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Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Geoff Huston suggests that it is time to give up on DNSSEC and look for a better way to secure the Internet namespace.

What appears to be very clear (to me at any rate!) is that DNSSEC as we know it today is just not going anywhere. It's too complex, too fragile and just too slow to use for the majority of services and their users. Some value its benefits highly enough that they are prepared to live with its shortcomings, but that's not the case for the overall majority of name holders and for the majority of users, and no amount of passionate exhortations about DNSSEC will change this.


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Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 1:21 UTC (Tue) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (2 responses)

Yeah, DNSSEC is just bad. It was misdesigned from the start, with too many wasted opportunities.

At this point, it probably makes sense to extend DoH to handle the rest of the DNS functions. And then build a proper forward-looking protocol on top of it. With quantum-safe crypto, robust signature chain checking, configurable denial of existance, etc.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 3:48 UTC (Tue) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

Oh yeah, one interesting thing that might make sense, is reusing DNSSEC public key infrastructure for DoH certificates. So basically DANE with stapling, but for DoH and only active when DoH is used.

This neatly sidesteps the problem with middleboxes that DANE+stapling has. If you are making a DoH request, you are sure that you are not getting middleboxed.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 10:02 UTC (Thu) by MarcB (subscriber, #101804) [Link]

The main issue is that there is no business case for DNSSEC. If there was one, people would have come up with solutions.
I know this, because I work for a company that offers both TLS and DNSSEC. DNSSEC is not worth 8 cents per month to most people.

After Snowden, when the browser-vendors started prominently displaying the lack of TLS for webpages, TLS took off. No such thing happened for DNSSEC.
That brings us to next issue: Local "DNS" APIs suck, mostly because they actually were never designed as DNS APIs. gethostbyname() was originally intended to just read /etc/hosts, it lacks essential things like the TTL of results and obviously also later additions like the authentication state. getaddrinfo() did not fix this.
So an application can't even display the DNSSEC state like the TLS state, unless it uses a proper DNS library, which in turn means that is has to figure out the correct, local DNS configuration - which is non-portable, might go wrong or might simply hit a dead-end in the form of a non-validating recursor.

Last but not least, DNSSEC does not offer much over TLS for HTTPS-only services. A CDN does not benefit from TLS and neither do web APIs. It is primarily valuable when there is some form of redirection, to another domain like MX or SRV records. But then, mail is one of the services that already struggles with the high number of DNS queries it has to perform nowadays, so there is reluctance to make them more expensive and less reliable.

That being said, some ccTLDs in Europe have high DNSSEC adaption rates. Unsurprisingly, this was achieved by creating a business case for it. But this is something that will not work for all ccTLDs and certainly not the gTLDs (it's really the registries that have to push this, but the commercial ones will never do this). Also, it appears to have stalled after an initial success.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 2:36 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (73 responses)

DNSSEC is a bit of a mess, but there are (somewhat) security-sensitive protocols built on it, such as SPF, DKIM and DMARC. One could argue that DNS was never meant to be used for things like that, but the fact is that it is being used for them.

I agree that for the HTTPS use-case, DNSSEC is superfluous, but the Internet is more than just the Web.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 2:47 UTC (Tue) by bradfitz (subscriber, #4378) [Link] (60 responses)

Can we get rid of SPF, DKIM and DMARC too? 😅

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 3:01 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (59 responses)

I'm fine with getting rid of SPF. DKIM and DMARC are actually fairly useful.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 7:46 UTC (Tue) by taladar (subscriber, #68407) [Link] (58 responses)

How about we just get rid of email entirely and replace it with something that wasn't designed in the 1970s with lots of underspecified parts that are implemented in incompatible ways and gaping security holes that need things like SPF, DKIM, DMARC, ARC,... to plug them badly?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 7:55 UTC (Tue) by DOT (subscriber, #58786) [Link]

We already have that: it's called Facebook.

Not entirely joking: email stinks on a technical level, but as a federation platform with global reach, it is the best we've got. A replacement might be cool tech, but it won't necessarily succeed in being an open, federated network.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 13:26 UTC (Tue) by MarcB (subscriber, #101804) [Link]

It is impossible to re-create a federated system like e-mail today. No big actor has a financial incentive to push this and no small actor is competent/motivated enough to adopt it. Improving mail, in a backwards compatible fashion, really is the only option.

It is also a common, yet misguided belief that the problems with sender authentication are primarily technical. The technical part has long been solved with PGP and DKIM.

The real problem is that authentication without a central authority is actually very hard. And we do not want such a central authority, in fact it can't even exist on a global scale.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 13:27 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (55 responses)

Sure, but email has one killer attribute:

Anyone can communicate with anyone else without needing to set up an account on a central system, just by knowing their email address.

If you can replicate that securely and convince people to adopt it, great! But I have my doubts.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 13:41 UTC (Tue) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link] (50 responses)

And the biggest problem with that is, and has been for many years, spam.

Which is a problem that affects snail-mail too. The big difference is that snail-mail actually has a cost measured in pounds, shillings and pence, so senders want to get their money's worth. True, the cost has been dropping, making it worth sending more junk email, but it's kept under control by sender costs.

Especially with all the stolen credentials, unfortunately email spam is too cheap ...

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:07 UTC (Tue) by pizza (subscriber, #46) [Link] (1 responses)

> And the biggest problem with that is, and has been for many years, spam.

Of course, spam is a complete non-issue on centrally-authenticated nonfederated walled gardens. Not. [1]

(And that doesn't begin to touch on the fact that email remains the only system where the end-user has tools to sort, filter, and otherwise set their *own* priorities free from 3rd party algorithmic enshittified twiddling)

[1] This was sadly hilarious: https://www.jwz.org/blog/2024/04/lets-check-in-on-the-enr...

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:38 UTC (Tue) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link]

:-)

One of the reasons I got disenchanted with flickr was the guy who kept spamming the WW1 aircraft group with pictures of jet airliners. And then flickr kept spamming me with "please follow / like this guy".

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:23 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (44 responses)

Spam is solved.

There are widely deployed and reasonably widely-used, distributed systems on the internet today that allow messaging between anonymous addresses, without spam - or at least, if someone wanted to spam it will cost them a lot of money.

