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Security quotes of the week

As with past network security changes, a major factor we need to account for is that no matter how valuable a particular goal is from a broader industry perspective, people don't tend to react to API breaks by fixing their code - they react by not upgrading at all.
Nick Coghlan

Once a proof-of-concept, the pocket-sized USB stick now fits in any security tester's repertoire of tools and hacks, says the Hong Kong-based company [PDF] that developed it. It works like this: when the USB Kill stick is plugged in, it rapidly charges its capacitors from the USB power supply, and then discharges -- all in the matter of seconds.

On unprotected equipment, the device's makers say it will "instantly and permanently disable unprotected hardware" .

Zack Whittaker

There's more. One company told me about a variety of probing attacks in addition to the DDoS [distributed denial of service] attacks: testing the ability to manipulate Internet addresses and routes, seeing how long it takes the defenders to respond, and so on. Someone is extensively testing the core defensive capabilities of the companies that provide critical Internet services.

Who would do this? It doesn't seem like something an activist, criminal, or researcher would do. Profiling core infrastructure is common practice in espionage and intelligence gathering. It's not normal for companies to do that. Furthermore, the size and scale of these probes -- and especially their persistence -- points to state actors. It feels like a nation's military cybercommand trying to calibrate its weaponry in the case of cyberwar. It reminds me of the US's Cold War program of flying high-altitude planes over the Soviet Union to force their air-defense systems to turn on, to map their capabilities.

Bruce Schneier sounds the alarm

In a speech delivered at the Billington Cyber Security Summit in Washington DC, director general for cyber security at GCHQ, Ciaran Martin, said: ‘We’re exploring a flagship project on scaling up DNS filtering: what better way of providing automated defences at scale than by the major private providers effectively blocking their customers from coming into contact with known malware and bad addresses?’
Alice MacGregor (Thanks to Paul Wise.)

to post comments

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 16, 2016 9:59 UTC (Fri) by k8to (guest, #15413) [Link] (5 responses)

I'm not sure I grasp the USB Kill Stick.

It's cute and all, but wouldn't a hammer offer similar results if you have local access to insert a USB device?

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 16, 2016 11:13 UTC (Fri) by liw (subscriber, #6379) [Link]

It doesn't need to be the attacker who inserts the USB Kill Stick into the computer. Simple social engineering will get people to insert a USB Kill Stick into their own computer. Getting them to hit the computer with a hammer is somewhat harder in practice.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 16, 2016 12:28 UTC (Fri) by farnz (subscriber, #17727) [Link]

If I were to "accidentally" drop a USB stick that looked like a USB Flash drive, labelled "Google plans - please return to MTV campus if found" somewhere near a TechCrunch writer, the chances are extremely high that said writer would plug it into a machine to see what was on it. Similarly, you could probably get a political journalist with a stick labelled "Trump master plans - destroy if found". It'd be chancy (what happens if the wrong person picks up the stick?), but you can drop and forget, thus being safely out of the way when the laptop goes "bang!".

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 16, 2016 19:49 UTC (Fri) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (1 responses)

In one company I worked, security department once did a campaign of dropping USB sticks that caused corporate computers to lock up if inserted. And then anyone asking the tech support department for help got a stern lecture.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 19, 2016 12:40 UTC (Mon) by cwillu (guest, #67268) [Link]

Thus ensuring that future issues with lock-ups are not directed to support; brilliant!

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 17, 2016 13:04 UTC (Sat) by gioele (subscriber, #61675) [Link]

> I'm not sure I grasp the USB Kill Stick.
>
> It's cute and all, but wouldn't a hammer offer similar results if you have local access to insert a USB device?

I see the USB Kill Stick as the physical counterpart to software security proof of concepts.

Typical sw scenario:

* "We do not need to fix this obscure crash, it never happens with proper input and it is not exploitable anyway"
* ... 2 days later ...
* "PoC published: read a file with `asdasda20101031rm-Rvf/` and it will format your disk"

The USB Kill is a nice demonstration that you need (among thousands of other things) current protection on all your USB ports. It is just a matter of letting a user plug an innocent looking stick into a USB port. Anybody with a USB stick is allowed near copiers in a copy shop and they can kill completely a thousands $currency machine in a second. I'd say it is harder to trash the same machine with a hammer without being noticed.

I hope this nice HW PoC will force manufacturer to think about this problem, especially now that USB is being pushed as a charging interface.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 22, 2016 17:16 UTC (Thu) by pboddie (guest, #50784) [Link] (3 responses)

...people don't tend to react to API breaks by fixing their code - they react by not upgrading at all.

Now all we need is for the same group of people to connect the dots between this well-articulated observation and the matter of people justifiably sticking with Python 2.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 22, 2016 19:08 UTC (Thu) by Cyberax (✭ supporter ✭, #52523) [Link] (2 responses)

Python 2 is not better because it's stable. It's better because it's _better_ than Python 3 trash fire.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 23, 2016 20:59 UTC (Fri) by pboddie (guest, #50784) [Link]

It is less to do with better or stable and more to do with how much work is generated and for whose benefit that work is done. Here, the benefit of fixing security oversights in one's own code arguably outweighs the cost of tracking the accompanying API changes, and yet the observation is made that people don't bother.

Now consider a less favourable perception of the benefits of something - Python 3 - and it shouldn't be a mystery as to why people aren't tracking that particular, very demanding, programme of change. But maybe it remains a mystery to some people because they perceive Python 3 adoption in general, along with the work it creates, to be more important than the necessary work created when potentially urgent security issues are addressed.

Security quotes of the week

Posted Sep 23, 2016 21:45 UTC (Fri) by anselm (subscriber, #2796) [Link]

That's a matter of opinion. I recently had occasion to start a large new project for work in Python 3 and so far I like it just fine. I think that in various respects it is nicer and more convenient than Python 2.

(I still have large swathes of Python 2 code from different projects that I don't exactly look forward to port to Python 3 eventually; it's just that for green-field development Python 3 seems perfectly OK to me.)


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