Attacking the kernel via its command line

If you want much older documentation with vendors using the term secure boot... you can have that.

> The rest of us are having a discussion about the "Secure Boot" term that has been used by basically all the client and server system firmware and bootloader developers across many OSes and companies to refer to one single feature and the ecosystem around it, and that feature has been deployed and supported for *years* now. If you want there to be some generic version that has some more generalized or more hardcore feature set, be my guest, but call it something else if you want people to understand you. Likewise, others likely will not speak in your own personal argot to describe the world they're in.

You're the one using a generic term in a niche way. How much market share does desktop Linux have? And by the way, not all desktop and server distributions are interested in an incomplete implementation of secure / verified boot or redefining the term that way.

> Not the case. Suffice it to say that as somebody who has spent much time working on these issues, in open source code where everyone can see, I do not agree with your point of view, and find your arguments against what we've done utterly uncompelling in light of a very simple fact: it prevents the actual exploits in the wild.

It is the case. You're stuck in the bubble of cargo cult security land with apparently no experience with systems using meaningful verified boot which are far more common than the entirety of desktop Linux.

It doesn't prevent actual exploits, and you've been unable to provide any example of that. You made a false claim that this level of incomplete secure / verified boot implementation prevented making a rootkit hiding itself from the rest of the OS.

> With that said, and since I see that Florian and Kurt already tried to explain this to you, and you simply refused to listen to anything they said, I think we're done talking. You're clearly not ready to have a civil discussion or try to understand anyone else's point of view, much less the actual technical details.

You're only interested in pushing marketing drivel and cargo cult security. They didn't try to explain anything. All of you have refused to engage in a technical discussion. You only make arguments from authority and inaccurate claims that you cannot defend.

> Same. Have a nice life.

Have a nice time keeping the information security industry dishonest.