Proof: install something like MetaMask, go to something like Etherscan and connect your MetaMask to it, and give out your address. People can message you - anonymously (other than knowing the hexadecimal public key address, sometimes called the "wallet"). You can even buy a human-readable alias for your public-key address, via ENS. So you can tell people to message "joe.eth".

There's a subset of tech people who have irrational hatred of anything they perceive as "crypto-currency", which unfortunately blinds them to some really useful technical mechanisms that solve long-standing problems on the Internet.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:25 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

I might actually be wrong about the specifics of the messaging system that the likes of Etherscan uses actually making use of the underlying payment sysetm to stop spam, but the point stands that this is a viable technical solution to spam.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:31 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (11 responses)

At the risk of starting something, I think everyone needs to read the FUSSP before promoting technical solutions to spam. This one looks like the e-postage solution.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:53 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (10 responses)

Dumb critiques are dumb.

Free messaging or spam. Pick one.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:58 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (7 responses)

Free messaging. Email is still widely used, especially in business communication. Despite its disadvantages, its advantages are compelling.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:04 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

Email has some inertia yes.

Spam is dealt with by out-sourcing email to a small number of large email providers, who have sufficient skill, resources and data (by aggregating over many customers) to deal with the spam. Even then, if someone you havn't communicated with before emails you, there's a good chance you'll never see it - unless you happen to be expecting it AND/OR you like wading through the vast sea of crap in your spam folder.

Few new systems would come with this problem, and any that did are even less likely to succeed.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:06 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (5 responses)

And "not free" does not imply having to pay some kind of currency. It could be "contribute some resources", e.g. CPU or storage space (e.g. to some distributed, decentralised computing system).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:15 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (4 responses)

OK, sure. Sorry, but I think you really need to take the FUSSP to heart. I can't tell you how many replacements for email have been proposed that have gone nowhere, and having worked in the email security industry for 19+ years, I've seen all kinds of proposals come to nothing.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:18 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (3 responses)

Additionally, "contribute some resources" would penalize legitimate emailers, but not even bother serious spammers in the slightest, who would have an army of compromised hosts to do their work at no cost to themselves.

All proposals that rely on people paying in some way imagine that spammers won't resort to fraud and push the costs on to victims.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 8:37 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (2 responses)

I don't even disagree with that FUSSP. I would have probably read it back in the day, and I'm sure completely agreed with it. I definitely would have made many of those arguments myself.

But my thinking has changed too. Will we replace email? Will we have other messaging systems that are widely used - obviously we do. And spam is a problem, and no useful, widely used system can exist without some amount of expenditure - by someone somewhere - to combat spam. Whether because we centralise the messaging to some (1 or a handful) of giant tech corporates, who can afford the staff and compute to mass analyse traffic and classify spam and stop it early on; or whether we push that expenditure of resources somewhere else; that expenditure is today a *FACT*.

So the FUSSP - to the extent it envisaged it as an invariant that email and (more generally) Internet messaging had to continue on as email had started out, as a free way to send messages - is wrong. We *do* pay to send and receive email. Corporates pay directly in subscription fee to a small circle of tech companies, end-users pay by viewing advertising.

As for your point on botnets and compromising hosts. That does indeed happen in the kinds of systems I was talking about. There are spam attacks against blockchains, e.g.. However, they are generally short-lived, because they are expensive. There are also botnets that use compromised hosts - however, these days they use them to just "mine" the token/"coin" - they don't bother sending spam, cause the token is worth more than the profit from sending spam.

And that's the thing, when you go in that direction, the economic utility of the payment system becomes such that it becomes uneconomical to spam. Why waste the more valuable token? The negative economic utility (overall) and minimal economic utility (to the spammer) of spam versus the greater general economic utility of the payment system and its token (which the would-be-spammer can use the compromised system to generate, at a low rate) mean the spam becomes uneconomic.

Also, those botnets of compromised hosts - while still robbing resources from the poor owner - are now less of a negative economic utility overall, whatever harm they're doing, they're at least helping a little to secure a distributed Internet payment system. At some point in the future, when we go from PoW to PoUsefulW systems, they may even help do useful stuff like participate in (say) genome analysis jobs submitted by cancer researchers.

So I re-iterate what I say - though, I'll change "dumb" to "naive" or "outdated": The FUSSP critique dates from a different era. It doesn't apply, or it's supposed objections are irrelevant. Society most definitely _does_ "pay" for email, and messaging generally. That is simply a fact. It's simply a matter of how you want to pay, and what is the best way to allocate and use the resources that are /required/ to combat spam.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 14:25 UTC (Wed) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (1 responses)

Will we replace email?

Yes and no. Obviously, many things that might have been emailed in the past use alternate messaging platforms, from Facebook Messenger to Slack to Snapchat to WhatsApp to flavor of the week...

But no in terms of email disappearing. That will not happen. If you want to contact a company to get information, are you going to want to sign up to its messaging platform of choice? Or just shoot a quick email?

Email is still extensively used, especially in business communications, because of its unique advantages: It's ubiquitous and anyone can communicate with anyone else with no prior setup needed. These attributes cannot be replicated in any other system that is any more resistant to spam than email is.

The continuing widespread use of email shows that we've decided the benefits are worth the annoyances.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 15:29 UTC (Wed) by ceplm (subscriber, #41334) [Link]

> But no in terms of email disappearing. That will not happen.

And then you meet Sourcehut …

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 16:30 UTC (Tue) by MarcB (subscriber, #101804) [Link] (1 responses)

But this is not a dumb critique. It was and is proven with every claimed solution. Yours included.

In fact, your solution ticks a lot of the check-boxes on this list and even could add a new one, since you seem to ignore the ridiculously low transaction rates of distributed block chains.

The idea of requiring extra resources to send mail is fundamentally flawed, because criminals do what criminals do: They steal them.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 8:38 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

See my reply to dskoll: https://lwn.net/Articles/975626/

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:37 UTC (Tue) by flussence (guest, #85566) [Link]

MetaMask, I've heard of that one. Specifically because it was the banner carried by a plague of twitter spambots around the start of the decade. The ".eth" tramp stamp, likewise, is permanently associated in my long-term memory with some of the worst middle-class grifter reply-guys ever to walk the internet.

