Of Copyright Transfers, Slander of Title, and SCO
February 4, 2004
By Pamela Jones, Editor of Groklaw
A lot of people are curious about SCO's
lawsuit against Novell for
"slander of title." First,
most people have never heard of such a claim
before and don't know what it is. Second, since the dispute surrounds a
question of transfer of copyrights, how exactly are copyrights validly
transfered and did there occur such a transfer between Novell and SCO?
And third, why sue for slander of title instead of bringing a breach of
contract claim or both together?
Taking those questions in order, first, what is "slander of title"?
Normally a claim you find in
real estate
matters, it's defined as "false, unjustified statements regarding another
person's
title to property". There are
elements you must prove
to win:
A cause of action for slander of title occurs when there is a false
and malicious statement made to disparage a person's title to real
estate. The elements of slander of title are: (1) falsity of the
statement made; and (2) malice.
If you own a house, and I know I don't but I claim to be the owner anyway,
you
can sue me for slander of title, because I have cast a cloud
over your ownership claim in that house. There is such a thing as
libel not only to your personal reputation but also to the reputation of
property. You can read a bit more on that here if you are
interested.
But if it's instead a good-faith conflict, in which each
side thinks it really does own the house, well, that's a different
kettle of fish. It still needs to get worked out in the courts, but it
isn't slander of title, because it's not malicious to assert what you
believe are your legal rights. Otherwise there could never be a
contract dispute.
Malice is also a necessary element in a
slander claim. The malicious claim must be intentional
and without reasonable
cause:
To
recover in an action for slander of title, a party must allege and
prove: (i) the utterings and publishing of disparaging
words; (ii) that they were false; (iii) that they were
malicious; (iv) that special damages were sustained thereby; (v)
that the plaintiff possessed an estate or interest in the property
disparaged; and (vi) the loss of a specific sale.
Malice as
a basis for recovery of actual damages in a slander of title case means
merely that the acts must have been deliberate conduct without
reasonable cause....
As compared to other 'injurious falsehood' causes of action, slander of
title or property differs in that there is no presumption of damages.
The plaintiff must show that he or she sustains special damage
proximately, naturally and reasonably resulting from the alleged
slander.... The plaintiff
must prove the loss of a specific sale, i.e., that a pending sale was
defeated by the slander.
That has a bearing, obviously, on SCO's case against Novell. And it's why
some are questioning their choice to use that claim. If you read Novell's
letters, do you get the impression that they feel they actually
do own the copyrights? Note particularly the letters dated
May 28, June 6 and 26, August 4, and October 9 to
follow the copyright argument. If Novell honestly believes that it owns
the copyrights, there is no slander of title. The
necessary element of malice would be missing. It's not slander if the party
has a valid claim. Novell claims it did not transfer the copyrights to
SCO. This raises the possibility that Novell could win on that basis
alone.
Can SCO succeed is establishing its claims to copyright on Unix code? Some
have expressed doubt. And even if SCO were to succeed in establishing that
Novell has no copyrights, there is a deeper question, namely: what can and
what
can't you copyright when it comes to software?
Who owns the copyrights here anyway? To delve into it deeply, you would
need to read the contracts involved, and after you do, I'm guessing you
still won't be 100% sure, though you may well find yourself leaning toward
Novell. SCO highlights, in
particular, Amendment 2
to the Asset
Purchase Agreement, but Novell points out that there were other
documents, including
Amendment 1, the
Schedules, and a Technology License Agreement, although the latter
does not pertain to the copyright issue. Novell isn't saying SCO has no
rights. Novell is saying it retained certain rights, that SCO needed to
assert a need for copyrights and that it never did that, that there were,
in other words, conditions that SCO has not satisfied. Because they did
not satisfy the conditions, the copyrights never transfered.
Why didn't SCO sue for breach of contract, then, if their position is
correct and copyrights were supposed to transfer and Amendment 2 is
the contract that was to make that happen? No one I have talked to can
figure that out. At least one attorney I asked about this thinks that
failure to assert a breach of contract claim will prove fatal to SCO's
chances of prevailing in the slander of title claim. While SCO alleges that
the copyrights were to have transferred under the Asset Purchase Agreement,
clearly it didn't happen, or there would be no dispute heading to court. So
why not sue for breach of contract and ask the judge to enforce the
contract?
