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LWN.net Weekly Edition for January 8, 2004

Red Hat borrows $500 million

Red Hat has a balance sheet that many other companies would envy. The company was lucky (and smart) enough to be the first Linux company to go public during the brief Linux portion of the dotcom bubble; it even had sufficient time to do a second offering to bring in another pile of cash. That windfall, along with careful management, left the company with $329 million in cash and investments at the end of November, 2003 (the last quarter for which numbers are available). That cash pile has been growing in recent quarters; Red Hat certainly need not be concerned about running out of money anytime soon.

So one might well wonder why Red Hat has just issued $500 million in bonds. Why take on half a billion dollars in long-term (20 years) debt when you haven't really figured out what to do with the cash you already have? We asked the company, and were told:

We decided to take this great opportunity to capitalize our company for the purpose of achieving our goal to become the defining technology company of the 21st century. We are focused on building and expanding our organization long term.

There are no specific plans for the cash at this time.

In other words, they aren't telling. One may well speculate that there are acquisitions (big ones) in the works; this idea is reinforced by this (Raleigh) News & Observer article:

"We believe the time for us as a company to take control of the market is now," said chief financial officer Kevin Thompson. "What we've done is capitalize ourselves so that we can react very quickly to opportunities that come up in the marketplace."

Customers are demanding products that Red Hat can't offer, Thompson said. It likely will have to buy other companies to add new products and services.

One assumes that Red Hat has some "opportunities" in mind, but they are not ready to talk about them at this time.

The truth of the matter is that Red Hat was able to get this money on great terms. The interest rate on this loan is 0.5%. So Red Hat could simply put the money into certificates of deposit (currently paying 4% or so in the U.S. for long terms), pay off the loan in 20 years, and pocket the interest. If Red Hat invests this money in this way, it has just acquired a few million dollars per year in free income for the next two decades. This is not a deal the company could afford to turn down.

The real question, perhaps, is why the (unnamed) investors decided to loan money to Red Hat on such terms. Long-term U.S. treasury bills pay 4.2% as of this writing - eight times what Red Hat is paying. The U.S. government is unlikely to reinvest such money as wisely as Red Hat, but it has the advantage of its coercive powers when payback time comes. Treasury bills pay more, and are safer too.

The answer to that question can only lie in the conversion feature of these bonds. The purchasers can convert the bonds to stock at a rate of about $25/share at any time. That rate is significantly above Red Hat's current stock price ($18.50, as of this writing) but, remember, these investors are working with a twenty-year horizon. The bonds are, essentially, a long-term call option which enables the investors to get their funds back if the stock price never goes above $25. Unless Red Hat goes into bankruptcy, the bond holders will probably do OK.

Red Hat started the first Linux financial boom with its IPO. What we may be seeing here is the beginning of the second, more sustainable boom. Serious money is, once again, flowing into Linux companies. The first boom changed the industry in many ways, and left numerous investors rather poorer than they were before. The second boom may be seen as when Linux really took off; it will doubtless bring changes as well. As always, it is going to be interesting to watch.

Comments (5 posted)

LWN's Obviously Incorrect 2004 Predictions

The new year is upon us, and so, like many other publications, we feel an irrational urge to wave our hands in the air and make predictions for what we think the coming year will bring us. So here we go. Needless to say, anybody who is thinking of acting on any of the following would be well advised to get a second opinion...

Enterprise Linux

The "enterprise Linux" business came into its own in 2003, as Red Hat, in particular, found a steady stream of willing customers which drove the company into a profitable state. Red Hat's enterprise offerings must be providing value to the company's customers, given the claimed 90% renewal rate on enterprise support contracts. But the per-system licensing of Red Hat Enterprise Linux has rubbed some community members the wrong way; many developers feel that Red Hat's contracts do not reflect the sort of world they thought they were helping to build.

So, we predict that, in 2004, the enterprise Linux backlash will grow, and we will begin to see whether that backlash can change the enterprise Linux market. A number of free enterprise Linux projects are out there, including CaOS, Whitebox Linux, and UserLinux. These projects have an uphill road ahead of them; to be successful, they will have to convince skeptical companies that they will be able to provide high-quality support for many years into the future. They will also have to make independent vendors see them as important enough to certify applications for. Oh, and, of course, they will have to create a top-quality distribution aimed at the needs of this sort of customer. Creating that distribution will not be easy, but it may prove to be the simplest of the challenges faced by any would-be challenger to Red Hat's enterprise offerings.

The interesting thing is, of course, that these challenges look remarkably similar to those faced by Linux itself a few years ago, when the idea that Linux could pull the rug out from under proprietary Unix systems and challenge Microsoft seemed ludicrous to many. But it happened. Now, challenging enterprise Linux with truly free Linux looks like a daunting task. But it may yet be that a free distribution combined with a distributed network of supporters could supplant today's enterprise offerings in just the same way that Linux has taken Unix's place. The community is capable of amazing things. Not everybody would see such an event as a good thing, but it could happen.

Desktop Linux

The desktop wars will heat up again in 2004. For those of us who remember the KDE/GNOME flame wars of years past, the relative calm and cooperation which has prevailed more recently has been a welcome thing. But there are pressures building which threaten to upset the peace.

The first of those pressures is licensing. Ironically, KDE's choice of the GPL for its libraries may work against it here. The looser GNOME library licensing allows its toolkits to be used, royalty-free, with proprietary applications. Proprietary KDE applications can only be distributed by paying royalties to Trolltech, which owns the Qt libraries. Many users and developers would rather not see proprietary applications exist at all, or, at least, not without paying those who have developed the underlying toolkit. These people are happy with KDE's licensing. Most users, of course, don't care. Distributors, however, usually want to enable vendors to sell applications on their platforms. This interest will push them toward the GNOME camp.

The other point, however, is that distributors are increasingly under pressure to make a choice. Supporting two desktop systems adds to the total workload of maintaining a distribution, and that costs money which may not be available. There is a common perception at this point that the two desktops are functionally identical in all the ways that matter; if that is true, why bother with two of them?

In 2004, these pressures will lead to rising emotions in the camps of both desktops as they see decisions being made for or against them. Perhaps the result will be a greater degree of cooperation between the two development communities via freedesktop.org or other mechanisms. Or, perhaps, our newsgroups, web sites, and mailing lists will once again play host to heated debates and flame wars in vain attempts to establish one desktop as being superior to the other.

