Ever-growing CRL?
Ever-growing CRL?
Posted Dec 6, 2024 13:28 UTC (Fri) by mcatanzaro (subscriber, #93033)In reply to: Ever-growing CRL? by NightMonkey
Parent article: Let's Encrypt sets date for ending OCSP support
Let's Encrypt is using the term "CRL" a little generously to additionally refer to proprietary solutions (proprietary as in nonstandard, not nonfree), specifically OneCRL from Mozilla and CRLSets from Chrome. The proprietary "delta CRLs" don't have any of these problems, but they are also not normal CRLs. I'm not interested in supporting them in GNOME because they are not Internet standards. To the best of my knowledge, they're really only used by Firefox and Chrome. I have ignored them. If one or the other could be standardized, then maybe it would be worth implementing in GnuTLS and OpenSSL? But as long as they remain nonstandard and not supported by TLS libraries, I don't care about them and users do not benefit.
In GNOME, the only supported form of certificate revocation is *stapled* OCSP. This doesn't have any privacy concerns that I'm aware of. We don't support TLS clients talking directly to OCSP servers (which is a terrible idea); instead, the TLS server is expected to talk to the OCSP server and "staple" the OCSP response by sending it to the client. It's only useful if you use the Must-Staple extension, though; otherwise, an attacker would simply not staple any OCSP response to guarantee no revocation. But it works. The Internet has collectively decided not to deploy it for unknown reasons; I'm really not sure why, because it's the only solution that really works. (Well, some sites deploy it. We've occasionally noticed certificate validation failures that don't occur in major web browsers when a website staples an invalid OCSP response.)