SCO has been claiming that its rights to Unix were absolute, but all the
while it turns out it was in hot and heavy correspondence with Novell, so
its rights were contested all along. That fact alone, the fact that Novell
firmly asserted what it claims to be its rights, indicates that SCO may
have great difficulty persuading a judge that malice was involved. If you
have read the contract documents, you already know it is far from obvious
that Novell has no legitimate claim.
SCO registered for copyrights, but so did
Novell. SCO would need to show that Novell transfered those rights to
SCO. And it had to have been in writing, because copyright law
requires copyright
transfers to be in writing and "signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." For example, a friend of
mine, who just registered a copyright in some music he wrote,
got a letter from the US Copyright Office that
included this sentence:
Copyright belongs initially to the author. It may be transferred
to another person or organization by a written agreement or by
operation of law. For registration purposes, the copyright
claimant is either (1) the author or (2) the person or
organization
that has obtained ownership of all rights under the copyright.
Here, that would mean
Novell, who would have to transfer by writing to SCO.
There is no official US Copyright Office form
for a copyright transfer, so
normally they are effectuated by contract.
Here are some examples of copyright transfer forms some have used, to
give you an idea, here and here and here
(PDF format)
and here
(also PDF).
So is the Asset Purchase Agreement plus amendments and schedules a
contract? Yes. Is a contract enough to transfer a copyright? Yes. Is it
clear on its face that this contract did mean to effectuate such a
transfer? That is not clear to many readers, and obviously Novell doesn't
think so. And intriguingly, if SCO ultimately fails to establish copyright
ownership, after publicly asserting Linux is infringing its copyrights
for nearly a year, and particularly if it sues end users for copyright
infringement, and it turns out their claim to copyright had no reasonable
basis and they knew it, is SCO opening itself up to a possible claim of
slander to title itself?
Comments (7 posted)
Needed: code auditors
Free software is said to be more secure than the proprietary alternatives
for a number of reasons. Near the top of most peoples' lists is the
openness of the code: with all those eyeballs on the code, security
problems are found and fixed quickly. Over the years, however, we have
seen numerous signs that fewer people are actually looking at code than
many of us would like to believe. Too many vulnerabilities remain in our
programs for years for us to have any real confidence that comprehensive
auditing is going on.
There have been attempts to encourage developers to audit code.
Almost exactly two years ago, the announcement went out
for the Sardonix project. Sardonix was started after Crispin Cowan noted
that the Linux Security Audit Project
appeared to have stalled. Since auditing was not happening by itself,
Sardonix sought to provide some motivation in the form of infrastructure
and credit for auditors. With these incentives, it was hoped, some
large-scale code auditing would start to happen.
Thus, with a little help from a DARPA grant, the Sardonix portal was launched. The portal
would track the audit state of various free software programs and would
give credit to those who did the auditing work. Sufficiently skilled and
productive auditors would be able to accumulate a large "audit karma" to
show their friends - and help improve the security of free software at the
same time.
Two years later, the only auditing work which has been done on Sardonix was
a small set of projects assigned by a university professor to his
students. The last posting to the Sardonix mailing list was sent in
November, 2003. The DARPA money has run out. Sardonix, it seems, is a
project which has failed.
One can attribute this failure to a number of reasons. Certainly Sardonix
was never promoted very well; almost nothing was heard from the project
after the initial announcement. With an effort to jump-start the process
and a set of vulnerabilities found by Sardonix auditors posted on Bugtraq,
the project might just have achieved critical mass. As it is, Sardonix
vanished into obscurity shortly after its launch, and few people ever heard
of it again.
The sad fact remains, however, that, with or without Sardonix, very little
auditing is getting done. The continuing stream of vulnerability reports,
many for problems which have lurked undetected for years, make this clear.
Auditing code is difficult, tedious, and error-prone work. It also tends
to be thankless; strangely enough, many developers do not welcome news of
vulnerabilities in their work (though most do respond and fix the
problems). New vulnerability information requires careful handling; a
sustained effort may be required to get the developer to take the problem
seriously, but widespread disclosure of the problem must be avoided until
developers and distributors have had a chance to react. To top it off,
those who do seek out vulnerabilities in software are often seen as
promoting their own agendas and making the problem worse.
It is not
surprising that few people are stepping up and taking on this work.