Beyond that, however, the hackers will stay busy and desktop Linux will amaze us again. In 2003, it was widely recognized that Desktop Linux has everything that many, if not most, business users need to get their jobs done. 2004 will be the year that desktop Linux stops playing catch-up (in some areas, at least) and truly begins to blaze interesting trails of its own. Projects like Dashboard, GNOME Storage, and Reiser4 are just the beginning of a wave of innovative projects which will change how we use our computers.

2004 may not, however, bring Linux into many more homes. A Linux system is more than adequate for Grandma to send email and wander around on the web. Your editor insists that his children use Linux for their email, browsing, and homework tasks, and it handles those jobs well. The sad truth, however, is that there still needs to be a Windows system around for other vital tasks - such as playing games. Home users are not interested in dual-boot systems; until Linux can do everything they need, they will stick with the same old stuff. Linux may eventually have a free application base which replaces many of the commercial offerings currently filling the shelves of computer stores, but it remains hard to imagine free games, for example, which can compete with the hit-driven commercial variety. Until there is a lively market for commercial Linux applications, there will be some hard limits to how many desktops we can occupy.

Legal issues

The SCO case will drag on, and become more complicated, in 2004. IBM may well succeed in getting many of SCO's complaints dismissed early in the year, but SCO probably has a good chance of keeping some of its breach of contract charges alive. SCO may have to retreat to some of its earliest charges (i.e. JFS, RCU, NUMA, SMP), but IBM may have to go to trial to prove that its code in those areas is not derived from SCO's Unix. SCO can probably muddy the waters enough to keep the judge from dismissing the case outright.

Even if the IBM case is dismissed in 2004, however, there is the issue of SCO's threats of copyright infringement suits against Linux users. One may be tempted to dismiss these threats as just that much more empty SCO bluster. It is worth considering, however, the pressures that SCO will be under, including the agenda of its lawyers and the looming "dividend" payments on the BayStar investment. SCO has no hopes for increasing revenue from its remaining software products at this point; it must litigate further to bring in cash. With the lawyers in charge, chances are that SCO will, indeed, launch new suits.

In fact, the company may well find backbone-challenged Linux users that will cave in and pay up rather than risk a court battle. Such an event will do short-term wonders for SCO's stock price and cash flow.

The simple fact is, however, that the SCO Group has still put forward very little evidence to back up its claim, and what evidence it has presented has mostly been laughed off the stage. The company's claims to own the "Unix ABI" will get no further. Beyond that, Novell's new copyright assertions have the potential to stop the show dead, at least until that dispute has its own day in court. But, regardless of the validity of Novell's claims, SCO's case is empty and the world, increasingly, is seeing that. By the end of 2004, the SCO cases will probably still be alive in some form, but the end will be in sight.

As an aside, Novell will face a severe test of its credibility in the eyes of the community. Nobody wants to see the SCO case resurrected in the future by a Novell which, perhaps after a management change or two, decides that its Unix copyrights (if they are Novell's) might yet be worth something. If Novell is serious about being a part of the Linux community, it needs to make a statement, soon, about just what it intends to do with the Unix copyrights it claims to own.

The GPL may have its day in court. The SCO Group has, of course, stated its intent to break the GPL in court. But that company's arguments, thus far, have failed to impress. SCO's GPL challenges should not get far. More interesting GPL-oriented cases may come from a different direction.

Many developers working in the industry are full of stories of rampant GPL violations, especially where embedded systems are involved. Last year's episode with the LinkSys WRT54G router is just the small tip of a large iceberg in this regard. To an extent, people have been willing to look the other way; it just hasn't seemed worth the trouble to challenge closed-source uses of GPL-licensed code in many cases. There are developers, however, who are increasingly unwilling to close their eyes to violations of their licenses. Expect more challenges against vendors using GPL-licensed code in non-licensed ways. The lack of any court decisions on the GPL will eventually embolden a violator to try his luck in front of a judge. At that point, we will begin to see what the judicial system really thinks of the GPL.

Security

2004 will make us care more about security. In 2003, we saw an ominous string of attacks against the servers which support the Linux development community. There is no reason to believe that these attacks will stop anytime soon. Sooner or later, perhaps in 2004, somebody is going to do some real damage on a scale we have not yet seen. A major breach, perhaps compromising the systems of many Linux users, will cost us money, time, and much credibility.

In recent years, most attacks against Linux systems have exploited known vulnerabilities for which patches existed. A well-managed site is nearly immune to attacks using known vulnerabilities; all of the major distributors are quite good (usually) about quickly preparing updates when a problem comes to light. The attacks we saw at the end of 2003, however, made use of previously unknown holes in rsync and the kernel. Defending against unknown vulnerabilities is much harder, and there do exist attackers who realize this, and who are smart enough to find such problems. In the coming year, we may well see some truly scary exploits of this sort of "zero-day" vulnerability.

There is some good news, however. By the end of 2004, we will see wider deployment of hardened Linux systems. The incorporation of SELinux and various other security technologies into the Fedora Core distribution (and, from there, into Red Hat Enterprise Linux) will drive much of this deployment, and threats from the outside will do the rest. Adding SELinux is a significant step in the evolution of Linux distributions; if this work is done properly, Linux users should soon have a much higher level of security available with a default system install. Proper containment of security breaches should, for example, make that next web server buffer overflow be much less of a threat than it is now.

Kernel

2.7 kernel development will begin after the 2.6.0 kernel has had a few months to stabilize. Expect the 2.7 development series to be quite different from 2.5, however. By the time that 2.5.0 came out, there was a massive backlog of patches waiting for inclusion. The 2.4 stabilization process had taken nearly a year, and there was a long shopping list of planned changes for 2.5, including the block layer rewrite, expanding the dev_t device number type, a new loadable module subsystem, a new kernel build mechanism, asynchronous and direct I/O, and many others.

On the eve of 2.7, the "patch pressure" is far lower. There's no end of ideas for 2.7, including virtual memory work (page clustering, shareable page tables, etc), the never-ending desktop interactivity work, and much internal reworking to eliminate race conditions, and so on. But many users are (or will be) far happier with 2.6 than they were with 2.4, and the list of features that the Linux kernel must have to not be jealous of its Unix predecessors is shrinking. The Linux kernel is maturing, in other words. It may well be that, with 2.7, the pace of change begins to slow a little.

