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Countering the trusting trust attack

Countering the trusting trust attack

Posted Feb 5, 2010 21:52 UTC (Fri) by Baylink (guest, #755)
In reply to: Countering the trusting trust attack by paulj
Parent article: Security in the 20-teens

Because I am a believer in the traditions of science, yes, I think it would be an excellent idea if you wrote up formally your problems with his paper...

which I *promise* I'm going to read, tonight while I wait for a server upgrade to finish. :-)

And certainly any level of the stack can be attacked, and I understand that was his point. But one either has to say "there's no practical way for me to validate the microcode of the CPU, and thus there's a practical limite to what I can verify", or one has to -- in fact -- do that validation.

If one can.

As we note on RISKS regularly, there are two issues at hand here: "pick your own low-hanging fruit", ie: make sure you apply extra security balm equally to all layers of your problem (as adjusted by your threat estimates at each layer), and "know your CBA": the amount of security at all levels you apply has to be in keeping with not only your threat estimate, but with what the bad guys can *get*.

This is, in particular, the part of the issue that terrorists throw monkey wrenches into: trying to inspire asymmetrical responses to what are, objectively, low-level threats. Your opponent wears himself out on the cape and never sees the sword. Bruce Schneier likes to address this issue.


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Countering the trusting trust attack

Posted Sep 20, 2010 14:53 UTC (Mon) by paulj (subscriber, #341) [Link]

Took a while, but I wrote up those views on "Diverse Double-Compiling" and stuck them online here.


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