The free software community has a lot of work to do if it wants to live up
to its promise of greater security. This battle must be fought on many
fronts: safer programming techniques, containment strategies, detection and
response, etc. But we also, somehow, have to find a way to get more
critical eyeballs looking at our code. As recent events have shown, the
black hats are already doing this work for their own purposes. If free
software wants to live up to its pretensions of being a more secure
alternative, it needs more developers reviewing the code.
Comments (17 posted)
UserLinux Moves Forward
A lot has been happening on the UserLinux front since Bruce Perens first
publicly
announced the project in
October. The project has moved
through the early discussion and design phases and is now moving into early
install testing with its own package repository. There is also a fairly
comprehensive
Wiki
for UserLinux with everything from project
policies and
package
framework to the
marketing
concept and
mission
statement:
Provide businesses with freely available, high quality Debian based
GNU/Linux operating systems accompanied by certifications, service, and
support options designed to encourage productivity and security while
reducing overall costs.
Users and developers who are eager to try out UserLinux will find instructions
on creating a UserLinux system by converting a Debian unstable
system using the UserLinux package repository. At the moment, the UserLinux
package repository only has three meta-packages, one for each UserLinux
configuration: Desktop, server and server-gui. By adding the UserLinux
repository to a system's /etc/apt/sources.list, users can use
apt to retrieve the packages necessary to run under one of the
UserLinux
profiles.
KDE, however, is not in the package lists. A recent email
from Bruce Perens to the UserLinux discussion list provoked Slashdot and a
few other news sites to declare that UserLinux
would support KDE after all. We touched base with Perens on Tuesday,
and he said that this comment has been misinterpreted:
The project policy remains the same -- the official GUI will remain
GNOME. The option was always there for commercial service providers to
support KDE, or any other add-on software that they would like. That little
one line and they got excited. The fact is that a customer asked me to
support KDE, and I said 'sure, I'll take your money to support any open
source software.'
In the past, Perens has mentioned that some companies have approached him
about the UserLinux concept. We asked Perens if he was now able to name any
of the companies that had expressed interest in backing UserLinux. Perens
declined to give the name of any companies he'd spoken with, saying that he
was in contract negotiations and he could not give any names at this
time. He also said that he asks people not to speculate on the companies he
may be in talks with, as it might give potential backers cold feet.
We also asked if there was a lot of work needed to make Debian
"enterprise-ready." Perens said that Debian is a "solid base" and that
there are only a few areas where Debian really needs improvement.
It's important to concentrate on Debian's strengths... I can't beat the
quality of Debian. A lot of what I'm doing on the UserLinux project is
making sure that Debian's good points are not compromised and that we take
advantage of all the good decisions that they've made...I want to be able
to take Debian into the enterprise without doing anything to dissuade the
Debian developers.
He did acknowledge that there are some areas which need improvement. For
example, Perens noted that some Debian packages are installed in a
non-functional state by default. Perens said that all packages should be
installed in a "working state" even if it's just a demo configuration for
testing. He also noted that UserLinux will need to support batch or cluster
installs, and that the new Debian installer will make Debian much more
business-friendly.
For developers who want to contribute to the project, Perens says that he'd
like to see them go through the Debian Developer process and check
any packages into the Debian repository first. "I would not like to see a
large repository of free software that does not live in Debian for some
reason." He said that he expects that UserLinux will begin to draw new
people into the project now that the project has entered the testing and
development phase.
When can we expect to see an official release of UserLinux? Perens said
that there is no firm date, but that the rough date for a release of
UserLinux will correspond with the Debian Sarge release. He also noted that
UserLinux will be providing pre-releases and CD releases before then.
Comments (18 posted)
New site feature: comment response notifications
Occasionally we get a request from readers to receive copies of responses to their
posted comments via email. We have recently freed up a bit of hacking time and
added that capability as a subscriber-only feature, with a bit of a twist.
That twist is this: response notifications are only available to
subscribers at the "professional hacker" level or above.
When we switched over to the subscription model, we implemented the
"starving hacker" level as a way for people who couldn't afford the full
LWN rate to subscribe anyway. The intended audience was students, people
who were looking for work, and those in parts of the world where $5 was a
lot of money. Over time, we have noticed a few trends:
- $5 is no longer very much money in much of the world.
- People should be having an easier time finding jobs. Our President
says so, so It Must Be True.
- The percentage of our subscriber base taking the "starving hacker"
option has grown significantly.
