Increasing the range of address-space layout randomization

Increasing the range of address-space layout randomization

Well, I have never once in my life claimed to be a journalist, FWIW.

Look, Brad, I think you have done a lot of good work. I certainly have no "personal vendetta" against it. Don't go paranoid on me, that won't help anybody.

I realize that trying to get work into the mainline can be frustrating and infuriating, and that holds doubly true for the kind of stuff that you do. It has taken a very long time for attitudes in the kernel community to catch up to our security problems, and the jury is still out on just how much that has happened even now.

Still, if you want to be a part of the kernel community, you need to be a part of the kernel community. If you work to get your code included just like everybody else does, there should be no issues around credit. If you sit on the sidelines and restrict access to your patches, you will be on the sidelines. Even then, when work clearly derives from what you have done (as with the post-init read-only stuff) the developers involved should credit their sources, and I will certainly try to mirror that. If this simple ASLR patch derives from your work, the author did not say so.

Honestly, Brad, I wish you would engage a bit more in useful forums; LWN, for all that I put into it, may not be the best place to actually get change effected. You have a lot to offer, but, if you want to come in from the cold, I don't think you can really expect me to just make that happen for you.