I'm content to deal with known devils like DKIM/DMARC forever. A 1.0 signal-to-noise ratio is worth nothing if the signal is just a constant fart sound.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 11:48 UTC (Wed) by jjs (guest, #10315) [Link] (11 responses)

Care to explain how this works? I get an etherium wallet (MetaMask), somehow attach it to a tool for scanning the etherium blockchain (EtherScan), and suddenly all the people I communicate with (who use email, and won't change their communications system just because I say so) will be able to send me messages, but scammers won't?

And I'll be able to send them emails from a wallet, at what advantage over using my email tools?

I'm not even sure how a wallet and blockchain scanning tool form a communications system.

One key item about email - it's not a system. It's a message transfer API. As marcB put it, it's a federated system. Multiple servers, transfer agents, clients for reading & composing email, etc. All communicate via a common API - the IETF mail format. And that's a strength - we can all communicate. It's also a weakness, in that, as a (as MarcB says) federated system, you can't easily just change one part & it all works. EVERYTHING and EVERYONE has to change. That's hard. Especially when dealing with millions (if not billions) of people.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:28 UTC (Wed) by excors (subscriber, #95769) [Link]

If I understand correctly, the key part is "if someone wanted to spam it will cost them a lot of money". A kilobyte of Ethereum on-chain storage costs about $65 at current prices. No spammer is going to spend that much per message, when they're indiscriminately sending to thousands of people.

(It's expensive partly because your message will be replicated in every copy of the blockchain in the world, for the rest of eternity - it's preposterously inefficient. Though I don't think that fully explains why it's literally a billion times more expensive than standard cloud storage.)

Of course, none of your friends are going to spend that much per message either. The only people who might consider it are scammers who've identified you as a high-value target (because your wallet is public so they can see you're rich) - for them it's a worthwhile investment to help them steal your money. See, for example, airdrop scams (https://support.metamask.io/privacy-and-security/staying-... - "MetaMask is aware of these scams, and is actively working on improvements to help prevent them, but in the decentralized web, the most important member of the security team is you", i.e. it's fundamentally the victim's fault. What a great new technology this is.)

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:43 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (9 responses)

I don't want to get too tied down into the specifics of some existing technology, but the point is that you have:

1. A public key, which can act as an address.

2. An associated payment system, which /could/ be used to enforce a payment, either per message or per first message (if that's spam, receiver could just block you). That payment could go to some processor, or the recipient, or split to both. That payment would make spam expensive (and scams too, but the economics are slightly different there).

3. A way for you to prove that you own the public address to 3rd parties, i.e. by signing a message (which can be in a specific form used for authentication, or general).

In the particular case I mentioned, "BlockScan Chat" I'm not 100% sure there's an associated charge, but I think there is. That's just one particular service though. The blockchain is a distributed and decentralised service, and it is possible to actually send the message via the blockchain itself - but using a payment chain for messaging is unlikely to be efficient (in terms of resources, economically, etc.). What you'd do is have the distributed payment system be used to validate entities, and impose economic costs to deter spam and cover the costs of the various parts of the system; and have the messaging on another system, that uses the former for auth and spam prevention.

That messaging system could be centralised. It could be decentralised and federated. Bear in mind that one of the precursor, building-block ideas for crypto-graphic block-chains was "HashCash" - a PoW system to deter spam for *SMTP email*.

I don't know why so a certain set of techies get squeemish over crypto-graphic block-chains with PoW. **Git is a block chain**. PoW has the potential to turn into PoUW (Proof-of-Useful-Work) which has the potential to make cloud computing *much* more efficient, including being more efficient at energy-use and *being able to find spare and 0-carbon energy* as part of that!

The social/inertia question of whether some new system would be adopted over email isn't interesting here. I responded here on the technical issue of preventing/minimising spam in decentralised, distributed systems.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 14:10 UTC (Wed) by excors (subscriber, #95769) [Link]

Blockscan Chat appears to be a non-decentralised messaging service (all the messages are simply stored on Blockscan's servers, accessed through an API provided by Blockscan), and its approach to spam is:

1) "At this [early beta] stage, each wallet can initiate up to 50 new chat conversations"
2) "there is an Anti Spam option in Settings menu. Turning it on allows only wallets that have sent at least one transaction on Ethereum (nonce > 0) to start new conversations with you."
(https://chat.blockscan.com/faq)

The first point by itself wouldn't stop spam, because a spammer can freely create a million wallet addresses. The second point by itself wouldn't stop spam, because a spammer could make one small transaction and then send a million messages to different users from a single wallet. Both together might help reduce spam, by imposing a non-negligible cost per message.

But the first point only works because it's a centralised messaging service, which can easily track and enforce rate limits, and because it doesn't have any legitimate users who want to send more than 50 messages per day (businesses sending important information to customers, etc) so they haven't had to come up with a more usable (but also more abusable) rate limiting system. It does nothing to demonstrate how a distributed system can prevent spam (which was your original claim), because it's not a distributed system.

Their FAQ says "For users who prefer a more decentralized approach, please see our IDM feature", linking to a global list of on-chain messages, but there appears to be less than one real message per hour, so that's clearly not a successful messaging system. (And one is spam asking people to follow them on other messaging platforms, another is someone saying they accidentally transferred $1400 to a stranger and could they please give it back, and another (unrelated) is someone saying "keep ur funds safer next time".)

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 14:46 UTC (Wed) by somlo (subscriber, #92421) [Link] (7 responses)

Isn't this like HashCash (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hashcash), except *way* more convoluted and, um, "integrated" ? :)

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 15:29 UTC (Wed) by unilynx (guest, #114305) [Link] (5 responses)

As far as I know the problem with Hashcash and any PoW scheme to prevent email spam, is that it both needs to be expensive enough that having a botnet do the PoW isn't feasible, and cheap enough not to exclude large parts of the (third) world. Those requirements are mutually exclusive

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 16:07 UTC (Wed) by somlo (subscriber, #92421) [Link] (4 responses)

Exactly. So, for all those reasons and more, i'm dubious that having to buy into the ethereum ecosystem is at all an improvement...

