OCI is an antiquated format, not fit for modern security requirements

Which is all nice and well, until you _need_ to have a component that is allowed to do such actions (eg: it needs to capture live dumps in order to keep a fleet maintainable), and it gets compromised

> Yes, although the Linux kernel is all one privilege level; implementing components in userspace we can actually e.g. have the thing parsing signatures and doing crypto actually dropping a lot of other ambient privileges.

Which is why virtualization-based security levels are being worked on, to split the kernel into multiple privilege levels too.

> I hope you'd agree that basically what we're talking about is having one bit of the kernel wire up some state to another bit of the kernel; there's no relationship to hardware.

Sure, it's an example, the point was to show that it is widely accepted that having hard security boundaries is widely accepted as good and necessary, and that delegating certain tasks to userspace and hoping for the best is not acceptable anymore for certain things, e.g. one wouldn't do that with the handling of a plain-text private key for a production system. The same principle applies to other security policies, in different contexts.