|From:||Theodore Ts'o <tytso-AT-mit.edu>|
|Subject:||Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection|
|Date:||Thu, 12 Dec 2013 14:06:59 -0500|
|Cc:||linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org, Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala-AT-gmail.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo-AT-kernel.org>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-AT-xmission.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto-AT-amacapital.net>, Kees Cook <keescook-AT-chromium.org>, Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter-AT-ffwll.ch>, Alan Cox <alan-AT-linux.intel.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh-AT-linuxfoundation.org>, Jason Wang <jasowang-AT-redhat.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem-AT-davemloft.net>, Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter-AT-oracle.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris-AT-oracle.com>|
On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 05:52:24PM +0100, firstname.lastname@example.org wrote: > From: Vegard Nossum <email@example.com> > > The idea is simple -- since different kernel versions are vulnerable to > different root exploits, hackers most likely try multiple exploits before > they actually succeed. Suppose we put put this into the mainstream kernel. Wouldn't writers of root kit adapt by checking for the kernel version to avoid checking for exploits that are known not work? So the question is whether the additional complexity in the kernel is going to be worth it, since once the attackers adapt, the benefits of trying to detect attacks for mitigated exploits will be minimal. Regards, - Ted
Copyright © 2013, Eklektix, Inc.
Comments and public postings are copyrighted by their creators.
Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds