LWN: Comments on "How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)"

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

nix — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 17:31:16 +0000

OK, so you actually *enjoy* having people point out that you are restricting the distribution and use of your own software through being pointlessly confrontational and antisocial?!

It is beyond me to see why anyone would value such a thing. (But then, I spent a huge proportion of my time over the past thirty-plus years attempting to become less abrasive and socially uncomprehending: I guess that makes it hard for me to see why attempting to make people dislike you could be considered a *good* thing.)

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

nix — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 17:29:11 +0000

I believe the line was "if you didn't use code written by assholes, your system would not boot". However, that doesn't mean one should go out of one's way to encourage developers in critical positions to be as unpleasant as possible!

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

ortalo — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 12:51:03 +0000

Dah.

We need to break that dichotomy between "users are not interested in security - look I can break their system any day in 2012" and "they found a DoS on my personal worthless phone and want me to stop me from making calls for business for one year - theses security guys are ivory tower idiots". (Note how both statements are equally stupid.)

That dichotomy *is* a problem. Maybe it has been maintained for a long time by people taking advantage of it for their own interest (such as writing reports about how long that single bug took to fix in the kernel, or grabbing budgets for entirely unsecure e-voting machines and other miscellaneous devices).
It has also been maintained by some of our short sightedness. We are culprit of not having studied enough the reasons for the existing disagrement on the level of necessary computer security mechanism in our systems, it deserves more studying.

Stated differently, the day we will say "that performance/usability vs. security debate is over, we know how to decide and agree on such questions (without forking entirely different systems)" - that day we will be able to claim higher security than proprietary systems. And that's doable.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

mathstuf — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 03:51:47 +0000

It's called "ApnSwitch" if scrolling through the app is too annoying (it is for me).

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

jldugger — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 20:09:26 +0000

A brief survey of my student system administrator population suggests that even here, 50 percent is a good estimate.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

nye — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 11:54:47 +0000

I'll try to remember that, thanks.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

hummassa — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 10:20:32 +0000

You apparently chose your handset poorly. Mine went from 2.3.x to 4.0, then 4.0.1, then 4.1, then 4.1.1, then 4.2, 4.2.1, and some days ago to 4.2.2.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

draco — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 03:59:44 +0000

YMMV, but my last (Android) smartphone got 1 OTA update over the course of 2.5 years. Something tells me it wasn't because the software was so secure it didn't need an update...

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

mathstuf — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 01:45:10 +0000

There's a widget in the F-Droid repo which allows you to turn of the data signal. It still acts as a phone, but if you know data service is going to be spotty, you can save lots of battery that way.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

mathstuf — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 01:22:58 +0000

This[1] could become a reality. It also looks like some have tried[2] (not that I'd trust any of those as-is).

[1]http://ipadpockettees.com/
[2]http://news.tacticalpants.com/the-perfect-ipad-2-pants-po...

Bacteria on cellphones

man_ls — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 19:07:38 +0000

Looking up how to do something. If your in the midst of working on your car, plumbing, heart surgery, or whatever then you can easily find videos, howtos, and guides for most anything quickly.

Just in case some real doctors just came out from hibernation, are reading this and planning to take their cellphones to their next operation: many bacteria are found in cellphones, including methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus. For the rest of you: wash your hands after fondling your smartphone and before doing the same to your closest ones, or cooking dinner. They are filthy!

Also a smartphone

man_ls — Tue, 19 Feb 2013 18:59:01 +0000

In case you did not notice: what you are carrying around is called a smartphone. Yes, even primitive Symbian devices were smartphones. They are not defined by the big screens or the short battery life, but by having a general purpose OS with the ability to load user programs.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dpquigl — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 15:45:21 +0000

You're right I was confused. I was looking through the PaX slides you referenced above and it had GRSecurity and RSBAC right next to each other so I associated them together. So yes the correct comparison would be SELinux against your RBAC mechanism.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

spender — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 15:21:38 +0000

I think you may be confused still ;) Grsecurity has its own RBAC system (I haven't given it a fancy name) which is included in the grsecurity patch. RSBAC is a totally different project, different authors, etc. It's not related to grsecurity in any way.