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 16:48 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (3 responses)

Again, to be very clear, if you understood that I am recommending some specific block-chain or tool, you've misread my comment. I'm saying we have certain technology tools (in the abstract) now with which to greatly mitigate (if not completely prevent) spam in a distributed, decentralised manner.

I.e., the argument that it is not possible is incorrect. Because we have today distributed, decentralised systems in wide-use which _are_ subject to attempted spam attacks by powerful and well-resourced entities and which do generally resist them quite well. And such systems can provide the building blocks upon which to build decentralised, permissionless, distributed messaging systems, which can be economically balanced such that the cost for normal use is relatively trivial, but sufficiently greater than-0 as to deter large-scale spam attacks.

(scam attacks are economically different).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 16:53 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

Oh, and to relate it back to the topic of DNS, such systems can (and are) also be used to implement naming systems, again in a distributed, decentralised manner while being robust against spam attacks - and with actual cryptographically strong proof of ownership too.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 7, 2024 4:03 UTC (Fri) by mrugiero (guest, #153040) [Link]

What you seem to be missing is the point where the economic incentives fail, regardless of particular current or future blockchain you pick.
If you have high cost per message, you make mining a more interesting target for botnets but also you leave out a significant fraction of users who can't or won't pay for it, while also making the reward of scams greater. It's worth investing some tokens to drain a wallet.
If you have low cost per message, then the token is also likely cheap (as you don't need as many to interact in the network), so the incentive for spamming for scams is high due to low reward of mining and high reward of scamming. But you get to keep a usable solution for the general population.
This applies to the blockchain scale issue as well. The higher the overhead, the higher the costs, and the higher the costs the larger your transactions need to be to be affordable, which means fewer users have the economic capacity to participate. But the cheaper they are, the more common it is to get fake tokens in your wallet trying to get you to engage and get drained.

The technical solution that supposedly makes the cultural issues uninteresting relies on and is solely about economic incentives, which also makes it part of the uninteresting but central human, rather than technical, issue, and those economic incentives appear to be flawed.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 7, 2024 7:55 UTC (Fri) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link]

> which can be economically balanced such that the cost for normal use is relatively trivial, but sufficiently greater than-0 as to deter large-scale spam attacks.

> (scam attacks are economically different).

And roughly what percentage of ALL email sent is scam attacks? 90%? More?

The amount of legitimate mail, as a percentage of all mail, is probably rounding error :-( Most of the rest will be scams.

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 16:43 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

I think I mentioned HashCash in my comment, the parent to the one you're replying to.

HashCash is a pre-cursor to block-chain crypto-currencies. It was specialised and lacked the economic incentives to make it work out. Cryptographic coins separate the PoW from the application, so are more broadly useful, have a better incentive structure, and have adoption as a result. Having adoption, those could now be applied back to the specific use-case of messaging (if not email itself, as email is not going to change now).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:00 UTC (Wed) by bluca (subscriber, #118303) [Link] (17 responses)

In a way, you are right that this is a solution for spam: once the planet is incinerated because of the humongous carbon footprint of these shitcoins cryptoscams, there won't be any spammers left either. Problem solved!

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:19 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (16 responses)

i don't want to turn this into a thread on blockchains, but you're spouting nonsense. In 2 dimensions:

1. Blockchain validation seeks cheap energy, to maximise profit. Cheap energy is generally energy that would otherwise go to waste. Spare energy at hydro-dams, wasted heat from gas flaring, solar, etc. A good chunk of the energy use is *already* from renewable sources, and a good chunk of the HC energy use is from sunk costs (e.g. flaring - waste heat and CO2 emissions that were going to happen regardless).

E.g., I have a computer doing a little mining in the winter. I could use a dumb electric heater, or I can put that energy through a computer and get some computation out of it before it turns to hear. I hope to have solar panels soon, and then I will use spare generated electricity in the summer.

1. Humanity is going to use more energy. You could ban crypto-currencies and this remains true. Further, humanity will continue to use *significant* amounts of energy for payment systems, and for fighting spam. The current systems for this are _unable_ to hunt around to find the cheapest (i.e., spare and otherwise wasted) energy - cause they're big monolithic, centralised systems where it is impossible to shift the energy use around the world.

We have to decarbonise, regardless. And we're going to spend energy on computer systems, regardless. One kind of transaction validation system - thanks to the separation of validation from most of the other stuff (inc. sensitive customer data) is able to economically efficiently "hunt" around to find the spare energy. The other is not.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:26 UTC (Wed) by bluca (subscriber, #118303) [Link] (2 responses)

Shitchains are planet incinerating ponzi schemes, that exist solely to enable scammers and ransomware, and no amount of massaging with nonsensical fluff is going to change that, sorry. Fortunately as a fad it's already dead, replaced by the AI fad

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 12:45 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (1 responses)

I bow to what must be your superior knowledge, given how extremely certain of yourself you are in all your comments here on LWN.

Stop here

Posted May 29, 2024 13:23 UTC (Wed) by corbet (editor, #1) [Link]

Once again, we have to say: this subthread isn't going anywhere, and it would really be best if all participants gave it a rest.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 2, 2024 9:08 UTC (Sun) by niner (guest, #26151) [Link] (12 responses)

Your post contains a false dilemma (dumb electric heater vs. computer). You could also use a heat pump to get a massive increase of heat per invested amount of energy, thus reducing your energy needs.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 2, 2024 10:40 UTC (Sun) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link] (11 responses)

It contains another false dilemma - it assumes there aren't other better uses for the energy.

For example, in the UK, we have one (or two?) massive hydro-electric batteries that recharge at night using base nuclear generation. If crypto-generation causes fossil-fuel plants to not "go to sleep", then that waste energy premise is false.

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 12:37 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (10 responses)

If I need to heat (parts of) my house, and my options are a) oil burner or b) electric heater, then how am I wasting energy if I use a PC as an electric heater by passing through it a very intricate "resistor" rather than a big, dumb resistor?

I don't have a heat pump. I don't know if it's feasible where I am, sitting on the top of a low valley. I don't know of any neighbours with heat pumps. I'll look int ito. Plenty have solar, and I hope to have too - I have saved up enough capital, and the economics now make sense.