The conclusion we have come to is that, as LWN (hopefully) grows, we need a
way to motivate people to select the full-rate option that goes beyond
"you'll feel better because you're supporting LWN." Given a cheaper choice
with the same benefits, many people will, rationally, take that route.
So limiting response emails to the higher subscription levels is a bit of
an experiment. Hopefully, it is a small inducement to select a higher
subscription level which does not actually deny anything truly important to
the "starving hacker" subscribers. We may take a similar approach with
other new features in the future, depending on how this one works out.
Getting response notifications is easy: there is a new dialog that shows up
when a comment is published that enables the email feature. There is an
expiration date, and the option to get notifications for responses all the
way down the tree. There are a couple of things worthy of note:
- We need to have your email address to be able to send responses to
you. If you have not given us a working address, the feature won't
work. The My Account page can be used to
set your address if need be. Also, please don't expect us to navigate
through challenge-response systems to send you email.
- If you get tired of seeing notifications, the My Account page will
let you turn them off.
You can also set your default response preferences in the account
customization area. While adding that capability, we also, finally, added
an option for the default setting of the "plain text/HTML" flag for
comments.
Comments (38 posted)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Security
Security news
Fixing spam with postage
Bill Gates has recently come up with an idea for the spam problem: charge
postage for email. This idea is far from new, of course, but, when Bill
says it, more people listen. On its face, the idea has a certain amount of
appeal. Spammers exist because the economics of the email system favor
them: large amounts of mail can be sent for no money, meaning that even
very small response rates can be profitable. Adding even a small
per-message cost would change the situation considerably. Some variations
of the scheme have email recipients pocketing the postage themselves,
perhaps only if they decide the associated message was unwanted. Others
have ISPs collecting that money; for some strange reason, most ISPs tend to
be more interested in the latter approach.
There are, of course, a few practical problems with this idea. Large
mailing lists, for example. If people sending to a list have to pay
postage for every recipient, list traffic is likely to drop considerably.
If, instead, a message to a list is paid as a single message, large lists will
remain attractive targets for at least some spammers.
The real problem, however, is that the postage approach, in most
implementations, takes a classic end-to-end Internet service and turns it
into something centralized. Certainly, one can envision a nice system
based on micro-payments where individual users have mail clients which deal
with postage issues directly and no central authority is involved.
Envisioning MSN or Yahoo choosing such a system is rather harder, however.
They will, instead, create a central "post office" which enforces the
postage policy and which collects some or all of the money involved. The
result is unlikely to resemble the email system we have known for the past
couple decades or so.
A central post office will require enforcement mechanisms, or people will
quickly learn to bypass it. It is hard to imagine unstamped email
being easier to stop than, say, music downloads. A postage-for-email
scheme looks like a sure way to set off another Internet arms race.
Things would be worse if the imposition of a central post office were
actually made to work. The temptation to start filtering mail, initially
for viruses or some such, would likely prove irresistible. Beyond doubt,
the types of mail requiring filtering would grow over time. A central post
office would also be an ideal place for governments to apply taxes to
electronic mail as their contribution to ending the spam problem. There
are also obvious privacy issues to worry about in this scenario.
The "postage stamp" approach to spam thus looks problematic on many
fronts. Before assuming that these problems would block the acceptance of
a central post office, however, one should keep this in mind: the spam
problem is getting worse quickly. A great many users will be willing to
give up a fair amount of their freedom to somebody who can come up with
something that looks like a working solution. This is a scary idea, but it
is also a great opportunity. If the free software community can come up
with a solution to the bulk of the spam problem while preserving our
decentralized net and our freedom, World Domination will be that much
closer.
Comments (26 posted)
Security posters from Microsoft
![[Worm crossing!]](/images/ns/worm-crossing.png)
Microsoft has had some high-profile security problems recently. A big
company like that knows what to do in this sort of situation, however:
release
a
set of motivational posters for the work place. The three posters are
downloadable in PDF format; surely our community has no end of gimp artists
who can improve on them. Remember: "Protect your stuff: use up-to-date
antivirus software."