-Brad

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dpquigl — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:03:14 +0000

I stand corrected. I thought it was part of your work with GRSecurity. Its good to see that its separated out so that if someone wanted to use it they could. However If I was going to roll my own kernel with RSBAC in it I'd just use the GRSecurity patches and get all the extra goodies that go along with it.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

spender — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:01:17 +0000

RSBAC is a completely separate project ;)

http://www.rsbac.org

-Brad

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dpquigl — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:57:04 +0000

Correction its RSBAC not RBAC.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dpquigl — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:50:58 +0000

You may find some people that think LSMs are enough but everyone I've spoken to (LSM authors) realize that the LSMs are really only access control models and that other parts of the kernel need to be hardened as well. That being said as someone who worked on SELinux it wasn't my job to harden the kernel. My job was to do research and we used SELinux as a platform. If it got merged upstream all the better. If it was something that someone like Red Hat wanted then I had more help in getting stuff upstream. Spenders main issue is with a community that seems indifferent at best and openly hostile at worse to handling security related issues. Its also that some of his features would not be as palatable with the subsystem maintainers that they would interact with.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

nye — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:49:23 +0000

>And battery life is overrated ?

Battery life if obviously a trade-off against what you want to do. If you want to do those things, it's not reasonable to expect that battery life will not be reduced.

(To take the argument ad absurdum, I could suggest that it's stupid to have a mobile phone at all when a landline never needs charging, but almost everyone acknowledges that having the extra mobility in exchange for the necessity of charging batteries is a worthwhile trade-off.)

If you literally never need any of those facilities, then of course a smartphone is a bad choice; that shouldn't even need saying.

If you *might occasionally* need them but don't use them in the normal course of events, the battery life is likely to be on the same order as a dumbphone. It will be less, to be sure, but not ten times less - you might be looking at around a week versus two weeks. The reason a smartphone's battery life is typically less in practice is that it turns out people want and use those features.

This isn't theoretical BTW; on some very rare occasions I've left my phone largely unused for a week or more and not had the battery run out, and it's an HTC Desire which is now pretty long in the tooth and wasn't particularly known for its stellar battery life even new.

(Random addendum: the real battery-killer is of course travelling, as the phone desperately tries to find a connection presumably by boosting its output power, then has to do it all over again 30 seconds later. Back when I had a non-smart mobile phone, it would have a battery life of around two weeks, or three hours on a train, which is a bit of a bugger really. Things don't seem to have improved much in that department.)

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dpquigl — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:41:59 +0000

Spender repeatedly spouts the false dichotomy that its either GRSecurity or SELinux. Lets clear something up right now. SELinux is an access control model. GRSecurity is a set of security enhancements to a bunch of places in the kernel including kernel memory protections using PaX. GRSecurity also includes their own access control model in the form of RBAC (Rule Based Access Control) where they have their own learning mode. The parts that you should compare SELinux and GRSecurity to are SELinux and GRSecurity RBAC. We in the SELinux community do not claim to do any sort of kernel level exploit mitigation and we never have. The best we could ever do is make policies that restrict avenues of attack for kernel exploits but we do not do anything to mitigate damage at a kernel level. As spender has pointed out the default policies for Fedora are very permissive because they have traded off some usability for strict security. We have people who use much stricter policies which restrict far more but those are in applications where the need for security far exceeds the need for usability. Those deployments are where the machine in question is acting mostly as an appliance which will never be interacted with directly.

All that being said Spender and PaXTeam do tons of great work. I would love to see a lot of their code merged into mainline but the likelyhood of that happening isn't very good. If you use a Hardened Gentoo kernel you'll actually get a kernel with PaX protections with some GRSecurity features and SELinux enabled which I think is an awesome thing. As Spender showcased above he does not play politics or suffer fools. What he doesn't seem to care about is that most of the kernel inclusion process is politics. We've seen it before with competing implementations of features where the person in the "in crowd" got their implementation chosen over someone who had been working on the problem for a very long time with a large user base. That coupled with a hostile attitude from upstream about security (Linus has repeatedly called security people crazy, Spender and SELinux people included) makes it hard to dedicate time to working on getting things upstreamed.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

ibukanov — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:33:18 +0000

> Smartphones are more insecure ... than modern computers.