Your wider point, if you mean use of electricity to run distributed systems like block-chains versus charging batteries with off-peak energy is a job for economics. Price things correctly, and things sort themselves out. I will note again though:

1. Crypto-currencies did not cause global warming

2. Human-kind's insatiable desire for electricity and consequent CO2 emissions will not go away if you could ban crypto-currencies

3. A significant component of our desire for electricity, in the developed world, are data-centres. Vast majority of which are *not* involved in crypto-currencies. We have acres and acres and acres of computers and GPUs churning through energy trying to learn our socio-economic relevant status/interests/connections and learn how to show us better ads. And it's getting worse. Something like 20% of the electricity in Ireland is being eaten up by data-centres. And that's not crypto-currencies.

3a: Who is to say these data-centres mining people's data scrolling cat and influencer videos to sell them ads is a better use of energy than powering currency systems that are (compared to government controlled fiat systems) essentially incorruptible and impossible for politicians to abuse to pay for their latest "crisis" policies by stealing people's savings through monetary manipulation to give that wealth to the well-connected classes? I know which I think is the more socially productive.

Humanity is unlikely to use less electricity. The developed world keeps using more and more, and the rest of the world aspires to developed world standards of living and will work to get it - which implies *massive* increases of global energy demand to come.

We need sustainable electricity. And we need lots more of it. Lots. Trying to ban one specific use of energy is dumb because it will in no way fix the problem - it's just you playing "Grumpy old man shouts at clouds" over some thing you happen to dislike, on which others disagree with you.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 12:38 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

And by "you" in the last analogy, I mean the techies who have an irrational dislike of anything "crypto-currency".

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 15:07 UTC (Tue) by kleptog (subscriber, #1183) [Link] (7 responses)

> Humanity is unlikely to use less electricity. The developed world keeps using more and more, and the rest of the world aspires to developed world standards of living and will work to get it - which implies *massive* increases of global energy demand to come.

The missing point is efficiency. Europe's total *energy* usage has been flat for decades while *electricity* use increased (fossil fuels are 60-70% wasted, we should keep them for things you can't do with electricity). And for the same amount of electricity we get vastly more actual *work* done than decades ago. Your current phone can do more than your old laptop on a fraction of the power use.

So yes, we're going to be using more electricity, maybe 2-3x by 2050. Most projections expect primary energy usage to remain flat in that period though.

Your point about trying to ban particular uses is on point though.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 16:04 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

That is a good point about energy use. I had not realised large chunks of Europe have been eking out efficiency gains for that long. Ireland a little bit less so - we're about the same as 1.5 decades ago, though, that's basically a dip after '08 financial crisis, and then back to rising annual demand in the last decade. And Ireland is tight on capacity already. The planning applications already put in for future data-centre builds will definitely exceed our current generation capacity.

This eking out of current generation capacity with efficiency gains is pretty cool - lot more than I'd realised TBH. But I'm not sure how long it will go on for.

That said, one area where we potentially can get more efficiency is by being a lot smarter about making use of waste heat. We have parts of society that use energy for work, creating unwanted heat; and we have other parts that need heat for warmth (residences and offices in the summer); and while in some places there are schemes to use the latter for the former, in many places that doesn't exist - and the socio-economics are such that it would be hard to see that ever changing. So we house data-centres and other such things in parts of Europe with cheaper land, away from offices and residences - often consuming green-field land (least, does in Ireland); and we vent the heat to atmosphere. And then houses are being heated in winter with "dumb" energy use - again, ultimately venting to the environment.

I think it'd be nice in to future to locate as much compute as possible _with_ humans, who can then benefit from the generated heat (least in winter).

To make that generally possible requires tackling a lot of economic-incentive issues... And... well... another story. ;)

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 16:09 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (4 responses)

One thing though: Some of that flat-lining of energy use in Europe over decades will have been due to the de-industrialisation of Europe, rather than efficiency gains.

Ireland kind of hints that, cause Ireland was never that industrial compared to Europe - Ireland has a more agricultural economy, compared to continent, until the rise of the tech sector from the 90s on. And it hasn't flat lined as much.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 5, 2024 9:22 UTC (Wed) by rschroev (subscriber, #4164) [Link] (3 responses)

That's a good point. By moving production from one place to another, emissions aren't reduced; they're just moved.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 5, 2024 9:40 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (2 responses)

Yes, a lot of industrial carbon emissions simply moved from Europe and USA over to China, from the 80s and (esp?) 90s onward.

That said, this may end up a win in terms of CO2 emissions. China is able to build out nuclear power (and is doing so), where USA and Europe struggle to do so for political reasons. Indeed, it's impossible in some parts of Europe.

(Yay Ireland, where we're devoutly nuclear-free; a stance we can only afford to take because we have a shared grid with the north, which has interconnectors to Britain, which has a [little] spare electricity thanks to... nuclear; and we're busy building another, long, inefficient, DC under-sea inter-connector to France - to access some of their electricity, which they have available to sell cause.. they have lots of nuclear generation).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 5, 2024 9:50 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

Oh, and hydro too of course. China can build out hydro like the British could in the ~30s - impossible today in the likes of UK.

The Chinese seem obsessed with reservoirs. I /think/ (from things I've read) cause they fear they could run out of water in 30 to 40 years. So, least the part I've been, there seem to be reservoirs everywhere - most of them also generating power.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 5, 2024 11:12 UTC (Wed) by malmedal (subscriber, #56172) [Link]

> Britain, which has a [little] spare electricity thanks to... nuclear;

According to 2023 numbers:

Britain gets 10.7% of its electricity from imports, 14.2% comes from nuclear.

The important sources are gas: 32% and wind: 29.4% these are nicely complementary since gas can easily be turned up or down according
to how much the wind blows.

Hydro is not going to be helpful currently at 1.8%. Could, at a stretch, be doubled if all environmental opposition were overcome.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 16:16 UTC (Tue) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link]

> And for the same amount of electricity we get vastly more actual *work* done than decades ago. Your current phone can do more than your old laptop on a fraction of the power use.

I might beg to differ ...

How much of what is done on that phone is actually *useful* work, (I won't comment on the usefulness of games etc,) and how much of that work could be done in less time, using less energy, if only somebody used their brain instead of letting AI get it all wrong ...