Comments (5 posted)
New vulnerabilities
crawl: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | crawl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0103
|
| Created: | February 3, 2004 |
Updated: | February 4, 2004 |
| Description: |
Steve Kemp from the GNU/Linux audit project discovered a problem in
crawl, another console based dungeon exploration game, in the vein of
nethack and rogue. The program uses several environment variables as
inputs but doesn't apply a size check before copying one of them into
a fixed size buffer. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
perl information leak
| Package(s): | perl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0618
|
| Created: | February 2, 2004 |
Updated: | April 21, 2004 |
| Description: |
Paul Szabo discovered a number of bugs in suidperl, a helper
program to run perl scripts with setuid privileges. By exploiting
these bugs, an attacker could abuse suidperl to discover information
about files (such as testing for their existence and some of their
permissions) that should not be accessible to unprivileged users. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
util-linux: information leak in the login program
| Package(s): | util-linux |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0080
|
| Created: | February 3, 2004 |
Updated: | April 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
The util-linux package contains a large variety of low-level system
utilities that are necessary for a Linux system to function.
In some situations, the login program could use a pointer that had been
freed and reallocated. This could cause unintentional data leakage. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
apache: buffer overflows in mod_alias, mod_rewrite
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0542
CAN-2003-0789
|
| Created: | October 28, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
André Malo discovered
buffer overflows in the mod_alias and mod_rewrite modules of the Apache
webserver. These occurred if a regular expression with more than 9
capturing parenthesis was configured. To exploit this, an attacker would
need to be able to locally create a carefully crafted configuration file
(.htaccess or httpd.conf).
CAN-2003-0542
Another buffer overflow in Apache 2.0.47 and earlier in mod_cgid's
mishandling of CGI redirect paths could result in CGI output going to the
wrong client when a threaded MPM is used.
CAN-2003-0789. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache2: Denial of Service vulnerability
| Package(s): | apache2 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | March 25, 2004 |
| Description: |
A problem was discovered in Apache2 where CGI scripts that write more than
4k to the standard error stream will hang the script's execution. This problem can lead to a
denial of service situation. See this bug
report for additional details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
bind: cache poisoning
| Package(s): | bind |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0914
|
| Created: | November 26, 2003 |
Updated: | February 19, 2004 |
| Description: |
A cache poisoning vulnerability in BIND may be exploited causing a
temporary denial of service until the bad record expires from the cache. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
CUPS: denial of service
| Package(s): | CUPS |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0788
|
| Created: | November 3, 2003 |
Updated: | March 4, 2004 |
| Description: |
Paul Mitcheson reported a situation where the CUPS Internet Printing
Protocol (IPP) implementation in CUPS versions prior to 1.1.19 would get
into a busy loop. This could result in a denial of service. In order to
exploit this bug an attacker would need to have the ability to make a TCP
connection to the IPP port (by default 631).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cvs: possible root compromise
| Package(s): | cvs |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0977
|
| Created: | December 29, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
Stable CVS 1.11.11 has been released,
adding code to the CVS server to prevent it from continuing as root after a
user login, as an extra failsafe against a compromise of the CVSROOT/passwd
file. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
ethereal: protocol dissector and other vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | ethereal |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0925
CAN-2003-0926
CAN-2003-0927
CAN-2003-1012
CAN-2003-1013
|
| Created: | December 18, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
Serious issues have been discovered in two ethereal protocol dissectors.
Both vulnerabilities will make the Ethereal application crash. The Q.931
vulnerability also affects Tethereal. It is not known if either
vulnerability can be used to make Ethereal or Tethereal run arbitrary
code. (CAN-2003-1012 and CAN-2003-1013) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Filename disclosure vulnerability in fam
| Package(s): | fam |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0875
|
| Created: | August 19, 2002 |
Updated: | January 5, 2005 |
| Description: |
"fam" (file alteration monitor) watches files and directories for changes and lets interested applications know when something happens. This package has a flaw in its group handling that blocks some legitimate operations while, at the same time, exposing the names of files that should otherwise be invisible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fetchmail may crash on specially crafted message
| Package(s): | fetchmail |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0792
|
| Created: | October 16, 2003 |
Updated: | April 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
A bug was discovered in fetchmail 6.2.4 where a specially crafted email
message can cause fetchmail to crash.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fileutils/wu-ftpd: denial of service
| Package(s): | fileutils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0854
|
| Created: | October 22, 2003 |
Updated: | March 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
There is, it seems, an integer overflow vulnerability in "ls" which can be exploited via wu-ftpd to create a denial of service situation. See this advisory from Georgi Guninski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gaim: remote overflows
| Package(s): | gaim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0006
CAN-2004-0007
CAN-2004-0008
|
| Created: | January 26, 2004 |
Updated: | February 16, 2004 |
| Description: |
Stefan Esser has discovered several vulnerabilities in Gaim 0.75. This advisory has details of 12 separate
vulnerabilities. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: DNS stub resolvers contain buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1146
|
| Created: | November 7, 2002 |
Updated: | February 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
DNS stub resolvers from multiple vendors contain a buffer overflow
vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability appears to be limited to
denial of service. (See CERT Vulnerability Note
VU#738331)
The BIND 4 and BIND 8.2.x stub resolver libraries, and other libraries such
as glibc 2.2.5 and earlier, libc, and libresolv, uses the maximum buffer
size instead of the actual size when processing a DNS response, which
causes the stub resolvers to read past the actual boundary ("read buffer
overflow"), allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
GnuPG: ElGamal signing keys compromised
| Package(s): | gnupg |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0971
|
| Created: | November 28, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
A severe vulnerability was discovered in GnuPG by Phong Nguyen relating to
ElGamal sign+encrypt keys. This
email message from Werner Koch contains more information. "Phong
Nguyen identified a severe bug in the way GnuPG creates and uses ElGamal
keys for signing. This is a significant security failure which can lead to
a compromise of almost all ElGamal keys used for signing. Note that this
is a real world vulnerability which will reveal your private key within a
few seconds." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash
| Package(s): | gtkhtml |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0133
CAN-2003-0541
|
| Created: | April 14, 2003 |
Updated: | April 18, 2005 |
| Description: |
GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.
GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug
when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed
messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
iproute: local denial of service
| Package(s): | iproute net-tools |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0856
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | December 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
The iproute utility is susceptible to spoofed netlink messages sent by local users, with the result that denial of service attacks are possible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kdepim: VCF file information reader vulnerability
| Package(s): | kdepim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0988
|
| Created: | January 15, 2004 |
Updated: | May 26, 2004 |
| Description: |
KDE has issued a security advisory for all
versions of kdepim as distributed with KDE versions 3.1.0 through 3.1.4
inclusive. A carefully crafted .VCF file potentially enables local
attackers to compromise the privacy of a victim's data or execute arbitrary
commands with the victim's privileges. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0988 to
this issue. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: privilege vulnerability on AMD64
| Package(s): | kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0001
|
| Created: | January 16, 2004 |
Updated: | February 17, 2004 |
| Description: |
On AMD64 systems, a fix was made to the eflags checking in
32-bit ptrace emulation that could have allowed local users
to elevate their privileges. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name
CAN-2004-0001 to this issue. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: local root exploit in 2.4.22
| Package(s): | kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0961
|
| Created: | December 1, 2003 |
Updated: | April 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in the Linux kernel versions 2.4.22 and
previous. A flaw in bounds checking in the do_brk() function can allow a
local attacker to gain root privileges. This vulnerability is known to be
exploitable.
The 2.4.23 kernel contains the fix. For more details on how this vulnerability works, see this LWN article. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
kernel-utils: setuid vulnerability
| Package(s): | kernel-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0019
|
| Created: | February 7, 2003 |
Updated: | January 21, 2005 |
| Description: |
The kernel-utils package contains several utilities that can be used to
control the kernel or machine hardware. In Red Hat Linux 8.0 this package
contains user mode linux (UML) utilities.
The uml_net utility in kernel-utils packages with Red Hat Linux 8.0 was
incorrectly shipped setuid root. This could allow local users to control
certain network interfaces, add and remove arp entries and routes, and put
interfaces in and out of promiscuous mode.
All users of the kernel-utils package should update to these packages that
contain a version of uml_net that is not setuid root.
Alternatively, as a work-around to this vulnerability issue the following
command as root:
chmod -s /usr/bin/uml_net |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
lftp buffer overflows
| Package(s): | lftp |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0963
|
| Created: | December 15, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
According to this advisory versions of lftp
prior to 2.6.10 are vulnerable to two exploitable buffer overflow
problems. Both occur when you connect to a web server with lftp using HTTP
or HTTPS, and then use lftp's "ls" or "rels" commands on specially prepared
directories on the web server. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libpng, libpng3: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libpng, libpng3 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1363
|
| Created: | December 19, 2002 |
Updated: | July 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
Glenn Randers-Pehrson discovered a problem in connection with 16-bit
samples from libpng, an interface for reading and writing PNG
(Portable Network Graphics) format files. The starting offsets for
the loops are calculated incorrectly which causes a buffer overrun
beyond the beginning of the row buffer. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mc: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | mc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-1023
|
| Created: | January 16, 2004 |
Updated: | April 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in Midnight Commander, a file manager,
whereby a malicious archive (such as a .tar file) could cause arbitrary
code to be executed if opened by Midnight Commander. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mikmod: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | mikmod |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0427
|
| Created: | June 16, 2003 |
Updated: | June 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Ingo Saitz discovered a bug in mikmod whereby a long filename inside
an archive file can overflow a buffer when the archive is being read
by mikmod. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mod_python: denial of service vulnerability
| Package(s): | mod_python |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0973
|
| Created: | January 27, 2004 |
Updated: | October 4, 2004 |
| Description: |
Apache's mod_python module could crash the httpd process if a specific,
malformed query string was sent.
