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Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 2, 2022 23:58 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523)
In reply to: Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1 by MatejLach
Parent article: Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

NSA is not going to install spy boxes in your DC network switches. There's simply way too much traffic to analyze and the network complexity makes it infeasible to even do independently of AWS.

So NSA would simply officially ask Amazon to provide them with a covert way to access the data for a specific customer directly using the AWS services.


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Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 3, 2022 9:48 UTC (Thu) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link] (1 responses)

The NSA may however have its employees go and work for your company under cover. It's pretty much a certainty that /multiple/ state intelligence agencies have agents working at the various large tech companies.

Minimising the trust and scope of access of what employees can access, to what they need to access for their immediate role, is a good thing, security wise.

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 3, 2022 17:31 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link]

Sure. But the complexity of AWS is so overwhelming that you won't really be able to do much unless you want a very targeted attack and have access through many layers of security (physical and virtual).

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 23, 2022 22:27 UTC (Wed) by Rudd-O (guest, #61155) [Link] (3 responses)

Counterpoint: NSA absolutely does install spyware into network switches.

Snowden already revealed this. There are extensive talks on the subject presented by Jacob Applebaum at CCC.

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 23, 2022 23:43 UTC (Wed) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (2 responses)

Sure. So you installed spyware into a TOR switch. Then what? The data plane is too fast for any meaningful analysis with the puny switch CPU.

You maybe can mirror one port to another, but in an Amazon DC this means nothing. You'll just confuse some random EC2 hardware instance. You won't even be able to do much if you redirect the traffic to an instance that you control, because it's encrypted.

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 24, 2022 9:54 UTC (Thu) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

"The data plane is too fast for any meaningful analysis with the puny switch CPU."

Except the L3 switch ASIC can be programmed to redirect only certain flows to said CPU. They can also be programmed to encap and redirect certain flows to other hosts. Indeed, they can be programmed to mirror packets (but I can't remember if the L3 ASICs commonly used at the super-large DCs can /both/ mirror and encap the same flow - if not, it's just a matter of time till they do).

So:

1. You don't need to analyse the entire data flow on the puny switch CPU, cause the /powerful/ switching ASIC can be programmed to do hardware tcpdumping (basically). Given the CPUs on these switches aren't /that/ puny (low to mid end Xeons), further analysis on host is quite feasible.
2. Even better, you can just redirect the flow you're interested in to a bigger server by encapping it (the server can resend the flow's packets out again so they're not missed).

Moving past TCP in the data center, part 1

Posted Nov 24, 2022 9:56 UTC (Thu) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

"You won't even be able to do much if you redirect the traffic to an instance that you control, because it's encrypted."

I note this is a good counter-argument to your own argument in another sub-thread that intra-DC traffic doesn't need to be encrypted. ;)


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