Insecure in what sense? A typical application on Windows/Mac/Linux PC can read/change all my data, but this is not so on Android. The only advantage of a PC AFAICS is the hardware visualization so OS can run wireless and other complex drivers isolated from the rest of the system. But such advantage is mostly theoretical as very few PC utilizes that.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

nye — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:33:01 +0000

>every single one of my telephonic correspondents who has a smartphone (even the highly technical ones) has terrible trouble actually getting it to work as a phone

I submit that this is largely selection/confirmation bias.

There are at least a couple of *billion* people with smartphones, the majority of whom are entirely non-technical and have no trouble using one as a phone. If the situation were even remotely as bad as you suggest, it would be very obvious.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

ibukanov — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:25:05 +0000

For wikipedia and maps one does not need a smart phone. I have relatively dumb phone with a tiny (less than 2 inch), but readable screen. It runs Java and Google has good clients for Mail and Maps. Opera Mini provides the rest. The phone lasts one week on a single charge with occasional mail/web usage and bluetooth data connections. The phone is lighter than most smart phones and does work when it is -20C (-4F) outside.

As a big bonus the complexity of software on the phone is much less than what is available on a typical smartphone so I can trust it more.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

imitev — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 10:20:10 +0000

> or 4, they respond when someone points out a problem and work to close that problem, but are not willing to sacrifice performance based on theoretical problems that they see no possible way to exploit

Well the *class* of exploits that grsecurity prevents looks rather practical to me (and if it was only theoretical why would security companies even bother using it?), so we'll have to agree to disagree.

> The kernel developers have removed code that they had the legal right to include in the kernel because the author of the code wanted them to.

Code != concepts. So OK, the problem is then with patents.
Let's have a look at virtualization: one would think that it's a patent minefield compared to security, but we continue to enjoy a steady rate of improvements and new features in that area. Maybe it's just that it's more fun and interesting to develop than security. Or not: companies make money selling virtualization products, or save money buying them to optimize their computing resources. Meanwhile, security is not only costly, with no immediate benefits, but it also prevents your employees from getting the work done in a quick&dirty way, it makes users yell at sysadmins, and a few other dozen complaints. You just realize how nice it would have been when your systems are compromised. And on the other side, if you invested in it, you might not see any effect since you effectively decreased the chance somebody would manage to hack you. I'm wandering too far, but the point is that security is a difficult sell, I don't think it has anything to do with legal stuff. People are just not interested.

> Well, he would have to make a case that he needed to be paid by them

I don't understand how your comment relates to what I've written.
There seems to be an assumption that Spender needs money and should be paid to push features upstream; I hope for him he's already well paid between sponsoring, consulting, and (maybe) selling exploits. I anticipate you'll ask why he's then bothering trying to advertise his superior features, maybe he's just trying to prove a point and have some recognition for the work he's doing - very human, after all. Granted, with a complete lack of diplomacy.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dlang — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 08:06:18 +0000

or 4, they respond when someone points out a problem and work to close that problem, but are not willing to sacrifice performance based on theoretical problems that they see no possible way to exploit.

They are also far too busy reviewing and accepting code where the author wants it to be part of the kernel to go hunting around for code that may exist, may or may not have bugs, may or may not apply to the core kernel without problems, and may or may not even be legally released.

one of the side effects of the SCO fiasco is that they require that people attest that they have the right to contribute the code that they submit. Just saying 'someone slapped a GPL tag on it' isn't going to be good enough

The kernel developers have removed code that they had the legal right to include in the kernel because the author of the code wanted them to. They aren't about to go hunting for code who's author may oppose what they do with it.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dlang — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 07:56:42 +0000

Well, he would have to make a case that he needed to be paid by them.

And as part of the application, he would need to show that he can work with the community, which would be a fairly hard thing to do given his current attitude

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

imitev — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 07:32:15 +0000

> the kernel people want to understand what the problem is, look at the impact of doing things, and try to find a solution that both solves the problem and doesn't hurt performance.

My feeling with kernel security is that performance and compatibility with broken stuff gets the priority over security. LWN's fine editors have been outlining the lack of focus on security - albeit with diplomacy and subtlety - for quite some time, so it's not just me.

grsecurity is GPL, so the personality of developers isn't relevant: whatever they think of Spender's behavior, any of the kernel people you mention could rip and push gresecurity solutions/concepts upstream. But this doesn't happen. So 1/ either kernel people who have enough "power" to push for such changes are not interested in security, or 2/ they won't look at spender's work just because they don't like him, or 3/ grsecurity features are useless. Kernel devs are not in kindergarten and if we assume that security-conscious companies who use grsecurity know what they are doing, that leaves us with 1/

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

anselm — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 07:15:14 +0000

I'm pretty sure spender doesn't work on grsec professionally for the same reason that Linus doesn't work on Linux professionally. If he had to declare loyalty to one company, it would create a conflict of interest.