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted Jun 4, 2024 15:20 UTC (Tue) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

"if I use a PC as an electric heater by passing through it a very intricate "resistor" rather than a big, dumb resistor"

Should have been more like:

"if I use a PC as an electric heater by passing that energy through it instead - the PC just being a very intricate "resistor" rather than a big, dumb resistor, as far as the heat generation is concerned"

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:28 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (2 responses)

Spam filters are pretty good nowadays. I think maybe one a month gets past my filter. (Disclosure: For many years, I owned an email security company and I use our own product as the filter, so it's very nicely tuned to my preferences.)

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:45 UTC (Tue) by Wol (subscriber, #4433) [Link] (1 responses)

My spam filter (comes from being on loads of mailing lists years ago) consists of aggressive filtering, that moves ham into subfolders. Then of course I need filtering to move all those emails the internet wrongly marked as spam (you know - where some intermediate mailer sticks "suspected spam scored 5.5" in front of the subject) out of my spam folder.

Plus a couple of rules to move known spam into the deleted folder.

After all that, the contents of my inbox and deleted folders consist mainly of spam, and all my ham is stored safely elsewhere. So I can do a quick skim of those two folders, and delete the lot ...

Cheers,
Wol

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 16:52 UTC (Tue) by flussence (guest, #85566) [Link]

I'm sure I'd have it much worse if I participated in mailing lists, but it seems like email spammers on the rest of the internet are massively inept nowadays; almost all of the ones that find my server by name failed at the "extract a valid email address from scraped webpage text" step. Using gmail-style "name+subidentifier@foo" syntax seems to be enough to lose 99% of the ones that'd otherwise have a shot.

I plonk the 2-3 per year that reach my inbox into a spam reporting DNSBL service so I can pretend I'm doing something useful.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:31 UTC (Tue) by wtarreau (subscriber, #51152) [Link]

> Anyone can communicate with anyone else without needing to set up an account on a central system, just by knowing their email address.

Exactly, and these days there's a huge tendency to forget this and force everyone to create multiple accounts a month on various places for stupid to useless stuff because accounts make users captive and indirectly give monetary value to the company that collects all of them. I really hate having to create accounts and avoid doing so as much as possible (and still have far too many for my taste).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 15:24 UTC (Wed) by unilynx (guest, #114305) [Link] (1 responses)

> Anyone can communicate with anyone else without needing to set up an account on a central system, just by knowing their email address.

Since when? Actual 'communication' is two-ways, and receiving mail requires a MX record, and thus a domain name. Where do I get those without registering for an account anywhere?

I guess you could avoid MX records by using user@[ip] email addresses, but do all email systems still support those, and do the users you want to communicate with understand them?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 7:24 UTC (Thu) by madhatter (subscriber, #4665) [Link]

With respect, dskoll didn't say "without setting up an account on any system", (s)he said "without setting up an account on a central system". There's a difference, specifically the (undesirable) presence of a gatekeeper in the latter case.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 7:20 UTC (Thu) by madhatter (subscriber, #4665) [Link]

Matrix?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 6:09 UTC (Tue) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (8 responses)

> DNSSEC is a bit of a mess, but there are (somewhat) security-sensitive protocols built on it, such as SPF, DKIM and DMARC.

Yeeh. A year or so ago, we accidentally tested this assertion. Our email domain record had an accidentally broken DNSSEC, and everything worked fine. We didn't get any issues with missed emails or anything.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:06 UTC (Tue) by jejb (subscriber, #6654) [Link]

> A year or so ago, we accidentally tested this assertion. Our email domain record had an accidentally broken DNSSEC, and everything worked fine. We didn't get any issues with missed emails or anything.

What I found a year ago when my zsk rollover failed and the timestamps on the RRSIGs went expired is that the google resolvers stopped resolving for my domain, so they seem to check even if they don't use DNSSEC for the google domain.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 23:30 UTC (Tue) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (6 responses)

Ah, sorry, I meant to write: There are somewhat security-sensitive protocols built on DNS. So we really should be securing DNS somehow.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 23:53 UTC (Tue) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (5 responses)

In practice, it's pretty hard to attack a typical email installation via DNS.

Suppose that you want to steal a password reset email from Coinbase, and you need to replace the victim's mail server (say, joe@somecorp.com) for that.

To do that, you'll need to be able to tamper with the traffic between somecorp.com and Coinbase. This can be feasible, but will probably require a state-level actor. But that's not all, MX records usually have a pretty long TTL, so the attack has to stay in place for a while. And if somecorp.com also uses a hosted nameserver option, like Namecheap, Route53 or something similar, then such an attack would be extremely conspicuous.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 0:26 UTC (Wed) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (4 responses)

That's not the sort of attack you'd do, though. Being able to poison a DNS cache and convince an email system that an email you send is correctly DKIM-signed by your bank is what you'd do.

Especially now that some email systems display a little "trusted" icon for properly-signed and DMARC-kosher emails, this is a tempting attack for phishers.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 1:38 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (3 responses)

You need to poison the cache on the email _server_. Which in many cases, is something like Google or Microsoft. And this is typically orders of magnitude more complex, as you don't have an easy vector of attack (like hotel networks).

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 6:28 UTC (Wed) by Heretic_Blacksheep (guest, #169992) [Link]

Arguably it's considerably easier to attack the blockchain weaknesses or engineer the victim rather than attack MS, Google, etc in a convoluted DNS poisoning attack. It's hardly a month that goes by to not see some new attack on a cryptocurrency or a group of cryptobros tricked into losing access to their wallets in social engineering attacks. If anything, the only thing cryptocurrency has really done is make it easier for outlaw nations and gangs to steal commodities of value (to someone).

One thing many people tend to do is overthink a problem and come up with Rube solutions, when the real weakness is nearly always the human, both in the attack and the implementation of security. Complex solutions don't survive human contact. Sometimes even simple ones don't survive human contact (like people reusing weak passwords).

