Tracking users
User tracking is always contentious. There are real advantages to gathering lots of information on how an application is used, but there are also serious drawbacks in terms of privacy. Many applications or distributions have "opt-in" mechanisms that report back, but that makes the data somewhat suspect because it comes from a self-selected group. But "opt-out" data gathering is frowned upon by privacy advocates and privacy-conscious users. As a recent discussion in the Mozilla dev-planning group shows, though, there are some who find that the need for data may outweigh some privacy concerns.
Mozilla is understandably concerned with Firefox's decline in market share and would like to try to determine what the underlying causes are. That has led to a proposal for a feature called MetricsDataPing that would collect a wide variety of information about the browser, its add-ons, and how it is used. That information would be sent to Mozilla over HTTPS each day that the browser is used. Crucially, the proposal is that MetricsDataPing would be an opt-out feature, which would require users to know about the feature and disable it if they didn't want to share that data.
This stands in contrast to features like Telemetry, which gathers data on browser performance, but it has two crucial differences from MetricsDataPing. First, it is opt-in so that users actively have to enable it, and secondly, it tries to avoid gathering any personally identifiable information (PII). It does not store IP addresses (but does geolocate the IP address and store that) and it generates a new ID every time the browser is restarted.
MetricsDataPing on the other hand would gather a much wider range of information such that "fingerprinting" a user just based on the data gathered would be a real possibility. Just a list of add-ons installed is probably nearly unique, but adding in just the installation date for the add-on, as MetricsDataPing does, would almost certainly make it unique. Information about search sources used, number of searches done, and that sort of thing also rings alarm bells for those concerned about privacy. It also uses a "document ID" to identify the data sent to the server, which would allow users to delete their data from the Mozilla servers. But the document ID could also essentially serve as a unique user ID (UUID) because the previous document ID is always sent with the current update, so that the older can be deleted.
There are efforts to anonymize the data that would be stored, but, as we have seen before, it is very difficult to truly anonymize collected data. Some of that is also true for Telemetry, because it has added fingerprintable data after its initial roll-out, but the key difference is that users have willingly chosen to share that data. That's the main difficulty that some see with the MetricsDataPing proposal. Benjamin Smedberg started off the discussion with a posting of his concerns:
But others, especially on the Mozilla metrics team, believe that the information gathered is critical. Blake Cutler described it this way:
Ben Bucksch made several suggestions on how to improve the privacy of the data gathered, but he is also worried that gathering data to figure out why Firefox usage is declining will actually result in more users leaving because of a perception that the browser is intruding on their privacy. While the data may be important and useful, there are other considerations according to Justin Lebar:
To that end, the discussion shouldn't center on why these metrics are important or difficult to obtain another way. The discussion is about whether we can at once collect the proposed metrics and stay true to our values. If we can't, then we can't collect the data, no matter how important it may be.
There was some discussion of technical measures to try to reduce the PII content of the messages, but there are still problems with things like fingerprinting. If you gather enough information (of the kind the metrics team thinks it needs), you are very likely to be able to track users. Even if the data is massaged in some fashion (aggregated for example), the perception of privacy invasion will still be present as Boris Zbarsky pointed out:
Even for opt-in services like Telemetry, gathering additional information
requires user agreement. When the list
of add-ons was added to the information that Telemetry supplied, users were
required to opt back in to Telemetry after being informed of that
change. As Lebar noted: "So again, here we have a decision made about sending the
list of add-ons in a ping-type thing, that we cannot do it without
explicit permission, even for people who already opted in to data
collection.
" But MetricsDataPing would, seemingly, gather that
information without asking the user even once.
Early in the thread, Mike Beltzner pointed
to a posting
on the Mozilla privacy blog that committed Mozilla "to a basic policy of 'no surprises,
real choices, sensible settings, limited data, and user control'
",
he said.
It's a bit hard to see how MetricsDataPing fits into that framework. For
some Linux distributions (which is probably not really where Mozilla is focused on
market share) it could easily be seen as a misfeature that should
be removed from the code—though that might lead to more "iceweasels"
due to Mozilla trademark issues.
In the end, Mozilla may need to find a way to satisfy its data needs with an opt-in feature, or find a very convincing argument for the impossibility of user tracking with the data it does collect. There is also the argument that there is a subtle self-unselection bias that is introduced with an opt-out feature. In what ways does the data get skewed by eliminating the very privacy-conscious? It is certainly understandable that the metrics team (and Mozilla as a whole) wants the data, but, like Linux distributions it may have to settle for indirect measurements or some self-selection bias.
| Index entries for this article | |
|---|---|
| Security | Privacy |
| Security | Web browsers |
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