|From:||James Morris <jmorris-AT-namei.org>|
|To:||Theodore Tso <tytso-AT-mit.edu>|
|Subject:||Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope|
|Date:||Mon, 21 Jun 2010 10:52:11 +1000 (EST)|
|Cc:||Casey Schaufler <casey-AT-schaufler-ca.com>, Alan Cox <alan-AT-lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Kees Cook <kees.cook-AT-canonical.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap-AT-xenotime.net>, linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-linux-foundation.org>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina-AT-suse.cz>, Dave Young <hidave.darkstar-AT-gmail.com>, Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky-AT-de.ibm.com>, Roland McGrath <roland-AT-redhat.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg-AT-redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-AT-zytor.com>, David Howells <dhowells-AT-redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo-AT-elte.hu>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra-AT-chello.nl>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-AT-xmission.com>, linux-doc-AT-vger.kernel.org, Stephen Smalley <sds-AT-tycho.nsa.gov>, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh-AT-redhat.com>, linux-security-module-AT-vger.kernel.org|
On Fri, 18 Jun 2010, Theodore Tso wrote: > Yet I would really like a number of features such as this ptrace scope idea --- > which I think is a useful feature, and it may be that stacking is the only > way we can resolve this debate. We've already reached a consensus that these things should be put into a separate LSM so we can evaluate the possible need for some form of stacking or a security library API. Note that people using SELinux or AppArmor already have the ability to restrict ptrace, and they would thus not need to stack this function if it were in a separate LSM. Do you have a use-case where stacking would be useful here? - James -- James Morris <email@example.com> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to firstname.lastname@example.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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