It's not even worthy of the same degree of trust as, say, the Simtec Entropy Key, because at least Simtec is a small company and you can in theory get to know the people who did the work and become as sure as you wish that they did not get nobbled by the secret services -- though even that entropy is somewhat less trustworthy than environmental entropy not derived from a necessarily-opaque IC. Intel? It's a behemoth, and we know it therefore does business with all sorts of people. Who knows what pressures may have been brought to bear?
This isn't saying that I think pressures *were* brought to bear on Intel to nobble their RNGs -- it's just that had they *been* brought to bear, the design would have looked just like we see now (as the nobbling would happen later in the process, with less risk of public exposure), and the CPUs that resulted would have looked from the outside *just like the ones we see now* except that their 'random' numbers would be predictable by a suitably-privileged outside attacker. So we cannot distinguish between those cases, so cannot grant the entropy derived from those CPUs the same definitely-unpredictable status as entropy derived from environmental noise.
(This is not, of course, unique to Intel. I consider uninspectable RNGs and binary crypto blobs from all vendors untrustworthy, but larger vendors are probably less trustworthy than smaller ones, regardless of the quality of their engineering or employees, simply because they are easier for the security services to quietly nobble.)
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