LWN: Comments on "Unknown root certificate in Firefox" https://lwn.net/Articles/382216/ This is a special feed containing comments posted to the individual LWN article titled "Unknown root certificate in Firefox". en-us Sun, 09 Nov 2025 02:29:21 +0000 Sun, 09 Nov 2025 02:29:21 +0000 https://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification lwn@lwn.net Unknown root certificate in Firefox https://lwn.net/Articles/382349/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382349/ roc <div class="FormattedComment"> The article quote is misleading. It's not as if no-one knows where the certificate came from. It came from RSA. The issue is that the certificate is essentially unmaintained and unused.<br> <p> <a href="http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2010/04/06/removing-the-rsa-security-1024-v3-root/">http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2010/04/06/removing-the-...</a><br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 22:00:56 +0000 Might be just badly documented, not "unknown" https://lwn.net/Articles/382287/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382287/ clump <div class="FormattedComment"> I wondered about that too, though what's in question is the 1024 key not the 2048 key. The same submitter (Kathleen Wilson) calls the 1024 key unknown on April second. <br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 18:43:51 +0000 Might be just badly documented, not "unknown" https://lwn.net/Articles/382278/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382278/ dskoll <p>I hope all the emails to and from RSA and Verisign reps are signed. Otherwise a nice DoS attack could be to call into doubt the validity of a root certificate...</p> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 18:02:39 +0000 Might be just badly documented, not "unknown" https://lwn.net/Articles/382249/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382249/ dwheeler <div class="FormattedComment"> It may be that at least one is just badly documented, not "unknown".<br> <p> If you look here:<br> <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701</a><br> <p> You'll see:<br> <p> =====================================================<br> I received the following in email from an RSA representative:<br> --<br> The ValiCert Class 3 root is still actively in use for certificate<br> validation and cannot be disabled at this time. <br> <p> In the past we used the ValiCert Class 3 root to sign the RSA Public<br> Root CA cert that is covered under our WebTrust audit and is used for<br> the actual issuance of customer CA certs under our RSA Root Signing<br> Service. No new CA signings are being performed under the ValiCert<br> Class 3 root hierarchy, but there are customers that still have active<br> certificates chaining to the ValiCert Class 3 root.<br> ...<br> I would recommend a target date of no earlier than 1/1/2012 for disabling the<br> ValiCert Class 3 root.<br> --<br> <p> I have confirmed that the recent WebTrust audit report covers the "RSA Public<br> Root CA V1" and "RSA Security 2048 V3" root certificates.<br> <a href="https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=981&amp;file=pdf">https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=981&amp;file=pdf</a><br> <p> Therefore, in this bug I will only propose that the "RSA Security 1024 V3" root<br> certificate be removed from NSS.<br> <p> <p> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:48:36 +0000 Unknown root certificate in Firefox https://lwn.net/Articles/382239/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382239/ Kit <div class="FormattedComment"> A project that records the certificates held by different websites would be fairly useful. It could be used in situations like this to see who even uses this cert (as well as the other certs in NSS's database).<br> <p> It could also be used by a browser plugin to help detect man in the middle attacks by rogue CAs (some heuristics could help prevent false positives, such as a changing cert when the prior one was about to expire is less warning-tastic). The browser plugin could help distribute the 'load' of scanning all those https sites, by (optionally) reporting back the certs it sees and the time stamps- which would be a useful thing to do for those that think, say, that the recently added Chinese CA will use it for malicious purposes to capture and record if they actually are.<br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:37:56 +0000 Unknown root certificate in Firefox https://lwn.net/Articles/382241/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382241/ Simon80 <div class="FormattedComment"> If the fear is of someone using this root certificate to enable a man-in-the-middle attack, it's possible to configure the Perspectives extension to watch out for that sort of attack (assuming it works as advertised).<br> <p> I think that Mozilla should consider adding similar functionality to core Firefox, because most of the users that stand to benefit from more thorough SSL cert verification aren't necessarily aware that there's a problem.<br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:35:27 +0000 Unknown root certificate in Firefox https://lwn.net/Articles/382233/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382233/ Trelane <div class="FormattedComment"> The bug for this: <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=549701</a><br> The commit bug, apparently: <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874">https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=139874</a><br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 16:05:01 +0000 Unknown root certificate in Firefox https://lwn.net/Articles/382225/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382225/ bboissin <div class="FormattedComment"> Is there a project to actively scan https website and record who is signed <br> by who? It would be very interesting to know if any website was signed by <br> this cert.<br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 14:59:33 +0000 Disable it.... https://lwn.net/Articles/382224/ https://lwn.net/Articles/382224/ rfunk <div class="FormattedComment"> Edit -&gt; Preferences -&gt; Advanced -&gt; Encryption -&gt; View Certificates<br> Scroll down to "RSA Security Inc", click on "RSA Security 1024 v3".<br> Edit. Uncheck the three checkboxes and hit OK.<br> </div> Tue, 06 Apr 2010 14:55:30 +0000