SCO Weekly News
It has been a busy week for those of us watching the SCO case. Here's a
summary of all that has been going on...
The fun started with an even more than usually bizarre open letter from Darl McBride
(actually written by his brother Kevin, about whom we will hear more
shortly, and a SCO technical writer) on the evils of the General Public
License. The letter makes for difficult reading, but the core of its
argument is this:
SCO argues that the authority of Congress under the
U.S. Constitution to "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful arts..." inherently includes a profit motive, and that
protection for this profit motive includes a Constitutional
dimension. We believe that the "progress of science" is best
advanced by vigorously protecting the right of authors and
inventors to earn a profit from their work.
By SCO's reasoning, the GPL, being a mechanism by which the owner of a
copyrighted work can allow others to distribute that work without paying a
license fee, interferes with the profit motive SCO has read into the
constitution and, thus, is unconstitutional. Needless to say, this novel
line of constitutional reasoning is finding few defenders outside of SCO.
See, for example, responses by Lawrence
Lessig, Linus
Torvalds (who did some interesting research into copyright law
himself), and on Groklaw.
The real purpose of the open letter appears to have been to distract
attention from some other events, the first of which being the hearing on
IBM's motions to compel discovery on December 5. As most readers will
have seen by now, IBM won a complete victory in that hearing. Both motions
to compel were upheld, while SCO's motion was tabled and all further SCO
discovery has been suspended until SCO has satisfied IBM's questions. SCO
now has 30 days to specify exactly which code it claims IBM has stolen, and
it will not be able to go fishing through AIX for its answers.
The December 5 hearing was also interesting in that David Boies, SCO's
brand-name lawyer, didn't see fit to show up. Instead, SCO was represented
by Kevin McBride, Darl's brother. This was Kevin McBride's first public
appearance in this case, and he appears to have impressed few people -
certainly not the judge presiding over the hearing. He started by sitting
at the defendants' table, and had to be told to move to the other side of
the court. His arguments were generally described as incoherent and
unconvincing; he talked a lot about what a complex case it was. And, of
course, he lost.
For those seeking further information, there are a few postings on Groklaw:
transcripts
of the hearing (scroll down to the second version, which is more
complete), a
list of what SCO must now provide to IBM, and a guest
article on where things go from here (mostly downhill).
SCO was supposed to announce its fourth quarter earnings on
December 8, but that announcement has been
delayed until the 22nd. The stated reason is that the company needs
more time to finish accounting for the BayStar investment. Others have
speculated that the quarter will look so bad that the company hopes that,
by delaying the announcement to just before Christmas, it can escape
notice.
Some of the truth, perhaps, came out in a three-part SEC filing on
December 9. This filing provides some interesting insights into how
SCO deals with its investors and lawyers. It also, perhaps, gives the real
reason for the earnings delay: SCO was still negotiating with BayStar and
the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). It would appear that these investors got a
little nervous about SCO's agreement with its lawyers giving those
lawyers 20% of any settlement, investment in, or sale of the company. As a
result, SCO has filed
a statement that it will not take any action which triggers the 20% fee
unless 2/3 of the preferred stockholders (BayStar and RBC) agree. The
investors, in other words, have established a veto power over the lawyers.
The second part of the filing is a
letter from Boies, Schiller & Flexner to SCO describing the
arrangement between the two companies. This letter is dated
February 26, 2003, but is only being released now. The letter states
that Boies et al. will be paid on an hourly rate - not the pure contingency
deal that SCO has claimed in the past. SCO was also required to put up a
$1 million retainer, and to top it up whenever it gets spent down to
$250,000.
Also stated in this letter is:
It is hereby recognized and acknowledged that Kevin McBride, the
brother of SCO's Chief Executive Officer, Darl McBride, is
an attorney at Angelo, Barry & Boldt who will be working on this
matter. By signing below, Darl McBride acknowledges that full
disclosure of Kevin McBride's involvement in the matter and the
terms and conditions of the fee letter has been made to and
approved by the Board of Directors of Client.
In other words, Boies was not entirely comfortable with Kevin McBride's
presence and required assurance that SCO's board of directors understood
what was going on.
The letter also notes that efforts to sell licenses to Microsoft and Sun
were already underway last February.
Finally, this
letter from SCO to Boies confirms recent payments to the law firm:
$2.6 million, plus the 400,000 shares of stock. SCO has until the
beginning of March to deliver the stock (SEC formalities must be cleared
first). The letter notes that Boies et al. will be taking on, in addition
to the IBM suit, defense against the Red Hat suit and IBM's counterclaims.
Boies will also be helping in "pursuing our potential claims against
third parties arising out of the USL/BSDI settlement." Exactly what
that means remains to be seen.
