A bad week
The OpenSSH and sendmail vulnerabilities are of particular concern. Almost every system of interest runs OpenSSH, and vast portions of the net still run sendmail. Any vulnerability in those programs automatically opens up large numbers of systems to exploitation. These are the sorts of problems that will, someday, be used for the creation of a virulent worm which attacks Linux systems. If we are lucky, no such event will strike us this time around, but let there be no doubt about it: as long as software which is so widely deployed has remotely exploitable holes, we are vulnerable to that sort of mass attack.
Now that the obligatory scary talk is done, let's take a look at the better news here. It is not clear that the bugs in either OpenSSH or sendmail are exploitable in any large-scale way. Even if they are, once again the problems have been found first by the good guys and fixes have been made quickly available by the Linux distributors. The patches being released are small and relatively non-disruptive; administrators can apply them quickly and with confidence. So most systems will be patched in a relatively short period of time. These vulnerabilities were a scary warning, but it does not appear that there will be any great consequences this time around.
Nonetheless, this episode is a warning. Our security, while arguably
better than that of the competition, is nowhere near good enough. We are
still encountering bugs in crucial, highly-audited code; one can only
imagine what lurks in programs which get less attention. And the network
environment we are creating is still too monocultural. The network as a
whole will be safer when there are multiple, interoperable programs capable
of performing the basic infrastructural tasks.
