Another look at response times
Vulnerability Distributor Debian Fedora Gentoo Red Hat SUSE Ubuntu Apache mod_ssl 14 9 21 11 14 12 clamav 22 3 3 n/a 5 -- evolution -- 1 13 19 6 1 fetchmail 22 0 4 4 7 5 PCRE 13 4 14 18 16 3 PHP XML-RPC 9 4 5 6 7 4 PHP XML-RPC 2 18 10 9 4 15 5 ProFTPd 35 -- 4 n/a n/a n/a vim modeline -- 16 n/a? 28 n/a? 1
In the above table, numbers which are underlined reflect alerts issued after the previous version. Those which are, instead, bold are corrections for erroneous entries published two weeks ago.
As one can see, a number of corrections were required. One might conclude from this that your editor was being even more clueless than usual when compiling the previous version of the table. One would probably be right, but there is a little more to it than that. It turns out that putting together a table like this is a hard thing to do.
The previous version stated that Fedora had not issued an advisory for clamav. That is, in fact, true; no advisory ever came out. The clamav package in Fedora Extras was quietly replaced, however, shortly after the vulnerability was disclosed. In the presence of silent fixes, it is hard for users to know if they are vulnerable or not; this is doubly true in cases where security fixes are backported to previous releases of the affected package. Fedora Extras does not do backporting, but it still requires an alert administrator to know that, while clamav has been fixed, ProFTPd in Extras remains vulnerable.
Speaking of ProFTPd, your editor had seen that package in a SUSE distribution he had at hand, and assumed it was still distributed. That turns out not to be the case.
Both SUSE and Gentoo claim to not be affected by the vim modeline vulnerability because they ship versions with the modeline feature turned off by default. Turning off a possibly insecure feature is a good thing to do; it reflects a concern by the distributor for the security of its users. Some of those users, however, will certainly turn the feature back on. Others will be concerned by the fact that they are running software with a known, unpatched vulnerability, even if that vulnerability does not directly affect them. In such cases, it would make sense for the distributor to, at a minimum, issue an advisory explaining the situation. Putting out a fix would be better.
Other corrections above reflect simple screwups on your editor's part. Sorry.
The corrected table still shows some real patterns in the relative response
times for security updates. There is value in this information. As time
permits, LWN will be making changes to its security database to make the
generation of this sort of table an easier and more accurate process. But
a task which, in the presence of nice things like CVE numbers, should be
relatively straightforward is likely to require a fair amount of time (and
iterations) for the foreseeable future.
