malicious filesystem not being a security issue!?
malicious filesystem not being a security issue!?
Posted Oct 2, 2026 15:38 UTC (Fri) by kolAflash (subscriber, #168136)Parent article: Coping with the onslaught of kernel security bugs
> seven were only exploitable by way of a malicious filesystem image,
> something that the kernel community has long documented as not
> actually being a security issue
Maybe I don't get the attack scenario right. But I'd say:
There are a lot of Linux based devices where it's expected that people plug in USB drives or maybe CDs/DVDs - the kind of hardware containing file systems. (rental) cars (USB MP3 playback), photo printer stations in copy shops, hotel room TVs, ...
And surely a lot of applications at home like a notebook, a phone (USB on-the-go) or a SOHO router with an USB port to connect a USB disk as network drive. And do GNOME and Android maybe even automount USB storage (even with the screen locked)?
Surely, for servers it's mostly irrelevant. Except when a sysadmin mounts the disk image of a customer VM on the host...
So the Linux kernel says it's the users or the integration vendors responsibility. But I'm pretty sure most users never heard of this and most integration vendors (car manufacturers, Linux distributions) don't care and even enable auto-mount for USB disks.
There seem to be some FUSE based drivers which can be used instead of in-kernel drivers. Like fuse2fs, fusefat, exfat-fuse and lklfuse (you should probably run it in a container if you fear a malicious file system). But I've never heard that at least udisks make use of them for removable media.
I understand that the kernel devs can't just take responsibility for everything. But maybe the kernel could at least have a mechanisms which requires an "accept-insecure" mount flag for file systems on a removable drive. So downstream projects like udisks become more aware of the problem.
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