A cost analysis of Vista content protection

Posted Dec 28, 2006 15:33 UTC (Thu) by i3839 (guest, #31386)
In reply to: A cost analysis of Vista content protection by csamuel
Parent article: A cost analysis of Vista content protection

Diffie-Hellman doesn't protect against man-in-the-middle attacks, so some form of authentication would be still needed. And for that there needs to be keys both in hardware and the driver.

The key in the driver could be replaced with any key the attacker wants, and then the authentication would seem to succeed and unencrypted content would be received by the fake videocard. I don't believe they're so stupid to bet on this...

But maybe they do, as it appears that the driver needs to do checks, and checks can be bypassed, so what the hell are they thinking? If the driver needs to do any checks then the system is broken by design.

A cost analysis of Vista content protection

Posted Jan 23, 2007 10:43 UTC (Tue) by i3839 (guest, #31386) [Link]

It seems they were indeed so stupid as this, both Blueray and HD-DVD are cracked because the encryption keys can be fished out of ram. Pathetic.