On Android distros [LWN.net]

On Android distros

Posted Jan 3, 2025 12:08 UTC (Fri) by excors (subscriber, #95769)
In reply to: On Android distros by epa
Parent article: Some things to expect in 2025

The app connects to some online service (e.g. your bank) which controls all the sensitive data this system is trying to protect. (It's not meant to protect purely offline apps). The app uses the API to get a securely signed attestation report, which it forwards to the online service for verification (checking the root certificate is signed by Google's attestation root key, the Verified Boot details say it's running trustworthy firmware, etc). The app/kernel/firmware can't forge the signatures, because the hardware does a reasonable job at keeping the private keys secret, so the server would reject a fake report and the app wouldn't have access to your money/secrets/etc.

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On Android distros

Posted Jan 3, 2025 14:01 UTC (Fri) by epa (subscriber, #39769) [Link] (1 responses)

So you're saying the signature for the attestation report comes from the TPM (not the Linux operating system).

On Android distros

Posted Jan 3, 2025 16:25 UTC (Fri) by excors (subscriber, #95769) [Link]

Basically, yes.

(Technically it's not called a TPM, probably because that's a specific ISO standard and they don't implement that, but it's a vaguely similar idea. On Pixel phones there's a small 'secure' OS running on the main CPU in parallel to Linux, using ARM TrustZone for isolation; plus a security core on the main SoC, with its own dedicated CPU/RAM/etc running another OS; plus a physically separate security chip with yet another simple OS. Some combination of those are used for Verified Boot, attestation, etc. See https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-n...)