
huge margin) threat
to security is weak passwords and requiring users to remember multiple
passwords and type in passwords all the time is entirely counter
productive. It's absolutely critical that they make it as easy and
convenient as possible to use secure passwords. So the place the 'ticket'
is cache'd in very important as is the places people type their passwords
and access other services from; which of course is the desktop.
If all the desktop is nothing more then a overgrown a terminal then that's
easy... just deny
everything to everybody. But that's not the reality of many places.
None of this is really rocket science and policykit is not the huge bloated
monster that people are trying to pretend that it is. Server environments
are much simpler and much easier to manage, which is one of the reasons
Linux is popular on the servers, but is unpopular on the desktop. "Group
Policy" is, indeed, one of the killer features when it comes to something
like Active Directory. Policykit can provide one aspect of what people
consider 'group policy' and things like Sabayon provide the other half.
Posted Nov 20, 2009 16:08 UTC (Fri)
by clugstj (subscriber, #4020)
[Link] (6 responses)
Posted Nov 20, 2009 16:24 UTC (Fri)
by drag (guest, #31333)
[Link] (5 responses)
1. Did not put it in the release announcements.
2. Made it default for all local users. It should of only been the default for the initial user.
That was the big mistakes.
The passwordless stuff is actually a good feature though. Asking for the user's password is just
This is a huge misconception that prompting the user for their password multiple times is useful
The number #1 threat to Linux desktop security is weak passwords. Requiring the user to use the
If you still desire a password for regular desktop events then it should probably be a third 'admin'
Posted Nov 20, 2009 16:33 UTC (Fri)
by clugstj (subscriber, #4020)
[Link] (4 responses)
Posted Nov 20, 2009 16:47 UTC (Fri)
by drag (guest, #31333)
[Link] (3 responses)
Posted Nov 20, 2009 19:45 UTC (Fri)
by dskoll (subscriber, #1630)
[Link] (2 responses)
The use case is "Being able to perform daily desktop activities without granting access to the root account". That's all.
sudo grants restricted access to the root account. So does Policy Kit. The technical details differ (sudo does it in-process with a SUID binary; Policy Kit does it via IPC to a daemon running as root), but you're just quibbling over semantics by claiming that Policy Kit does not grant "access to the root account." Note that I have no strong preferences for sudo over Policy Kit except for the general observation that very granular and tweakable security facilities are often harder to get right than less granular ones. However, as long as distros do a good job of providing sensible Policy Kit defaults, then Policy Kit is fine. The big issue was that F12's (now reverted) policy was not very sensible.
Posted Nov 20, 2009 21:18 UTC (Fri)
by drag (guest, #31333)
[Link] (1 responses)
Posted Nov 20, 2009 22:07 UTC (Fri)
by dskoll (subscriber, #1630)
[Link]
However the Dbus IPC is sockets-based. Nothing exotic like a shared memory scheme or anything like that. It gives users root access via those privileged daemons in the a similar manner that having httpd running as root gives remote users root access over port 80. Except there are two huge differences:
So it's not the case that all the security lies in dbus. The security lies in dbus and the policy kit daemon and in making sure your policies are correctly implemented. It's the last two (especially the last one) that will cause trouble. I'm not convinced that a root-privileged daemon that sanitizes its input is any more or less secure than a SUID binary that sanitizes its environment, etc. It seems to me neither approach is inherently more or less secure.
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
screwed up on two accounts:
security theater because they have already proven their identity through passwords by being able to
log in before. In addition to that prompting users for their user password offers almost no protection
against attacker dwelling in their user account.
security. It actually is more likely to make things worse since it encourages bad password policy and
numbs the user against real security concerns. Prompting them for the root password is counter
productive since the whole goal is to eliminate access to root in addition to promoting the same bad
password behaviors and encouraging the user to ignore real security concerns.
same passwords multiple times or requiring them to use passwords for regular events is making the
problem worse. Regularly popping up warning dialogs is very bad also. Either they have the rights to
perform the action or they don't.. bugging them over and over again when they have rights to the
action is very 'windows-like' in it's bad behavior.
password that is not root and is not the user's password. Even though that is still mostly theater it's
probably a good compormize.
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
> Still haven't seen a use case that would have been difficult/impossible to implement with
"sudo". Why the wheel reinvention?
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
The use case is "Being able to perform daily desktop activities without granting access to the root
account". That's all. Like I said people are trying to make this too complicated or something. I don't
know.
The one use case that most people are probably using now and don't give a shit about is the ability to
hotplug
cameras and USB devices on their desktops. I haven't heard anybody screaming about this for a long
time.. not since it was initially introduced and they mistakenly setup the policy for Gnome users to
automount any volume and not just removable media.
That's traditionally root-only action that eliminated a big reason for using sudo on the desktop and
increased the usability of the Linux desktop in a huge way. No root
password prompt
and no user password prompt. This goes for cdroms, usb keys, cameras, and other things. Would it
make sense to deny the users this feature if they are not members of wheel and go back to
requiring them to use sudo if they were members?
The ability to perform that action is configurable through policykit and users can decide the automount
policy through configuring apps residing entirely in their user account. Administrators can configure all
of this through the policykit/sabayon type stuff combined with other *kit things.
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
Yeah. The defaults were not that sensible. Only one user should be
administrator and it should of been apparent in the release documentation.
Fedora 12 to remove unprivileged package installation
However the Dbus IPC is sockets-based. Nothing exotic like a shared memory
scheme or anything like that. It gives users root access via those
privileged daemons in the a similar manner that having httpd running as
root
gives remote users root access over port 80.
So ya any security issues in dbus itself or the dbus libraries that
applications use would quite easily lead to a compromise and that is
something that distros and developers are going to have to be very careful
about. As long as that is audited and user supplied input over dbus is
carefully managed
then it should reduce the attack vector for attackers seeking local root
exploits by quite a bit for typical desktop users (vs traditional linux
desktop
were open sudo and su access are regularly used features)
Policy Kit vs sudo