|| ||William Lee Irwin III <wli-AT-holomorphy.com>|
|| ||Stephen Smalley <sds-AT-epoch.ncsc.mil>,
Andrea Arcangeli <andrea-AT-suse.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm-AT-osdl.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org>, kenneth.w.chen-AT-intel.com,
Chris Wright <chrisw-AT-osdl.org>|
|| ||Re: disable-cap-mlock|
|| ||Thu, 1 Apr 2004 09:51:14 -0800|
On Thu, Apr 01, 2004 at 12:37:51PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>> What prevents any uid 0 process from changing these sysctl settings
>> (aside from SELinux, if you happen to use it and configure the policy
On Thu, Apr 01, 2004 at 09:44:05AM -0800, William Lee Irwin III wrote:
> I'm aware it does some very unintelligent things to the security model,
> e.g. anyone with fs-level access to these things can basically escalate
> their capabilities to "everything". Maybe some kind of big fat warning
> is in order.
--- mm4-2.6.5-rc3.orig/security/Kconfig 2004-04-01 07:38:49.000000000 -0800
+++ mm4-2.6.5-rc3/security/Kconfig 2004-04-01 09:49:43.000000000 -0800
@@ -49,6 +49,13 @@
depends on SECURITY!=n
This allows you to disable capabilities with sysctls.
+ It effectively breaks the kernel's security model so that
+ any user with fs-level access to /proc/sys/capability/*
+ can escalate their privileges to "able to do anything",
+ but some users have special-case needs for these things.
+ Don't use this on any system with untrusted local users.
+ It's probably best to firewall the living daylights out
+ of anything using this also.
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