Or maybe the kernel hackers will come up with some amazing new ideas and run with them; at that point, all bets are off.

To conclude...

It's going to be an interesting year. That, perhaps, is the only truly safe prediction to be found among all the others on this page. All the rest are offered with no warranty as to their veracity, suitability for any particular purpose, or connection with any sort of reality whatsoever. LWN.net does not provide indemnification for users of its predictions - though purchasers of our "predictions license" (available for a limited-time special half-price deal through January, 2007) will get a promise from us to not sue them.

Comments (29 posted)

Some LWN notes

We recently received a message complaining about the lack of "LWN status update" news in recent times. It is true we have backed off on such articles; LWN should carry the news, not be the news. But, for those who are wondering, here's a brief update.

When we started the subscription program, we set our goal at 4000 individual subscribers as a minimum needed to keep going. We have not achieved that goal; there were just over 3000 subscribers when the "great expiration" hit at the end of September. At that point, about 1000 subscriptions ran out over the course of a few weeks. We have since clawed our way back up to just under 3000 subscribers again. It is gratifying, to say the least, that the renewal rate was so high.

3000 subscriptions is sufficient to keep us going for now, but we still need to find a way to increase that number substantially. We are pondering various ideas; stay tuned over the next few months as we figure out how to proceed.

Meanwhile, thanks to the generosity of the folks at HP, LWN editor Jonathan Corbet will be attending (and speaking at) Linux.Conf.Au from January 14 to 18. We look forward to reporting from what is, by all accounts, an outstanding conference. There is also a distinct appeal to going to a place where the temperature is above freezing.

Finally, LWN.net will celebrate its sixth anniversary in about two weeks. Six years ago, we could never have dreamed of the directions LWN would take us - it was, after all, simply intended to be an attention-getter for a Linux consulting and support company. It has been (and continues to be) a great ride, however, and we expect to keep doing this for a long time. Thanks to all of you for being such a great and supportive reader community.

Comments (6 posted)

Page editor: Jonathan Corbet

Security

The Savannah Compromise - what really happened?

January 1, 2004

This article was contributed by Joe 'Zonker' Brockmeier.

2003 hasn't been a banner year for computer security, and that includes Linux. The CVS repository for the Linux kernel was attacked (if clumsily), several servers related to the Debian project were compromised, and the GNU Project's Savannah server was also broken into recently. Since there has been little information published about the nature of the Savannah compromise, we contacted Bradley Kuhn, executive director of the Free Software Foundation for more information.

Kuhn described the Savannah compromise as "almost identical to what happened to Debian." (A detailed account of the Debian compromise can be found here.) Kuhn said that he believes that the Savannah compromise and the Debian attacks were related, and happened at about the same time. However, he said that the project has not put a great deal of time and effort into analyzing the attacks because it was more important to put Savannah back online and to try to harden the system to see to it that a similar compromise doesn't happen again. The hard drives from Savannah have been saved for future reference, but the project is not putting its efforts into thoroughly analyzing the attacks.

For the most part, Savannah has been restored and changes have been made to try to ensure a similar attack will not be possible. However, there are still some features that remain unavailable, including Web CVS access and new projects are not being approved for the time being. According to the Savannah website, new projects will probably be accepted sometime before the end of January, 2004.

Has there been an attempt to insert a trojan into any of the code residing on Savannah? Kuhn says that they've asked the owners of projects on Savannah to go through and verify the code that is on Savannah to be sure that it hasn't been trojaned. So far, there have been no reports of tainted code. However, not all of the projects have reported their status. Kuhn also noted that projects on the Savannah website will soon have an indicator to report whether or not the developers have verified that they have checked the integrity of their software.

We also asked if there was any sensitive information on Savannah that may have been compromised. Kuhn said that the useful information on Savannah mostly consists of the code for the various projects, and that the only other information of interest would be developers' passwords. The passwords on Savannah have been reset, of course, and the developers have been encouraged to "investigate their own personal security."

For now, the GNU Project is not actively pursuing criminal prosecution of the attacker or attackers. Kuhn says that the project is not "ethically opposed" to prosecuting the intruder, but that with limited resources he'd rather divert time and energy to restoring the services and trying to harden systems to make future attacks more difficult and easier to contain.

To that end, the compromise may actually be a good thing in the long run. Kuhn said that they have contacted the CVS maintainers and have offered to pay for development of features that would allow GPG signing of commits through CVS -- making it much more difficult for changes to be inserted unnoticed into code held in a CVS repository. He said that they have also contacted the GNU Arch maintainer about adding GPG signing. Though it may take some time to develop, the addition of GPG signing to commits would be a welcome feature.

Kuhn said that he expects that the future will bring more attacks on the community, as free and open source software become more prevalent. Opponents of the open development model will no doubt be using these events as an illustration of the "dangers" of open source. Though the recent intrusions have mostly been an inconvenience, it's important that the community learn from these attacks, and redouble efforts to prevent them in the future.

Comments (21 posted)

New vulnerabilities

cvs: possible root compromise

Package(s):cvs CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0977
Created:December 29, 2003 Updated:February 13, 2004
Description: Stable CVS 1.11.11 has been released, adding code to the CVS server to prevent it from continuing as root after a user login, as an extra failsafe against a compromise of the CVSROOT/passwd file.
Alerts:
Whitebox WBSA-2004:004-01 2004-02-12
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:1207 2004-01-28
Conectiva CLA-2004:808 2004-01-20
Debian DSA-422-1 2004-01-13
Red Hat RHSA-2004:003-01 2004-01-09
Gentoo 200312-08 2003-12-28

Comments (none posted)

fsp: buffer overflow and directory traversal

Package(s):fsp CVE #(s):CAN-2003-1022 CAN-2004-0011
Created:January 7, 2004 Updated:January 7, 2004
Description: fsp suffers from both a buffer overflow vulnerability (which can be exploited to run arbitrary code) and a directory traversal problem.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-416-1 2004-01-06

Comments (none posted)

jabber: denial of service

Package(s):jabber CVE #(s):CAN-2004-0013
Created:January 7, 2004 Updated:January 26, 2004
Description: A vulnerability was discovered in jabber, an instant messaging server, whereby a bug in the handling of SSL connections could cause the server process to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
Alerts:
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:005 2004-01-23
Debian DSA-414-1 2004-01-06