Comments (6 posted)
Interview: Dan Ravicher on derived works
December 10, 2003
By Pamela Jones, Editor of Groklaw
What is a derivative work when it comes to software? Between SCO's
attempts to define it as "anything that ever breathed the same air as Unix"
and the recent discussions on linux-kernel about the status of
closed-source modules (see
this week's Kernel
Page), it is only natural to wonder if there is any way, short of going
before a judge, to know. Is there a standard rule a programmer can measure
his work by and know whether he has produced a derived work or not?
Dan Ravicher, Esq., Senior Counsel, Free Software Foundation, and
Executive Director, Public Patent
Foundation, was kind enough to grant me an interview
and explain. Note that he is discussing the situation in the US,
because that is where he practices. However, his ultimate advice
applies to international copyright issues as well, namely: ask a lawyer
who practices where you live for an opinion. Get it in writing.
PJ: Is there one definition, The Definition, as it were, of
derivative works that applies to everyone?
The definition of derivative work is an issue under copyright law,
which is exclusively a federal question (state courts are forbidden
from addressing the issue). Therefore, there could conceivably be
94 different "derivative work" definitions, as there are 94
different federal district courts (the trial level of the federal
court system). [Note: There could be even more, as there are
several judges within each district, who could each have different
opinions on the law.]
Although district court judges are supposed to give deference to
one another's opinions, they often do not. As such, above those 94
district courts, there are 13 circuit courts of appeals, which each
attempt to unify the law as between all the district courts within
their jurisdiction. Here's a map showing which
districts fall into which circuits. Again, like the district
court judges, the circuit court judges are supposed to give
deference to one another's opinions, but they often do not. So,
above the 13 circuits, is the Supreme Court, which is supposed to
unify law amongst the circuits.
Every case has a right to appeal to the Circuit Court, but appeal
to the Supreme Court is only by discretion. As of yet, despite the
difference in opinions between the circuits regarding the question
of what constitutes a derivative work of software, the Supreme
Court has not taken any such case. One can speculate why this is
so, including that many of the circuits, including two of the most
influential to the conservative Supreme Court, the 7th and the 4th,
have yet to take an opinion on the issue. Further, the 9th and 2nd
Circuits, routinely the most important for copyright law (because
NY and CA are home to media companies and Hollywood), are pretty
much in agreement on the issue, and several circuits have followed
their lead.
If it is circuit by circuit, how does Utah's circuit, where the
SCO v. IBM case will be decided, define it?
Utah's District Court is within the 10th Circuit, which has adopted
the Abstraction, Filtration, and Comparison test of the 2nd
Circuit. For a discussion of how that test defines derivative
work, you can read a paper I have written on that subject
here [PDF
format].
[Editor's note: the above paper actually covers a few different tests used
by the circuit courts to determine whether one program is a derived product
of another. It is recommended reading for anyone who would like a better
understanding of the different ways of approaching this problem.]
Please bear with me. This is a long question, but I want to be sure you
cover the complete question, and I know you are a programmer as well as an
attorney: The Linux kernel is, of course, licensed under the GPL. There is
a continuing controversy over the legal status of closed-source kernel
modules. Nobody really likes them, but they have been tolerated so far.
There are kernel hackers who have threatened to eventually take a binary
module vendor to court for infringing their copyrights, however.
Is a kernel module a derived product or not? Some people claim
that there are precedents saying that anything which can be
unplugged and replaced falls on the other side of the
boundary and cannot be considered a derived product. Others
point out the substantial amount of inline function code used
by Linux modules, along with the deep knowledge of kernel
internals required, and say that modules are necessarily
derived products.
One can point to a continuum of modules to see that the
situation is not simple. LSM security modules can hook into
almost every part of the kernel and fundamentally change its
operation; almost everybody agrees that they are derived
products. On the other hand, modules exist which allow the
loading of Windows NDIS drivers into a Linux kernel; few
people would claim that the Windows driver has become a
derived product.
Is there any way to figure out where the boundary really is short of
asking a judge?
The intuition that there is no bright line answer regarding modules
is correct. The test of derivative work is a very fact-specific
one; meaning that minor differences can substantially impact the
result. In practice, highly factual issues are typically resolved
by both sides in litigation having representative experts testify
that the facts lead to one conclusion or the other.
However, this doesn't mean one needs to necessarily wait for a
judge to decide the issue in order to have some guidance. In order
to better manage and calculate legal uncertainty, clients often ask
their attorneys for a legal opinion regarding a certain situation.
In what are called "Opinion Letters", attorneys opine as to the
conclusion they think would be reached if a judge addressed at the
issue. For instance, a few years back the W3C sought the opinion
of its attorneys regarding whether or not one of its standards
infringed a patent, which you can read here.
Although such letters are not a guarantee that the issue, if ever
presented to a court, would be resolved in that way, they do allow
the client or other recipient of the letter to rely on the
attorney's opinion in making decisions. That reliance, if
reasonable and based on a "competent opinion", may go a long way to
help the client prove they did not act in bad faith, which is very
important under the law because penalties for copyright
infringement can be drastically increased if the infringer is found
to have acted in bad faith.