If that were the case, the obvious move would be for the Linux Foundation to pay him a stipend just like they're paying Linus.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

dlang — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 06:26:42 +0000

> ..for the same reason that Linus doesn't work on Linux professionally.

Umm, Linus does work on Linux as his full-time paid job, he has for quite a few years.

He avoided working at any distro, but he is one of several people who are paid by the Linux Foundation to work on Linux full-time.

creating fixes that almost nobody runs isn't a very effective thing to be doing. if they produced 1/10 as many fixes, but those fixes got into the upstream kernel their effect on the world would be much larger.

The problem is that they want to just say "security says we need to do this" and have whatever they have provided accepted.

the kernel people want to understand what the problem is, look at the impact of doing things, and try to find a solution that both solves the problem and doesn't hurt performance. That's not what Spender and Paxteam want, they seem to want people to accept and run whatever they provide.

There are other developers who work this way, and a few of them do have an impact (Theo, djb, and Jörg Schilling are three examples), but they end up fading from relevance over time as other people who work better with others are more effective.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

treed — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 06:18:05 +0000

Sounds like sour grapes to me. The grsecurity guys are pretty bummed that SELinux is getting all of the love.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

px43 — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 06:10:50 +0000

I'm pretty sure spender doesn't work on grsec professionally for the same reason that Linus doesn't work on Linux professionally. If he had to declare loyalty to one company, it would create a conflict of interest. I'm sure any of those places would hire him in a heartbeat if he actually showed any interest. We really do need people like him though, not worrying about politics and doing the shit that needs to be done. Others like bliss and kees can do the rest and work on getting things upstreamed :-)

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

clopez — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 03:48:17 +0000

I only can agree with you.

What strikes me is why Spender was unable yet to get a well-paid full-time job for hacking on grsecurity.

Isn't any of the big Linux distributions focused on the server market (RedHat/SUSE/Oracle/Ubuntu..) interested in shipping hardened kernels? Aren't their customers demanding this? Why?

Is just because they think that with the linux LSMs (SELinux/Apparmor/etc..) is enough?

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

bojan — Sun, 17 Feb 2013 20:45:51 +0000

Let me start by something that I find mostly irrelevant, which is about what I can do. Well, the only thing I can do, I'm pretty much doing here. Essentially, there are people that keep coming up with ways to subvert the kernel, who at the same time claim to have a systematic way of preventing that, while keeping the kernel just as usable (this is how I understand what you claim to have). I would like to have this in my stock kernel.

You keep repeating the history. The only thing this will tell you is what not to do. It is otherwise mostly irrelevant. Also, as a side note, pointing fingers and blaming people (especially saying that everything is 100% someone else's fault in an argument) is simply counter productive.

Now to the real issue. You ask:

> Both the PaX Team and myself do this work in our own free time. It already uses up more of my time than I'm comfortable with. Where do you propose this additional time come from to do the things you suggest?

I propose you spend none of your free time on this. Zero. I propose you get paid to do this. And well.

Linux is a multi billion dollar business. If you can show to any of the companies that are involved (Google, Red Hat, Oracle, Samsung, etc.) that they can sell what you have, they will buy it.

So, in a nutshell: you need to sell it.

Doing things the old "I'm a volunteer who pays my own way to a conference" way isn't going to do it. You should stop fighting "them" and become one of "them" - and get paid for it.

So, when you rock up at a conference (at company expense) and present your work (which has been shipping in a supported product people paid money for), others may listen more closely.

At least there is no downside for you - you would get paid doing what you obviously love doing anyway. And you would have a greater number of users who appreciate your work.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

spender — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 23:08:49 +0000

We've addressed this several times in different places, including:
https://lwn.net/Articles/315164/
http://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/59020/why-are-the...

Read those first. This is the post I'll link to for similar questions in the future.

