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Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2)

To:  Michael Stone <>
Subject:  Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2)
Date:  Thu, 17 Dec 2009 23:43:58 -0500
Cc:  Mark Seaborn <>,,,, Andi Kleen <>, David Lang <>, Oliver Hartkopp <>, Alan Cox <>, Herbert Xu <>, Bryan Donlan <>, Evgeniy Polyakov <>, "C. Scott Ananian" <>, James Morris <>, "Eric W. Biederman" <>, Bernie Innocenti <>, Randy Dunlap <>, Américo Wang <>
Archive-link:  Article, Thread

On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:29:57 EST, Michael Stone said:
> Daniel Bernstein has observed [1] that security-conscious userland processes
> may benefit from the ability to irrevocably remove their ability to create,
> bind, connect to, or send messages except in the case of previously connected
> sockets or AF_UNIX filesystem sockets. We provide this facility by implementing
> support for a new prctl(PR_SET_NETWORK) flag named PR_NETWORK_OFF.

Dan does indeed have a point - but is this better achieved via either
the already-existing LSM interfaces (opening the stacking-LSM can of worms
again), or the SECCOMP framework?  We already have 2 other ways to turn off
stuff, do we really want a third way?

Alternatively, could a more generalized prctl interface be leveraged to handle
SECCOMP, and/or other targeted things that want to stack with LSM?

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