For starters, why not use a garbage-collected safe language (compiled one which doesn't require a VM, like OCaml or D) for reimplementation of OpenSSH? It'd instantly decrease the number of exploitable buffer-overflow bugs nearly to zero. In fact, I'm reading OpenSSH CVEs and almost _all_ of them are caused by its usage of unsafe language.
New OpenSSL should still be implemented in C, because it's the lowest common denominator, alas.
>Have you seen the horror that lurks in standards that mix XML and crypto? XML has many congenial aspects, but it does not mix well with the "just define a canonical bitstring dammit" world of crypto.
It's actually not that complex. The relevant standards are: http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-c14n and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-exc-c14n/ , they are nicely _short_ and can be quite easily implemented. In fact, I've implemented a subset of them in the past quite easily.
XML signature core standard is also very nice and readable: http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/
Hmm... It's actually not that much work to build new security protocol...
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