People who suggest what patrick_g have suggested are generally ignorant of our history and what we've done, and honestly I find the constant suggestions (even if good-intentioned) from people who don't contribute to furthering security or to our project in any way pretty tiresome and rude.

Both the PaX Team and myself do this work in our own free time. It already uses up more of my time than I'm comfortable with. Where do you propose this additional time come from to do the things you suggest? Take note that that additional time isn't a one-time cost, it would be a cost any time we want to push any additions or changes. It would still be a cost to us every time the kernel is updated. If you think otherwise, ask who is currently ensuring that kptr_restrict in the upstream kernel does what it claims?

The only work that interests me is dealing with the unsolved, difficult security problems. I don't want to spend my time playing politics. I paid out of my own pocket in 2010 to attend the Linux Security Summit and present on what the current state of security was in grsecurity and suggesting ways Linux could harden the kernel in the next decade (judging by how long it takes to rip off our features). Do you know how many major kernel developers attended the summit? None! They were all busy in their own non-security subgroups. It was overall an SELinux circlejerk and a waste of time (other than convincing Kees Cook apparently).

What has been suggested was already attempted by Vasiliy Kulikov during the 2011 GSOC. Here were the results:
http://openwall.info/wiki/Owl/kernel-hardening
What got merged upstream as a result of this?
A variant of /proc restrictions from Openwall and grsec (but without my additional changes).
Openwall's HARDEN_SHM as an optional sysctl.

Dan Rosenberg got Openwall's dmesg restriction merged upstream and attempted to get grsecurity's HIDESYM feature merged upstream. While the dmesg feature is complete (not difficult as it's only a single line of code basically) the HIDESYM feature is woefully incomplete and thus quite useless. None of the kernel developers nor Dan himself care to update it so that it does what it claims.

Seriously, this is all! How much time was wasted on all this? Over 600 emails were ultimately sent on the kernel-hardening list alone for this:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/

What have other people done in this area? Ubuntu's kernel hardening roadmap is nearly completely Openwall/grsecurity ripoffs:
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Roadmap/KernelHardening
It hasn't been updated in nearly a year, unsurprisingly not long after Kees Cook left Canonical for Google.

In September, 2012 a "Linux security workgroup" was formed:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2012/09/24/1
They have yet to accomplish anything AFAIK.

I don't believe in wasting time on these top-down exercises, where we build some organization or framework with the expectation that the actual useful people or code will just fall into place. It's almost always a failure. Instead I've put my focus on actually creating things. During the same timeframe as above (2011 to now), what have I alone accomplished?

See http://grsecurity.net/the_case_for_grsecurity.pdf slide 15 onward

Bruteforce deterrence for suid/sgid binaries
Preventing module auto-loading by unprivileged users
Enforcing that only filesystem modules can be loaded via mount
Banning an unprivileged user until reboot if he/she causes a detected kernel corruption
Whitelisting specific slab caches when doing copies between userland and the kernel. A copy_from_user could not be abused, for instance, to perform a copy directly into a task struct now.
Disallowed ptracing unreadable binaries
A multithreaded app's change from uid 0 to non-0 will be shared among all threads. Glibc already does this in userland, but other libcs/languages do not.
Race-free implementation of Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch
Prevented suid apps from being able to have alternate memory layouts
Reduced ability to lessen stack entropy for suid apps
Implemented a special ID to protect various /proc entries against future /proc/pid/mem-style vulnerabilities
Automatically protected /proc entries and other seq_file users against kernel address leakage.
Prevented infoleaking of write timings against block/character devices
Killed reliable technique of overwriting another thread's userland stack due to distros not enabling -fstack-check on network services
Protected the BPF JIT against use for in-kernel arbitrary code execution
Implemented PXN support on ARM with VMSAv7, LPAE on or off
Implemented PAX_KERNEXEC on ARM LPAE
Implemented PAX_KERNEXEC/PAX_UDEREF on ARMv6+

We'd need a couple more pages to list what the PaX Team has accomplished in the same time-frame. The "toolchain support" section of http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/PaXTeam-LATINOWARE12-PaX-l...
lists just some of these.

Now that the general ignorance has been laid bare, do you really want to demand that I waste the time I currently spend creating the above and put it toward fighting with Linus and others to get a measly percentage of these previous improvements merged upstream? It's telling really that on this site, people want to complain to or insult the messenger instead of asking questions and learning something about how security can be improved.