Comments (1 posted)

kernel: two vulnerabilities in 2.4.23

Package(s):kernel CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0984 CAN-2003-0985
Created:January 5, 2004 Updated:January 19, 2004
Description: Paul Starzetz discovered a flaw in bounds checking in mremap() in the Linux kernel versions 2.4.23 and previous which may allow a local attacker to gain root privileges. No exploit is currently available; however, it is believed that this issue is exploitable (although not trivially.) The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0985 to this issue. There is also a minor information leak in the real time clock (rtc) routines. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project has assigned the name CAN-2003-0984 to this issue. See this advisory for more information.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-427-1 2004-01-19
SuSE SuSE-SA:2004:003 2004-01-15
Debian DSA-417-2 2004-01-09
Slackware SSA:2004-008-01 2004-01-08
Gentoo 200401-01 2004-01-08
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:001 2004-01-07
Slackware SSA:2004-006-01 2004-01-06
Red Hat RHSA-2003:416-01 2004-01-07
Fedora FEDORA-2003-047 2004-01-07
Debian DSA-417-1 2004-01-07
Immunix IMNX-2004-73-001-01 2004-01-05
SuSE SuSE-SA:2004:001 2004-01-05
Fedora FEDORA-2003-046 2004-01-05
Debian DSA-413-1 2004-01-06
Trustix 2004-0001 2004-01-05
Conectiva CLA-2004:799 2004-01-05
EnGarde ESA-20040105-001 2003-01-05
Red Hat RHSA-2003:419-01 2004-01-05
Red Hat RHSA-2003:418-01 2004-01-05
Red Hat RHSA-2003:417-01 2004-01-05

Comments (1 posted)

mpg321: format string vulnerability

Package(s):mpg321 CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0969
Created:January 6, 2004 Updated:March 28, 2005
Description: A vulnerability was discovered in mpg321, a command-line mp3 player, whereby user-supplied strings were passed to printf(3) unsafely. This vulnerability could be exploited by a remote attacker to overwrite memory, and possibly execute arbitrary code. In order for this vulnerability to be exploited, mpg321 would need to play a malicious mp3 file (including via HTTP streaming).
Alerts:
Gentoo 200503-34 2005-03-28
Debian DSA-411-1 2004-01-05

Comments (none posted)

nd: buffer overflows

Package(s):nd CVE #(s):CAN-2004-0014
Created:January 6, 2004 Updated:January 7, 2004
Description: Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in nd, a command-line WebDAV interface, whereby long strings received from the remote server could overflow fixed-length buffers. This vulnerability could be exploited by a remote attacker in control of a malicious WebDAV server to execute arbitrary code if the server was accessed by a vulnerable version of nd.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-412-1 2004-01-05

Comments (none posted)

xsok: bad privilege handling

Package(s):xsok CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0949
Created:January 7, 2004 Updated:January 7, 2004
Description: Steve Kemp discovered a problem in xsok, a single player strategy game for X11, related to the Sokoban game, which leads a user to execute arbitrary commands under the GID of games.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-405-1 2003-12-30

Comments (none posted)

Updated vulnerabilities

apache: buffer overflows in mod_alias, mod_rewrite

Package(s):apache CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0542 CAN-2003-0789
Created:October 28, 2003 Updated:February 13, 2004
Description: André Malo discovered buffer overflows in the mod_alias and mod_rewrite modules of the Apache webserver. These occurred if a regular expression with more than 9 capturing parenthesis was configured. To exploit this, an attacker would need to be able to locally create a carefully crafted configuration file (.htaccess or httpd.conf). CAN-2003-0542

Another buffer overflow in Apache 2.0.47 and earlier in mod_cgid's mishandling of CGI redirect paths could result in CGI output going to the wrong client when a threaded MPM is used. CAN-2003-0789.

Alerts:
Whitebox WBSA-2004:015-01 2004-02-12
Fedora FEDORA-2003-004 2004-01-08
Red Hat RHSA-2003:405-00 2003-12-18
Red Hat RHSA-2003:320-01 2003-12-16
Red Hat RHSA-2003:360-01 2003-12-10
Gentoo 200310-03 2003-10-28
Trustix 2003-0041 2003-11-15
Conectiva CLA-2003:775 2003-11-05
Slackware SSA:2003-308-01 2003-11-03
EnGarde ESA-20031105-030 2003-11-05
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:103 2003-11-03
Gentoo 200310-04 2003-10-31
Immunix IMNX-2003-7+-025-01 2003-10-28
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.046 2003-10-28

Comments (none posted)

apache2: Denial of Service vulnerability

Package(s):apache2 CVE #(s):
Created:September 29, 2003 Updated:March 25, 2004
Description: A problem was discovered in Apache2 where CGI scripts that write more than 4k to the standard error stream will hang the script's execution. This problem can lead to a denial of service situation. See this bug report for additional details.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200403-04 2004-03-22
Netwosix NW-2004-0006 2004-03-25
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:096-1 2003-10-24
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:096 2003-09-26

Comments (none posted)

bind: cache poisoning

Package(s):bind CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0914
Created:November 26, 2003 Updated:February 19, 2004
Description: A cache poisoning vulnerability in BIND may be exploited causing a temporary denial of service until the bad record expires from the cache.
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-003.0 2004-02-19
Debian DSA-409-1 2004-01-05
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:047 2003-11-28
Trustix 2003-0044 2003-11-27
Immunix IMNX-2003-7+-024-01 2003-10-27
EnGarde ESA-20031126-031 2003-11-26

Comments (none posted)

CUPS: denial of service

Package(s):CUPS CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0788
Created:November 3, 2003 Updated:March 4, 2004
Description: Paul Mitcheson reported a situation where the CUPS Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) implementation in CUPS versions prior to 1.1.19 would get into a busy loop. This could result in a denial of service. In order to exploit this bug an attacker would need to have the ability to make a TCP connection to the IPP port (by default 631).
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-012.0 2004-03-03
Conectiva CLA-2003:779 2003-11-07
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:104 2003-11-05
Red Hat RHSA-2003:275-01 2003-11-03

