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Randomizing the kernel

Randomizing the kernel

Posted Apr 11, 2013 23:58 UTC (Thu) by Beolach (subscriber, #77384)
Parent article: Randomizing the kernel

Just a couple weeks back, LWN posted a link to the PaX Team calling KASLR Cargo Cult Security. I quite liked the metaphor they used to illustrate how small a benefit it gives:

this moving target only moves once and is pretty easy to spot.
That said, even w/ only minuscule benefit, I think it might still be worthwhile, if it has an even more minuscule cost. Does anyone know if KASLR has any impact on performance?


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Randomizing the kernel

Posted Apr 12, 2013 13:09 UTC (Fri) by tialaramex (subscriber, #21167) [Link]

The earlier link is already mentioned in the article. Deciding whether defences are worthwhile is largely impossible unless you have in mind a specific threat model.

All ASLR-style defences have entirely practical statistical attacks, so if the threat you're modelling wouldn't be phased by that then it's worthless /for that model/. This is a contrast to something like W^X which isn't statistical, an attack that's stopped by W^X is stopped, maybe it can be re-activated by another route, but it can't just be retried (or used against more hosts) with the expectation that it will eventually work.

I make the distinction _entirely practical_ because there are theoretical statistical attacks against a lot of things which we can discount. We quite reasonably don't consider "just guessing" a 128 bit AES secret key to be a practical attack on a scheme using AES encryption for example.


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