In 2008, we made the case (and proved really, it's not up for debate at this point) that the upstream developers were intentionally covering up security vulnerabilities and that this was harmful for Linux as a whole. The overwhelming response to Linus covering up security vulnerabilities was: "Yes, and?".

In recent news, this has screwed over Linux users yet again with the publication of CVE-2013-0871: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q1/326. The vulnerability was reported to security@ last month and yet across the board there is not a single vendor report or fix. This despite a Red Hat employee committing the fix. I however spotted the fix last month and backported it, as it matched the model I joked about in my H2HC presentation as a way to find silent upstream vuln fixes. Solar Designer's comments in the reply raise some serious questions that people should be asking. If history is any judge, though, they won't, and the status-quo will continue.

The majority of Linux users apparently are happy with the constant cycle of updates, bugfixing as the way to security, the "a bug is a bug" mantra, the appeal-to-authority SELinux, and other associated snake-oil and bad security advice. I'm no longer interested in helping these people; I believe in a security meritocracy. I'm not going to change the minds of users in general who aren't receptive to new ideas. For them, there's an entire parasitic security industry of AV/IDS/IPS/"Cloud" vendors who would be happy to take their money and make them feel good about it.

As I said before, this problem is not about us: it's about you and the rest of the Linux community. What are you doing to push for change from the status-quo? What are you doing to improve security and how it's handled? What are you doing to extend our work? What are you doing to support our work and make our efforts easier?

-Brad

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

hummassa — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 03:42:23 +0000

My phone makes all of the above continuously (I am a heavy, heavy user w/skype, facebook, twitter, gps, bluetooth, two email accounts all active at the same time) and has a maximum battery life of ~30h. It was like 40h when it was still on 2.3 and it got to less than 25h when it went to 4.0, so 30h is ok for me now. Just plug it in every night, and if I forget to do so, it still can survive 'till I get to the office to plug it in there for one hour or so.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

Cyberax — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 03:39:37 +0000

Nah, Spender is almost always correct. He certainly produces something of quality (grsecurity) that is usable and has some interesting technical solutions.

However, nix's arguments about spender's attitude are spot on.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

idupree — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 03:21:48 +0000

Smartphones are more insecure and more expensive (in the U.S.; including the price of mobile data) than modern computers. These will change, but haven't yet.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

bojan — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 01:37:58 +0000

Brad,

Trading insults on LWN may be fun, but given than you seem to care about security, open source, Linux kernel and users, doing the above would be a lot more useful. I would surely appreciate knowing that my latest stock kernel of my fav distros is as good as it can possibly be security wise.

Unfortunately, you should not expect that everyone's a genius when it comes to security. Most people are average or thereabouts, yours truly included. If I was able to get my shitty contribution into kernel proper, I am sure it should be possible for you as well. Patience, will to compromise and listening to points of view of others will be required, however.

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

spender — Sat, 16 Feb 2013 00:11:15 +0000

Well I'm happy that at least you've found a way to feel superior to all involved without having to contribute anything of technical merit yourself!

Let me know when you've made that positive constructive contribution for today.

-Brad

How The Linux Foundation and Fedora are Addressing Workstation Security (Linux.com)

ssmith32 — Fri, 15 Feb 2013 23:36:41 +0000

lol. You just made my day. Seriously, still laughing... :)

You flame the list, make absolutely no useful, constructive suggestions, then proceed make some long walk-around-the-park sarcastic remark about another user.. and then finally link to a collection of comments you curate that describe what a jerk some people say you are?

The last was the part that made me smile.. picturing a guy with his treasured list of "bad things nix said about me today" tucked away in a drawer, crooning over it... "my precious..."

I suppose I'm missing some history here.. you could be a great guy and all in real life, but on the face of it, that is.. so... weirdly anti-social.

Like I said I guess I missed something, but, can't figure out what..

But seriously.. if you don't like the linux people or respect the work or even use the software, why do you bother with it? If you don't like collaboration, why not take djb approach and just write your own kernel? I mean he's a difficult guy too, but he ends up making useful contributions that way.

I'm not the best programmer, I'm sure you could hack the crap out of me, and I struggle with people at time too.. but I do try to make sure I make a positive, constructive contribution to the world at the end of the day..

Take care,
-stu