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Just get rid of the sid name

Just get rid of the sid name

Posted Aug 11, 2024 6:29 UTC (Sun) by NYKevin (subscriber, #129325)
In reply to: Just get rid of the sid name by bluca
Parent article: Distinguishing Debian testing from unstable

> Because every other distribution can self-identify. Why would there need to be something else when that works just fine?

You're already doing like 80% of the work. You need to have a standard "recipe book" for creating images (unless you're one of those "the sysadmin does everything manually" people, but those people mostly don't use images in the first place). All I'm suggesting is that you keep track of which recipe you used. It's one value, which is probably just an integer or UUID. Why is that difficult?

> Also, by self-identifying, metadata is automatically covered by cryptographic signature o f the artifact, so if this is used in a deployment system, it can be trusted, without the need to implement a sidecar metadata and its own out-of-band verification methods.

Pffft, that's ridiculous. As soon as you have two or more computers, and they're not all in the same physical trust domain (building, in most cases, or perhaps an entire physically-secured campus), you need certificates and signatures on absolutely everything that moves between them. If you rely on the image's signature, then the recipient has to blindly trust that you wanted this image, and not any other image, installed on this hardware. For that matter, the recipient also has to blindly trust that you wanted the installation to take place at all. What if some attacker calls InstallImageOnComputer (or whatever it's named) on all of your production serving instances at once? You'll have an outage, and it will be entirely your own fault for letting them do that.

So you have to sign a metadata sidecar anyway, and this is not a real objection.


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Just get rid of the sid name

Posted Aug 11, 2024 7:52 UTC (Sun) by gioele (subscriber, #61675) [Link] (2 responses)

> > Because every other distribution can self-identify. Why would there need to be something else when that works just fine?
>
> You're already doing like 80% of the work. You need to have a standard "recipe book" for creating images (unless you're one of those "the sysadmin does everything manually" people, but those people mostly don't use images in the first place). All I'm suggesting is that you keep track of which recipe you used. It's one value, which is probably just an integer or UUID. Why is that difficult?

It's a matter of standardization.

You, as the creator of the images can easily write some sort of identifier somewhere. But the hundreds of applications out there that may do something based on that identifier need to be taught how to read that identifier you came up with (filename, format, etc.).

os-release already specifies all this in a standardized way and is supported by all programs that care about identifying an OS/image/VM. Such programs can rely on os-release being correct on all distros, except Debian.

Just get rid of the sid name

Posted Aug 11, 2024 14:02 UTC (Sun) by DanilaBerezin (guest, #168271) [Link] (1 responses)

> os-release already specifies all this in a standardized way and is supported by all programs that care about identifying an OS/image/VM. Such programs can rely on os-release being correct on all distros, except Debian.

I think the point of contention is that the Debian Project does not see "Unstable" as a distro at all. So it doesn't violate the spec in their eyes whatsoever. I don't think the spec requires that /etc/os-release specify new values in the file for every branch of a distros SW.

Just get rid of the sid name

Posted Aug 11, 2024 14:06 UTC (Sun) by pizza (subscriber, #46) [Link]

> I think the point of contention is that the Debian Project does not see "Unstable" as a distro at all. So it doesn't violate the spec in their eyes whatsoever. I don't think the spec requires that /etc/os-release specify new values in the file for every branch of a distros SW.

And the other side of that point of contention is that whether or not Debian sees "Unstable" as a standalone distro (ie distinct from "testing") that's not how its *users* see (and use) it.

Just get rid of the sid name

Posted Aug 11, 2024 10:31 UTC (Sun) by bluca (subscriber, #118303) [Link]

> All I'm suggesting is that you keep track of which recipe you used. It's one value, which is probably just an integer or UUID. Why is that difficult?

We already do that. It's os-release, and it works everywhere else, including in other debian releases, just not in sid. Why should we need to hack around with sid-specific workarounds?

> Pffft, that's ridiculous. As soon as you have two or more computers, and they're not all in the same physical trust domain (building, in most cases, or perhaps an entire physically-secured campus), you need certificates and signatures on absolutely everything that moves between them. If you rely on the image's signature, then the recipient has to blindly trust that you wanted this image, and not any other image, installed on this hardware.

You don't blindly trust it of course, the signature is checked against the root of trust that is already present on the machine where it is being used. This is not hypothetical - it's how dm-verity works, using either the kernel built-in keyring, or the secure boot derived keyring.

> For that matter, the recipient also has to blindly trust that you wanted the installation to take place at all. What if some attacker calls InstallImageOnComputer (or whatever it's named) on all of your production serving instances at once? You'll have an outage, and it will be entirely your own fault for letting them do that.

If an attacker has full root privileges, then they can dd whatever they want to the disk and reboot. Why would some sidecar signature checks prevent that? Sorry but I don't follow this point


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