Universal signing of source code and source packages
Universal signing of source code and source packages
Posted Sep 15, 2008 12:06 UTC (Mon) by epa (subscriber, #39769)Parent article: Adding a signing key to RPM
How long will it be until it becomes de rigeur to check signatures on all source code before building it? It's still very common to download a tarball with no signature and blithely type 'make'. But with version control systems such as git and hg that compute a secure hash of all content, you won't be downloading foo-1.5.2.tar.gz but instead revision 5891b5b522d5df086d0ff0b110fbd9d21bb4fc7163af34d08286a2e846f6be03.
Even when linking to a source tarball you can use the convention of putting a checksum in the #thingy part of the URI, as foo-1.5.2.tar.gz#sha256=71573b922a87abc3fd1a957f2cfa09d9e16998567dd878a85e12166112751806. It would be a good idea for all user-agents like Firefox and wget to check this, and have an option to add the #sha256= gunk to the URI automatically when you copy and paste it.
A collaborative checksum system, where 'make' automatically uploads checksums to a central server saying 'I built source with checksum abc into an object file with checksum xyz' might also catch potential trojaning, or at least spot build errors. (If the source package is designed for Fooboo Linux 5.5, then building it on that system should generate an exact binary package, and it would be interesting to see in what cases it does not.)
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