Comments (none posted)

ethereal: protocol dissector and other vulnerabilities

Package(s):ethereal CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0925 CAN-2003-0926 CAN-2003-0927 CAN-2003-1012 CAN-2003-1013
Created:December 18, 2003 Updated:February 13, 2004
Description: Serious issues have been discovered in two ethereal protocol dissectors. Both vulnerabilities will make the Ethereal application crash. The Q.931 vulnerability also affects Tethereal. It is not known if either vulnerability can be used to make Ethereal or Tethereal run arbitrary code. (CAN-2003-1012 and CAN-2003-1013)
Alerts:
Whitebox WBSA-2004:002-01 2004-02-12
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:1193 2004-01-31
Red Hat RHSA-2004:002-01 2004-01-05
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:002 2004-01-13
Conectiva CLA-2004:801 2004-01-07
Red Hat RHSA-2004:001-01 2004-01-07
Debian DSA-407-1 2004-01-05
Fedora FEDORA-2003-040 2003-12-18

Comments (none posted)

Filename disclosure vulnerability in fam

Package(s):fam CVE #(s):CAN-2002-0875
Created:August 19, 2002 Updated:January 5, 2005
Description: "fam" (file alteration monitor) watches files and directories for changes and lets interested applications know when something happens. This package has a flaw in its group handling that blocks some legitimate operations while, at the same time, exposing the names of files that should otherwise be invisible.
Alerts:
Red Hat RHSA-2005:005-01 2005-01-05
Debian DSA-154-1 2002-08-15

Comments (none posted)

fetchmail may crash on specially crafted message

Package(s):fetchmail CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0792
Created:October 16, 2003 Updated:April 8, 2004
Description: A bug was discovered in fetchmail 6.2.4 where a specially crafted email message can cause fetchmail to crash.
Alerts:
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2004.012 2004-04-08
Gentoo 200403-10 2004-03-30
Netwosix NW-2004-0002 2004-02-20
SCO Group CSSA-2004-004.0 2004-02-19
Slackware SSA:2003-300-02 2003-10-22
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:101 2003-10-16

Comments (none posted)

fileutils/wu-ftpd: denial of service

Package(s):fileutils CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0854
Created:October 22, 2003 Updated:March 2, 2004
Description: There is, it seems, an integer overflow vulnerability in "ls" which can be exploited via wu-ftpd to create a denial of service situation. See this advisory from Georgi Guninski for details.
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-006.0 2004-03-01
Trustix 2003-0042 2003-11-15
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:106 2003-11-12
Red Hat RHSA-2003:309-01 2003-11-03
Immunix IMNX-2003-7+-026-01 2003-10-31
Conectiva CLA-2003:771 2003-10-24
Conectiva CLA-2003:768 2003-10-22

Comments (none posted)

glibc: DNS stub resolvers contain buffer overflow vulnerability

Package(s):glibc CVE #(s):CAN-2002-1146
Created:November 7, 2002 Updated:February 5, 2004
Description: DNS stub resolvers from multiple vendors contain a buffer overflow vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability appears to be limited to denial of service. (See CERT Vulnerability Note VU#738331)

The BIND 4 and BIND 8.2.x stub resolver libraries, and other libraries such as glibc 2.2.5 and earlier, libc, and libresolv, uses the maximum buffer size instead of the actual size when processing a DNS response, which causes the stub resolvers to read past the actual boundary ("read buffer overflow"), allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash).

Alerts:
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:009 2004-02-04
Red Hat RHSA-2002:197-09 2002-11-06
Red Hat RHSA-2002:197-06 2002-10-03

Comments (none posted)

GnuPG: ElGamal signing keys compromised

Package(s):gnupg CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0971
Created:November 28, 2003 Updated:March 3, 2004
Description: A severe vulnerability was discovered in GnuPG by Phong Nguyen relating to ElGamal sign+encrypt keys. This email message from Werner Koch contains more information. "Phong Nguyen identified a severe bug in the way GnuPG creates and uses ElGamal keys for signing. This is a significant security failure which can lead to a compromise of almost all ElGamal keys used for signing. Note that this is a real world vulnerability which will reveal your private key within a few seconds."
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-009.0 2004-03-02
Debian DSA-429-2 2004-02-13
Debian DSA-429-1 2004-01-26
Gentoo 200312-05 2003-12-12
Fedora FEDORA-2003-025 2003-12-10
Red Hat RHSA-2003:395-01 2003-12-10
Red Hat RHSA-2003:390-01 2003-12-10
Conectiva CLA-2003:798 2003-12-09
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:048 2003-12-03
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:109 2003-11-28

Comments (3 posted)

gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash

Package(s):gtkhtml CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0133 CAN-2003-0541
Created:April 14, 2003 Updated:April 18, 2005
Description: GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.

GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash.

Alerts:
Debian DSA-710-1 2005-04-18
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:093 2003-09-18
Conectiva CLA-2003:737 2003-09-12
Red Hat RHSA-2003:264-01 2003-09-09
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:046 2003-04-15
Red Hat RHSA-2003:126-01 2003-04-14

Comments (none posted)

iproute: local denial of service

Package(s):iproute net-tools CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0856
Created:November 25, 2003 Updated:December 14, 2004
Description: The iproute utility is susceptible to spoofed netlink messages sent by local users, with the result that denial of service attacks are possible.
Alerts:
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:148 2004-12-13
Fedora FEDORA-2004-154 2004-06-03
Fedora FEDORA-2004-115 2004-05-11
Debian DSA-492-1 2004-04-18
Gentoo 200404-10 2004-04-09
Red Hat RHSA-2003:316-01 2003-11-24

Comments (none posted)

kernel: local root exploit in 2.4.22

Package(s):kernel CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0961
Created:December 1, 2003 Updated:April 5, 2004
Description: A vulnerability was discovered in the Linux kernel versions 2.4.22 and previous. A flaw in bounds checking in the do_brk() function can allow a local attacker to gain root privileges. This vulnerability is known to be exploitable.

The 2.4.23 kernel contains the fix. For more details on how this vulnerability works, see this LWN article.