The Apache Foundation has reported that mod_python may be prone to
Denial of Service attacks when handling a malformed query. Mod_python
2.7.9 was released to fix the vulnerability, however, because the
vulnerability has not been fully fixed, version 2.7.10 has been released.
Users of mod_python 3.0.4 are not affected by this vulnerability. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mpg123: heap overflow
| Package(s): | mpg123 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0865
|
| Created: | November 12, 2003 |
Updated: | February 19, 2004 |
| Description: |
Versions of mpg123 through 0.59s contain a heap overflow which may be exploited remotely (by a hostile server). See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mpg321: format string vulnerability
| Package(s): | mpg321 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0969
|
| Created: | January 6, 2004 |
Updated: | March 28, 2005 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in mpg321, a command-line mp3 player,
whereby user-supplied strings were passed to printf(3) unsafely. This
vulnerability could be exploited by a remote attacker to overwrite
memory, and possibly execute arbitrary code. In order for this
vulnerability to be exploited, mpg321 would need to play a malicious
mp3 file (including via HTTP streaming). |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mplayer: remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | mplayer |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0835
|
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | April 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability was found in
MPlayer. A malicious host can craft a harmful ASX header, and trick MPlayer
into executing arbitrary code upon parsing that header. Read the full advisory
for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Nessus NASL scripting engine security issues
| Package(s): | nessus |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 27, 2003 |
Updated: | August 12, 2004 |
| Description: |
Some some vulnerabilities exsist in the Nessus NASL scripting engine. To
exploit these flaws, an attacker would need to have a valid Nessus account
as well as the ability to upload arbitrary Nessus plugins in the Nessus
server (this option is disabled by default) or he/she would need to trick a
user somehow into running a specially crafted nasl script. Read the full
advisory for additional information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
netpbm: insecure temporary files
| Package(s): | netpbm |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0924
|
| Created: | January 19, 2004 |
Updated: | December 29, 2004 |
| Description: |
netpbm is graphics conversion toolkit made up of a large number of
single-purpose programs. Many of these programs were found to create
temporary files in an insecure manner, which could allow a local
attacker to overwrite files with the privileges of the user invoking a
vulnerable netpbm tool. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Net-SNMP: security bugs in versions before 5.0.9
| Package(s): | Net-SNMP |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0935
|
| Created: | December 2, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
The Net-SNMP project includes various Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) tools. A security issue in Net-SNMP versions before 5.0.9 could
allow an existing user/community to gain access to data in MIB objects that
were explicitly excluded from their view.
Version 5.0.9 of Net-SNMP is not vulnerable to this issue. In addition,
Net-SNMP 5.0.9 fixes a number of other minor bugs. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug
| Package(s): | nfs-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0252
|
| Created: | July 14, 2003 |
Updated: | March 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
Linux NFS utils package contains remotely exploitable off-by-one bug.
A local or remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending
specially crafted request to rpc.mountd daemon. See this BugTraq post for more details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openssh: timing attack leads to information disclosure
| Package(s): | openssh |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0190
|
| Created: | May 2, 2003 |
Updated: | November 30, 2004 |
| Description: |
From the advisory:
"During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable
with PAM support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This
bug allows a remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems,
through a simple timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and
may have high severity, if combined with poor password policies and other
security problems that allow local privilege escalation." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
postfix: denial of service vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | postfix |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0468
CAN-2003-0540
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | May 27, 2004 |
| Description: |
The postfix MTA, versions through 1.1.12 (but not 2.0) is subject to two remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerabilities; see this advisory from Michal Zalewski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
rsync - remotely exploitable heap overflow
| Package(s): | rsync |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0962
|
| Created: | December 4, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
An advisory has gone out warning of a
remotely exploitable heap overflow vulnerability in rsync versions 2.5.6
and prior. If you are running an rsync server, you will want to apply a
distributor patch or upgrade to 2.5.7 in the near future. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Multiple-use vulnerability in Safe.pm
| Package(s): | Safe.pm |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1323
|
| Created: | October 9, 2002 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
usePerl has a
description of a vulnerability in the Safe.pm Perl module. It seems
that if a Safe compartment is used more than once, it ceases to be safe.