DNSSEC's a problem and a pain point to manage, that's really not at issue. Known problem. It's another problem that got over-thought resulting in another solution that is often improperly implemented resulting in false security. But, at this point it's become as entrenched as any other legacy system. It's even made its way into government regulatory requirements so the likelihood of anyone making it go away is really slim-to-none if only because of bureaucratic inertia in regulatory regimes, enterprises, and organizations.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 14:20 UTC (Wed) by dskoll (subscriber, #1630) [Link] (1 responses)

Yes, DNS cache-poisoning attacks are not easy, and they have become more difficult. But they're still easier than they would be if DNS were cryptographically-protected, in which case they'd be completely impractical.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 17:27 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

Yes, I agree. It's just that DNS security doesn't actually matter that much anymore. The HTTP-based infrastructure is adequately protected by the WebPKI, and MX-infrastructure is not seen as something needing protection because attacks on it are impractical.

So there's little motivation to use DNSSEC, it creates a lot of operational pain for very little actual gain.

I think there's a window of opportunity with DoH, it can be used as a base for a new protocol (DNS2?) with better design.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 7:47 UTC (Tue) by NYKevin (subscriber, #129325) [Link] (2 responses)

Let's Encrypt has been handing out DNS-verified HTTPS certificates for years, and if you Google [letsencrypt dnssec], most of the results are variations of "I turned on DNSSEC and now Let's Encrypt won't let me renew." Presumably, the problem is turning on DNSSEC *incorrectly*, but my point is that Let's Encrypt appears to be just fine with a no-DNSSEC verification (to the point that that's actually the easier config to get right). Obviously DNS verification is a different problem to SPF etc., but it's not that different, is it?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 13:30 UTC (Tue) by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167) [Link] (1 responses)

The Web PKI's Ten Blessed Methods (there aren't actually ten of them and haven't been for many years) say that *if* a CA [in this case Let's Encrypt] can confirm there's no DNSSEC for the name requested, they can issue based on basically just hoping DNS works. Maybe it works, maybe it doesn't, the owner of the name didn't protect it with DNSSEC so too bad.

So, if you don't *have* DNSSEC then you get this best effort from Let's Encrypt and it's probably fine unless it isn't.

If you have DNSSEC and it works, of course everything works and you get the security you wanted.

If you have DNSSEC but you broke it, you can't prove control for Let's Encrypt.

As is usual in this discussion, nobody is offering an actual alternative, what they're offering is: Maybe we don't care.

I don't think this ends well, but it's not as though I can make people care, at least not until it's too late.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 15:11 UTC (Tue) by NYKevin (subscriber, #129325) [Link]

> So, if you don't *have* DNSSEC then you get this best effort from Let's Encrypt and it's probably fine unless it isn't.

To be fair, the port 80 verification challenge has exactly the same problem, but over HTTP instead of DNS. Bootstrapping trust without something resembling DNSSEC is pretty hard.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 2:38 UTC (Tue) by flussence (guest, #85566) [Link] (3 responses)

I'm normally weirdly attached to crusty tech like this, but at this point in time I agree. Throw it in a shallow hole and bury it, I'd rather have to put up with another layer of TLS certificates than this mess. I'm just glad it never got popular enough for a HSTS-equivalent to take root or we'd never escape it.

DNSSEC suffers from the middlebox problem. Quite a lot. My ISP's default DNS servers are completely incompatible with it (in 2024!), my domain registrar's DNS service is ham-fisted and doesn't allow any configurability or DS record delegation, and my local recursive resolver's error logs are kept warm by missing/timed-out signature errors (the configured upstream, quad9, barely works at the best of times - this is probably a contributing factor).

The punchline to the whole thing is the use, the mere presence, of RSA-512. The whole thing is built on export-grade encryption.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 4:55 UTC (Tue) by miekg (subscriber, #4403) [Link] (2 responses)

You mean RSA/*SHA512*? There never was the option for RSA and 512 bits.

See https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-...

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 10:08 UTC (Tue) by flussence (guest, #85566) [Link] (1 responses)

Crossed wires, my bad.

The bare minimum RSA size supported by tooling is *1024*, which is used in the wild, too big to fit in a UDP response, and only slightly better than WEP.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 17:56 UTC (Tue) by hkario (subscriber, #94864) [Link]

sha-1 signatures are still widely used

DoH is no alternative

Posted May 28, 2024 5:33 UTC (Tue) by oldtomas (guest, #72579) [Link] (2 responses)

Whoever dominates the browser "market" (who is that, again?) has a choke point in DNS.

We are moving into a dystopia where the Internet is owned by just one company. At a breakneck pace. And all the nerds are cheering.

DoH is no alternative

Posted May 29, 2024 20:15 UTC (Wed) by ceplm (subscriber, #41334) [Link] (1 responses)

We three protest and use the only independent browser out there, but well …

DoH is no alternative

Posted May 31, 2024 5:43 UTC (Fri) by oldtomas (guest, #72579) [Link]

And teach other people (especially kids) how to fix their browsers. And why. And remind monpoly agencies that they're asleep at the wheel. And...

Stealing a quote from a giant (and adapting it to this context): freedom is a process, not a product.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 13:56 UTC (Tue) by birdie (guest, #114905) [Link]

I've been using it for over five years with zero issues.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 28, 2024 14:15 UTC (Tue) by farnz (subscriber, #17727) [Link] (3 responses)

There's a plausible world where opportunistic IPSec based on DNS was easy to set up, in which DNSSEC would have made a lot of sense; if we lived in that world, as part of connecting to the name "lwn.net", my system would automatically set up an IPSec association using DNS lookups to find the correct certificate for the association. This would then make DNSSEC useful, since it would allow you to confirm that the certificate for "lwn.net" really did come from "lwn.net", and not from your ISP's MitM of DNS for their own nefarious purposes.

But we don't live in that world. We live in one where the binding between a name and encryption keys is done at the application level via TLS and DTLS, and one where the certificates are passed separately to the name resolution. In this world, DNSSEC would only be useful if the entities managing certificates changed their rules (the CA/Browser Forum rules) to require DNSSEC if you're authenticating the certificate via DNS - but, as Geoff points out, they've not done that, and probably won't for a long time.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 18:19 UTC (Thu) by raven667 (subscriber, #5198) [Link] (2 responses)

I wonder what this world would have looked like with opportunistic IPSec instead of SSL/TLS but the problem is that updating applications is much more straightforward than updating the OS on each endpoint, which is often tied to the 3-7y endpoint hardware lifecycle, to make the OS network stack participate in security negotiation, this would also pretty much require IPv6 to have unique IP/name mappings for every service name in existence (no virutalhosting at the network level with IPSec).