Alerts:
Debian DSA-475-1 2004-04-05
Debian DSA-470-1 2004-04-01
Debian DSA-442-1 2004-02-19
Debian DSA-433-1 2004-02-04
Debian DSA-423-1 2004-01-15
Red Hat RHSA-2003:368-01 2003-12-19
Conectiva CLA-2003:796 2003-12-05
Gentoo 200312-02 2003-12-04
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:049 2003-12-04
Yellow Dog YDU-20031203-1 2003-12-03
Red Hat RHSA-2003:389-01 2003-12-01
Fedora FEDORA-2003-026 2003-12-02
Slackware SSA:2003-336-01 2003-12-01
Red Hat RHSA-2003:392-00 2003-12-01
Trustix 2003-0046 2003-12-01
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:110 2003-12-01
Debian DSA-403-1 2003-12-01

Comments (1 posted)

kernel-utils: setuid vulnerability

Package(s):kernel-utils CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0019
Created:February 7, 2003 Updated:January 21, 2005
Description: The kernel-utils package contains several utilities that can be used to control the kernel or machine hardware. In Red Hat Linux 8.0 this package contains user mode linux (UML) utilities.

The uml_net utility in kernel-utils packages with Red Hat Linux 8.0 was incorrectly shipped setuid root. This could allow local users to control certain network interfaces, add and remove arp entries and routes, and put interfaces in and out of promiscuous mode.

All users of the kernel-utils package should update to these packages that contain a version of uml_net that is not setuid root.

Alternatively, as a work-around to this vulnerability issue the following command as root:

chmod -s /usr/bin/uml_net

Alerts:
Red Hat RHSA-2003:056-08 2003-02-07

Comments (none posted)

lftp buffer overflows

Package(s):lftp CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0963
Created:December 15, 2003 Updated:February 13, 2004
Description: According to this advisory versions of lftp prior to 2.6.10 are vulnerable to two exploitable buffer overflow problems. Both occur when you connect to a web server with lftp using HTTP or HTTPS, and then use lftp's "ls" or "rels" commands on specially prepared directories on the web server.
Alerts:
Whitebox WBSA-2003:404-01 2003-12-17
Conectiva CLA-2004:800 2004-01-06
Debian DSA-406-1 2004-01-05
Gentoo 200312-07 2003-12-16
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.053 2003-12-17
Red Hat RHSA-2003:404-01 2003-12-16
Red Hat RHSA-2003:403-01 2003-12-16
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:116 2003-12-15
Fedora FEDORA-2003-034 2003-12-15
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:051 2003-12-15
Immunix IMNX-2003-73-002-01 2003-12-09
Slackware SSA:2003-346-01 2003-12-12

Comments (none posted)

libnids: remotely exploitable buffer overflow

Package(s):libnids CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0850
Created:October 29, 2003 Updated:January 6, 2004
Description: libnids (a NIDS plugin which emulates the Linux 2.0 IP stack) contains a buffer overflow vulnerability which can be exploited remotely. Version 1.18 fixes the problem.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-410-1 2004-01-05
Gentoo 200311-07 2003-11-22
Conectiva CLA-2003:773 2003-10-29

Comments (none posted)

libpng, libpng3: buffer overflow

Package(s):libpng, libpng3 CVE #(s):CAN-2002-1363
Created:December 19, 2002 Updated:July 14, 2004
Description: Glenn Randers-Pehrson discovered a problem in connection with 16-bit samples from libpng, an interface for reading and writing PNG (Portable Network Graphics) format files. The starting offsets for the loops are calculated incorrectly which causes a buffer overrun beyond the beginning of the row buffer.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200407-06 2004-07-08
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2004.030 2004-07-06
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:063 2004-06-29
Whitebox WBSA-2004:249-01 2004-06-21
Fedora FEDORA-2004-176 2004-06-18
Fedora FEDORA-2004-174 2004-06-18
Fedora FEDORA-2004-175 2004-06-18
Fedora FEDORA-2004-173 2004-06-18
Red Hat RHSA-2004:249-01 2004-06-18
Conectiva CLA-2003:564 2003-01-23
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:008 2003-01-20
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.001 2003-01-15
Yellow Dog YDU-20030114-2 2002-01-14
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:0004 2003-01-14
Red Hat RHSA-2003:006-06 2003-01-09
Debian DSA-213-1 2002-12-19

Comments (none posted)

mikmod: buffer overflow

Package(s):mikmod CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0427
Created:June 16, 2003 Updated:June 16, 2005
Description: Ingo Saitz discovered a bug in mikmod whereby a long filename inside an archive file can overflow a buffer when the archive is being read by mikmod.
Alerts:
Fedora FEDORA-2005-405 2005-06-16
Red Hat RHSA-2005:506-01 2005-06-13
Fedora FEDORA-2005-404 2005-06-09
Gentoo 200307-01 2003-07-02
Debian DSA-320-1 2003-06-13

Comments (none posted)

mpg123: heap overflow

Package(s):mpg123 CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0865
Created:November 12, 2003 Updated:February 19, 2004
Description: Versions of mpg123 through 0.59s contain a heap overflow which may be exploited remotely (by a hostile server). See this advisory for details.
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-002.0 2004-02-19
Debian DSA-435-1 2004-02-06
Conectiva CLA-2003:781 2003-11-12

Comments (none posted)

mplayer: remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability

Package(s):mplayer CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0835
Created:September 29, 2003 Updated:April 6, 2004
Description: A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability was found in MPlayer. A malicious host can craft a harmful ASX header, and trick MPlayer into executing arbitrary code upon parsing that header. Read the full advisory for details.
Alerts:
Mandrake MDKSA-2004:026 2004-04-05
Gentoo 200403-13 2004-03-31
Conectiva CLA-2003:760 2003-10-06
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:097 2003-09-30
Gentoo 200309-15 2003-09-27

Comments (none posted)

Nessus NASL scripting engine security issues

Package(s):nessus CVE #(s):
Created:May 27, 2003 Updated:August 12, 2004
Description: Some some vulnerabilities exsist in the Nessus NASL scripting engine. To exploit these flaws, an attacker would need to have a valid Nessus account as well as the ability to upload arbitrary Nessus plugins in the Nessus server (this option is disabled by default) or he/she would need to trick a user somehow into running a specially crafted nasl script. Read the full advisory for additional information.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200305-10 2003-05-27

Comments (none posted)

Net-SNMP: security bugs in versions before 5.0.9

Package(s):Net-SNMP CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0935
Created:December 2, 2003 Updated:February 13, 2004
Description: The Net-SNMP project includes various Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) tools. A security issue in Net-SNMP versions before 5.0.9 could allow an existing user/community to gain access to data in MIB objects that were explicitly excluded from their view.