The problem is fixed in Safe 2.08. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
sane-backends: several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | sane-backends |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0773
CAN-2003-0774
CAN-2003-0775
CAN-2003-0776
CAN-2003-0777
CAN-2003-0778
|
| Created: | September 11, 2003 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
Alexander Hvostov, Julien Blache and Aurelien Jarno discovered several
security-related problems in the sane-backends package, which contains
an API library for scanners including a scanning daemon (in the
package libsane) that can be remotely exploited. These problems allow
a remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitrary
amounts of memory. The attack is successful, even if the attacker's
computer isn't listed in saned.conf.
You are only vulnerable if you actually run saned e.g. in xinetd or
inetd. If the entries in the configuration file of xinetd or inetd
respectively are commented out or do not exist, you are safe.
Try "telnet localhost 6566" on the server that may run saned. If you
get "connection refused" saned is not running and you are safe.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the
following problems:
-
CAN-2003-0773: saned checks the identity (IP address) of the remote
host only after the first communication took place (SANE_NET_INIT). So
everyone can send that RPC, even if the remote host is not allowed to
scan (not listed in saned.conf).
-
CAN-2003-0774: saned lacks error checking nearly everywhere in the
code. So connection drops are detected very late. If the drop of the
connection isn't detected, the access to the internal wire buffer leaves
the limits of the allocated memory. So random memory "after" the wire
buffer is read which will be followed by a segmentation fault.
-
CAN-2003-0775: If saned expects strings, it mallocs the memory
necessary to store the complete string after it receives the size of the
string. If the connection was dropped before transmitting the size,
malloc will reserve an arbitrary size of memory. Depending on that size
and the amount of memory available either malloc fails (->saned quits
nicely) or a huge amount of memory is allocated. Swapping and OOM
measures may occur depending on the kernel.
-
CAN-2003-0776: saned doesn't check the validity of the RPC numbers
it gets before getting the parameters.
-
CAN-2003-0777: If debug messages are enabled and a connection is
dropped, non-null-terminated strings may be printed and segmentation
faults may occur.
-
CAN-2003-0778: It's possible to allocate an arbitrary amount of
memory on the server running saned even if the connection isn't dropped.
At the moment this can not easily be fixed according to the author.
Better limit the total amount of memory saned may use (ulimit).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
screen: privilege escalation
| Package(s): | screen |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0972
|
| Created: | November 28, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
According to
this advisory a buffer overflow in GNU screen allows privilege
escalation for local users. Usually screen is installed either setgid-utmp
or setuid-root.
It also has some potential for remote attacks or getting control of another
user's screen. The problem is that you have to transfer around 2-3 gigabytes
of data to user's screen to exploit this vulnerability. 4.0.1, 3.9.15 and
older versions are vulnerable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
slocate: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | slocate |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0848
|
| Created: | January 20, 2004 |
Updated: | February 16, 2004 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in slocate, a program to index and
search for files, whereby a specially crafted database could overflow
a heap-based buffer. This vulnerability could be exploited by a local
attacker to gain the privileges of the "slocate" group, which can
access the global database containing a list of pathnames of all files
on the system, including those which should only be visible to
privileged users. This problem, and a category of potential similar
problems, can be fixed by modifying slocate to drop privileges before
reading a user-supplied database. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
File overwrite vulnerability in tar and unzip
| Package(s): | tar unzip |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2001-1267
CAN-2001-1268
CAN-2001-1269
CAN-2002-0399
|
| Created: | October 1, 2002 |
Updated: | April 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
The tar utility does not properly filter file names containing
"../", meaning that a hostile archive can, if unpacked by an
unsuspecting user, overwrite any file that is writable by that user. GNU
tar versions 1.13.19 and earlier are vulnerable; unzip through version 5.42
has the same vulnerability. |
| Alerts: |
|