Turning this on its head, I wonder what DNS over IPSec would look like, if DNS servers routinely also supported opportunistic IPSec with _long_ association validity periods, you could have all the DNS traffic occur with UDP latency encapsulated in IPSec, only incurring the IKE startup penalty when querying an authoritative server for the first time.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 21:30 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

IPSec is another braindead protocol from 90-s, unfortunately. It has too much stuff that makes no sense, and it also depends on out-of-band IKE for key exchange.

The modern implementation of DNSSEC would look like Wireguard. Honestly, that's what we should just do: standardize on Wireguard for DNS. It also supports UDP.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 31, 2024 8:15 UTC (Fri) by farnz (subscriber, #17727) [Link]

To get to this world, we'd need IPSec to be much simpler; Wireguard is fundamentally a subset of IPSec with all the hard decisions made for you, for example, and some slightly different packet formats. It drops a lot of the mess in IPSec that's there to cope with the 0.1% of NSA employees who need something a bit different to the norm, and that's a good thing.

The modern version would probably be opportunistic Wireguard, with keying from DNS, and DNS resolution done via DoH.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 6:35 UTC (Wed) by erwbgy (subscriber, #4104) [Link] (1 responses)

Back when I used to work in this space, DNSCurve seemed like a viable option, but I never got a chance to try it. Does anyone have real world experience using it?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 17:59 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

I don't think it has been ever deployed. The idea to use NS records as trust anchors is interesting, but the CurveCP protocol is the worst kind of NIH syndrome. The amount of infrastructure that you need to implement just for the CurveCP to work doesn't justify its benefits.

I've recently had an idea to use Wireguard instead. Basically, just use NS records for the Wireguard keys. Then just use the regular DNS-over-UDP secured by Wireguard.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 8:50 UTC (Wed) by jd (guest, #26381) [Link] (1 responses)

The problem is fundamentally exactly the same as one of the decisions behind early IPv6 design: security is implemented as an afterthought or an optional extra.

It's why I was so annoyed when IPSec was taken out of IPv6, as it had been a key selling point for IPv6 up to that point. The whole protocol was built around security from the start, or so the theory went.

Security as an afterthought, and especially security designed by committee as an afterthought, is rarely going to offer advantages.

Of course, I've mixed feelings. Back in the early 90s, I was running around 7 MUDs and MUSHes, and there were issues due to DNS being unreliable and slow. So I simply duplicated the zones of the remote DNS servers that weren't reliable and resolved everything locally. It was quicker and easier than trying to persuade ISPs to be competent.

(Didn't trust the university's IT department, either, so duplicated most of their services, too. I must have annoyed so many people...)

These days, I still can't trust ISPs to be competent, but I've fewer mechanisms to bypass ineptness, and the more you secure things, the more you've got to trust others.

I really do like the idea of properly secure infrastructure, especially when it's critical services, but this will only work as intended, or at all, if the companies running the infrastructure up their game.

Badly-designed, badly-implemented, and badly-installed security are all worse than no security.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 10:19 UTC (Wed) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

The problem is security is difficult and amorphous. Different entities can come to very different conclusions as to which point they want to occupy on the trade-off space of security, convenience, cost, etc.

The lesson here - an old one, that is simply being reinforced, yet again - is that the core network will be (needs to be) dumb. And every bit of complexity needs to be pushed off to end-hosts. Middle-host functionality should be minimised, as much as possible.

Even DNS is moving away from a core network service, to an edge-service, thanks to DoH.

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 29, 2024 19:47 UTC (Wed) by sailus (subscriber, #33593) [Link]

As most protocols today use TLS, not performing secure DNS queries in conjunction of these protocols is not as much a problem it once could have been. That does not mean DNSSEC would not serve an important purpose of providing secure DNS queries when they are required.

DNSSEC is also a crucial link in the chain of securely obtaining a TLS certificate by ACME (e.g. Let's encrypt) over HTTP, besides the CAA <URL:https://letsencrypt.org/docs/caa/> DNS record -- the security of which also depends on DNSSEC. Remove that, and it will take only a MitM attack for a third party to obtain a certificate to a domain. Certificate transparency does mitigate that but it's a poor replacement for DNSSEC.

I believe people, even relatively large companies, just assume DNS works the way it appears to be working. Why would they fix it if nothing appears to be broken?

Also one factor hindering the adoption of DNSSEC has been the fragility of the implementations but that should be more or less sorted out by now: even BIND 9 mostly "just works". Maybe admins don't bother with it still because they remember it used to be hard?

DNSSEC + UDP = problems

Posted May 29, 2024 23:38 UTC (Wed) by DemiMarie (subscriber, #164188) [Link]

I think a major problem with DNSSEC is that it does not work well with UDP. ECDSA might solve that, but post-quantum signatures will likely bring the problem back.

However, DNS-over-UDP lacks encryption support, and all of the replacement options are fine with large DNS records. Maybe that is the solution?

Huston: Calling Time on DNSSEC?

Posted May 30, 2024 17:37 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

One other thing, the design of DNSSEC was geared towards early 90-s. Back then, signing was expensive, and it was inconceivable that resolvers would be able to sign every request on the fly. So that's why there's all this infrastructure around KSKs and ZSKs, and the whole Rube Goldberg machine of NSEC/NSEC3. It was really the only way to add cryptographic authentication to DNS back then.

As a result, DNSSEC also _can't_ encrypt the replies. A strong encryption needs a client-supplied nonce (or a private/public key pair), that would necessitate signing every reply.

None of these concerns is valid now. But the DNSSEC design has never been updated. Oh well.

actually DNSSEC has the killer APP - DANE

Posted Jun 6, 2024 4:59 UTC (Thu) by johnjones (guest, #5462) [Link]

Soon Microsoft will both deploy DANE for SMTP and then it becomes part of the standard deployment practices for a domain when you host with exchange...

its the only way we are going to fix the email mess and by extension SIP

regards

John Jones


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