Verify the identity of developers
Verify the identity of developers
Posted Mar 30, 2024 7:39 UTC (Sat) by epa (subscriber, #39769)In reply to: A backdoor in xz by mss
Parent article: A backdoor in xz
Of course “moles” could still exist, but they would be much more difficult for hostile nations to create than an entirely fake identity like Jia Tan. To add a backdoor the easiest way would then be to compromise some developer’s workstation or steal their private key. Which is by no means impossible, but raises the difficulty somewhat, and is harder to do undetected.
It wouldn’t even need to be GitHub. If Debian started using git sources for releases (no more downloading of random tarballs), a further step would be to require signing of each individual change in the repository (via signed tags or something, I don’t know the details, but it’s possible somehow) and then not trust changes from a new contributor until that person has visited a Debian keysigning party. Again, hardly watertight, but better than no checks at all.
Most of the discussion here has focused on supply chain measures. And I agree with that approach—not trying to “catch the bad guys”. But once the weakest links are tightened, and accepting the fact that we will never have enough reviewers to check every commit, it could make sense to review the people themselves.