Version 5.0.9 of Net-SNMP is not vulnerable to this issue. In addition, Net-SNMP 5.0.9 fixes a number of other minor bugs.

Alerts:
Whitebox WBSA-2004:023-01 2004-02-12
Red Hat RHSA-2004:023-01 2004-01-15
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:115 2003-12-11
Red Hat RHSA-2003:335-01 2003-12-02

Comments (none posted)

nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug

Package(s):nfs-utils CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0252
Created:July 14, 2003 Updated:March 8, 2004
Description: Linux NFS utils package contains remotely exploitable off-by-one bug. A local or remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted request to rpc.mountd daemon. See this BugTraq post for more details.
Alerts:
Trustix TSLSA-2004-0009 2004-03-05
SCO Group CSSA-2003-037.0 2003-11-17
Conectiva CLA-2003:700 2003-07-22
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:076 2003-07-21
Gentoo 200307-07 2003-07-19
Yellow Dog YDU-20030718-1 2003-07-18
Slackware SSA:2003-195-01b 2003-07-15
Immunix IMNX-2003-7+-018-01 2003-07-14
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:031 2003-07-15
Slackware SSA:2003-195-01 2003-07-14
Debian DSA-349-1 2003-07-14
Red Hat RHSA-2003:206-01 2003-07-14

Comments (none posted)

openssh: timing attack leads to information disclosure

Package(s):openssh CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0190
Created:May 2, 2003 Updated:November 30, 2004
Description: From the advisory: "During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable with PAM support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This bug allows a remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems, through a simple timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and may have high severity, if combined with poor password policies and other security problems that allow local privilege escalation."
Alerts:
Ubuntu USN-34-1 2004-11-30
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.035 2003-08-06
Red Hat RHSA-2003:222-01 2003-07-29
Gentoo 200305-02 2003-05-13
Gentoo 200305-01 2002-03-05

Comments (1 posted)

postfix: denial of service vulnerabilities

Package(s):postfix CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0468 CAN-2003-0540
Created:August 5, 2003 Updated:May 27, 2004
Description: The postfix MTA, versions through 1.1.12 (but not 2.0) is subject to two remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerabilities; see this advisory from Michal Zalewski for details.
Alerts:
Mandrake MDKA-2004:028 2004-05-26
Trustix 2003-0029 2003-08-04
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:081 2003-08-04
EnGarde ESA-20030804-019 2003-08-04
Conectiva CLA-2003:717 2003-08-04
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:033 2003-08-04
Red Hat RHSA-2003:251-01 2003-08-04
Debian DSA-363-1 2003-08-03

Comments (none posted)

proftpd: remote root shell

Package(s):proftpd CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0831
Created:September 24, 2003 Updated:January 2, 2004
Description: The ASCII translation mechanism in ProFTPD 1.2.8 contains a vulnerability which will provide a remote attacker with a root shell - if the attacker is able to download a specially-crafted file. See this ISS advisory for more information.
Alerts:
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:095-1 2003-12-31
Conectiva CLA-2003:750 2003-09-29
Gentoo 200309-16 2003-09-28
Trustix 2003-0037 2003-09-27
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:095 2003-09-26
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.043 2003-09-25
Slackware SSA:2003-259-02 2003-09-23

Comments (2 posted)

rsync - remotely exploitable heap overflow

Package(s):rsync CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0962
Created:December 4, 2003 Updated:March 3, 2004
Description: An advisory has gone out warning of a remotely exploitable heap overflow vulnerability in rsync versions 2.5.6 and prior. If you are running an rsync server, you will want to apply a distributor patch or upgrade to 2.5.7 in the near future.
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-010.0 2004-03-02
Immunix IMNX-2003-73-001-01 2003-12-05
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:111 2003-12-04
Red Hat RHSA-2003:399-01 2003-12-04
Red Hat RHSA-2003:398-01 2003-12-04
Fedora FEDORA-2003-030 2003-12-04
Conectiva CLA-2003:794 2003-12-04
Gentoo 200312-03 2003-12-04
EnGarde ESA-20031204-032 2003-12-04
Debian DSA-404-1 2003-12-04
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.051 2003-12-04
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:050 2003-12-04
Trustix 2003-0048 2003-12-04
Slackware SSA:2003-337-01 2003-12-03

Comments (none posted)

Multiple-use vulnerability in Safe.pm

Package(s):Safe.pm CVE #(s):CAN-2002-1323
Created:October 9, 2002 Updated:February 20, 2004
Description: usePerl has a description of a vulnerability in the Safe.pm Perl module. It seems that if a Safe compartment is used more than once, it ceases to be safe. The problem is fixed in Safe 2.08.
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-007.0 2004-02-20
Gentoo 200212-6 2002-12-20
Trustix 2002-0087 2002-12-19
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2002.014 2002-12-16
Debian DSA-208-1 2002-12-12

Comments (none posted)

sane-backends: several vulnerabilities

Package(s):sane-backends CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0773 CAN-2003-0774 CAN-2003-0775 CAN-2003-0776 CAN-2003-0777 CAN-2003-0778
Created:September 11, 2003 Updated:February 20, 2004
Description: Alexander Hvostov, Julien Blache and Aurelien Jarno discovered several security-related problems in the sane-backends package, which contains an API library for scanners including a scanning daemon (in the package libsane) that can be remotely exploited. These problems allow a remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitrary amounts of memory. The attack is successful, even if the attacker's computer isn't listed in saned.conf.

You are only vulnerable if you actually run saned e.g. in xinetd or inetd. If the entries in the configuration file of xinetd or inetd respectively are commented out or do not exist, you are safe.

