> The great thing about this is that, for example, your bind
> "policy" gives access to /.* (that means any file on the
> filesystem), because it is assumed that bind is chrooted.
> ... This shows very clearly that apparmor is essentially a
> "fail open" security mechanism
If 'bind' is configured to chroot to e.g. /chroot/bind, then it seems like a mistake to have bind's AppArmor policy specify pathname-access with /.*; it seems like the policy should specify "real" path names, i.e. /chroot/bind/* . This way, AppArmor apps would "fail closed" rather then "fail open". [This methodology might also work with namespace changes.]
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