Try "telnet localhost 6566" on the server that may run saned. If you get "connection refused" saned is not running and you are safe.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the following problems:

  • CAN-2003-0773: saned checks the identity (IP address) of the remote host only after the first communication took place (SANE_NET_INIT). So everyone can send that RPC, even if the remote host is not allowed to scan (not listed in saned.conf).
  • CAN-2003-0774: saned lacks error checking nearly everywhere in the code. So connection drops are detected very late. If the drop of the connection isn't detected, the access to the internal wire buffer leaves the limits of the allocated memory. So random memory "after" the wire buffer is read which will be followed by a segmentation fault.
  • CAN-2003-0775: If saned expects strings, it mallocs the memory necessary to store the complete string after it receives the size of the string. If the connection was dropped before transmitting the size, malloc will reserve an arbitrary size of memory. Depending on that size and the amount of memory available either malloc fails (->saned quits nicely) or a huge amount of memory is allocated. Swapping and OOM measures may occur depending on the kernel.
  • CAN-2003-0776: saned doesn't check the validity of the RPC numbers it gets before getting the parameters.
  • CAN-2003-0777: If debug messages are enabled and a connection is dropped, non-null-terminated strings may be printed and segmentation faults may occur.
  • CAN-2003-0778: It's possible to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory on the server running saned even if the connection isn't dropped. At the moment this can not easily be fixed according to the author. Better limit the total amount of memory saned may use (ulimit).
Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-005.0 2004-02-19
SuSE SuSE-SA:2003:046 2003-11-18
Conectiva CLA-2003:769 2003-10-22
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:099 2003-10-09
Red Hat RHSA-2003:278-01 2003-10-07
Debian DSA-379-1 2003-09-11

Comments (none posted)

screen: privilege escalation

Package(s):screen CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0972
Created:November 28, 2003 Updated:March 3, 2004
Description: According to this advisory a buffer overflow in GNU screen allows privilege escalation for local users. Usually screen is installed either setgid-utmp or setuid-root.

It also has some potential for remote attacks or getting control of another user's screen. The problem is that you have to transfer around 2-3 gigabytes of data to user's screen to exploit this vulnerability. 4.0.1, 3.9.15 and older versions are vulnerable.

Alerts:
SCO Group CSSA-2004-011.0 2004-03-02
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:1187 2004-01-26
Conectiva CLA-2004:809 2004-01-20
Debian DSA-408-1 2004-01-05
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:113 2003-12-08
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.050 2003-11-28

Comments (none posted)

File overwrite vulnerability in tar and unzip

Package(s):tar unzip CVE #(s):CAN-2001-1267 CAN-2001-1268 CAN-2001-1269 CAN-2002-0399
Created:October 1, 2002 Updated:April 9, 2006
Description: The tar utility does not properly filter file names containing "../", meaning that a hostile archive can, if unpacked by an unsuspecting user, overwrite any file that is writable by that user. GNU tar versions 1.13.19 and earlier are vulnerable; unzip through version 5.42 has the same vulnerability.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:183571-1 2006-04-04
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0195-01 2006-02-21
Conectiva CLA-2002:538 2002-10-29
Mandrake MDKSA-2002:066 2002-10-10
Mandrake MDKSA-2002:065 2002-10-10
EnGarde ESA-20021003-022 2002-10-03
Gentoo unzip-20021001 2002-10-01
Gentoo tar-20021001 2002-10-01
Red Hat RHSA-2002:096-24 2002-09-18

Comments (1 posted)

Multiple vendor telnetd vulnerability

Package(s):telnet Telnet netkit-telnet-ssl kerberos telnetd netkit-telnet nkitb/nkitserv/telnetd krb5 CVE #(s):
Created:May 20, 2002 Updated:October 5, 2004
Description: This vulnerability, originally thought to be confined to BSD-derived systems, was first covered in the July 26th Security Summary. It is now known that Linux telnet daemons are vulnerable as well.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200410-03 2004-10-05
Yellow Dog YDU-20010810-2 2001-08-10
Yellow Dog YDU-20010810-1 2001-08-10
SuSE SuSE-SA:2001:029 2001-09-03
Slackware sl-997726350 2001-08-09
Red Hat RHSA-2001:100-02 2001-08-09
Red Hat RHSA-2001:099-09 2002-02-07
Red Hat RHSA-2001:099-06 2001-08-09
Progeny PROGENY-SA-2001-27 2001-08-14
Mandrake MDKSA-2001:093 2001-12-17
Mandrake MDKSA-2001:068 2001-08-13
HP HPSBTL0202-023 2002-02-12
Debian DSA-075-2 2001-08-14
Debian DSA-075-1 2001-08-14
Conectiva CLA-2001:413 2001-08-24
SCO Group CSSA-2001-030.0 2001-08-10

Comments (none posted)

vim - modeline vulnerability

Package(s):vim CVE #(s):CAN-2002-1377
Created:January 16, 2003 Updated:February 10, 2004
Description: VIM allows a user to set the modeline differently for each edited text file by placing special comments in the files. Georgi Guninski found that these comments can be carefully crafted in order to call external programs. This could allow an attacker to create a text file such that when it is opened arbitrary commands are executed.
Alerts:
Conectiva CLA-2004:812 2004-02-10
Mandrake MDKSA-2003:012 2003-02-03
Yellow Dog YDU-20030127-3 2003-01-27
Gentoo 200301-13 2003-01-22
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.003 2003-01-21
Red Hat RHSA-2002:297-17 2003-01-15

Comments (4 posted)

zebra: denial of service vulnerability

Package(s):zebra CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0795 CAN-2003-0858
Created:November 13, 2003 Updated:January 7, 2004
Description: Zebra an open source implementation of TCP/IP routing software.

Jonny Robertson reported that Zebra can be remotely crashed if a Zebra password has been enabled and a remote attacker can connect to the Zebra telnet management port. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0795 to this issue.

Herbert Xu reported that Zebra can accept spoofed messages sent on the kernel netlink interface by other users on the local machine. This could lead to a local denial of service attack. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0858 to this issue.

Alerts:
Debian DSA-415-1 2004-01-06
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2003.049 2003-11-25
Conectiva CLA-2003:786 2003-11-20
Red Hat RHSA-2003:307-01 2003-11-13

Comments (none posted)

Page editor: Jonathan Corbet

Kernel development

Release status

Kernel release status

The current 2.6 kernel is 2.6.0. Linus released the second 2.6.1 release candidate on January 6 without an announcement; the (relatively small) list of changes can be seen in the long-format changelog. Previously, 2.6.1-rc1 (announcement, changelog) had been released on December 31. It included quite a few fixes, along with a couple of internal API changes (see below), the restoration of the old