Coming soon: the second half of this interview, which covers free
software and patents, especially Microsoft's claimed FAT filesystem
patent.
Comments (7 posted)
A Look at the UserLinux Proposal
About two months ago we
reported that Bruce Perens was
considering the formation of a community-driven "enterprise" Linux
distribution. Perens has made up his mind, and has produced a
manifesto which serves as
a rough outline of what UserLinux would be, and a
discussion
list for those interested in participating. According to Perens,
UserLinux would be "a system for both desktop and server use in businesses
of all sizes."
Why would we need another Linux system? It's not as if there's any lack of
distributions. We spoke to Perens to get the details on
UserLinux. According to him, there's a need for UserLinux because
current Linux vendors are too focused on profits, and the needs of users
are being neglected. In the last year or so, he noticed "the rise of
proprietary open source. Software that is purportedly open source-licensed,
but the user is still made to pay in the long run."
This trend is causing problems for Linux. In his white paper, Perens writes:
The very aspects that make Linux desirable, its low cost, Open
Source nature, and the way it gives customers more control over
their software, are under attack by Linux vendors bent on
increasing shareholder value. Businesses are paying more as Linux
distributions demand a per-seat cost and service lock-in for
software that they didn't develop and that others support.
In creating a community-driven solution for business, UserLinux could
provide an alternative for businesses that aren't looking to pay per-seat
fees to companies like Red Hat. However, a community-driven project will
face problems that Red Hat and other vendors have already (at least to some
extent) overcome.
One major obstacle that UserLinux will face is garnering the support of
independent system vendors, such as Oracle. Any distribution aimed at the
"enterprise" market will need that support. Theodore Ts'o noted
that this can be an expensive undertaking for some of the highly desirable
ISVs. Perens acknowledges this in the second draft of the UserLinux paper:
It will probably be necessary for us to arrange to have a porting
lab for the use of ISVs, where they could come to do their work
with the support of an expert in our system, and for them to have
free call-in support on issues related to supporting their products
on our platform. These things would be paid for by the service
provider organization.
The question, of course, is how the organization will pay to support a lab
and other endeavors. Perens explained that he would like to see an
organization for UserLinux service providers, which could certify providers
and serve as a point of contact for the providers and customers. Providers
would probably pay some fee for certification "on a sliding scale based on
the size of the business" to allow for sole proprietorships. The
organization might charge some percentage for business referred to the
providers, but he doesn't want the organization to be a mandatory
gatekeeper between customers and providers. He also noted that UserLinux
could also have uncertified providers, they would simply not be allowed to
use the trademark for certification.
The service organization also answers another question that businesses are
likely to have: "Who is going to support me?" Perens states in his paper that
a organization built around UserLinux would actually be able to support
more customers than Red Hat:
Red Hat boasts that it employs 300 engineers, but few of those
engineers are in customer-contact positions. Their support
organization is surprisingly small. Our multi-company effort has
the potential to be able to offer more service, even by simple
metrics like head-count, reasonably early in its existence. It can
provide better-localized service because of the potential for
involvement by service companies in many regions. And we can
provide better quality, and lower-cost service, due to the fact
that our service providers will compete with each other for
business.
This organization may work to provide technical support, though it bears a
strong resemblance to Red Hat's early "Support Partner" program, which was
never very successful. What may prove harder is convincing potential users
that other sorts of support - such as security updates - will be available
for several years into the future.
Another obstacle faced by UserLinux is package support. Specifically, which
packages to bundle into the distribution. At this point, Linux has several
areas where there are a number of competing packages that perform the same
general functions. Perens argues that an enterprise project should make
choices between various packages and pick a single package rather than be
bogged down trying to support a array of packages. This would not prevent
users or vendors from adding packages, but the default system would include
only one of a given type of package.
This is likely to cause some heated and unpleasant debates as UserLinux
moves forward. There are already some strong
objections to Perens' preliminary choices on the UserLinux discuss
list. Eventually, these choices have to be made, however. Perens proposes
that these and other technical choices be made by a meritocracy, similar to
projects like the Linux kernel, the Apache project or the Debian project
itself.
UserLinux is, at this point, only a concept. There is much work to be done,
and much of it is in uncharted territory. Whether or not it succeeds
depends on a number of factors, some of which are obvious now and others
will only become apparent with time. But if the success of Linux has taught
us anything thus far, it is that the open source community can succeed
where many expect failure.
Comments (3 posted)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Security
Security news
Lessons from the Debian compromise
December 10, 2003
This article was contributed by Robert Bernier
It's been said that what doesn't kill you makes you stronger: if so then
Debian must be very strong these days.
The recent attack on Debian's servers is well known. It has been well
documented and explained in detail. What remains to do is to consider the
aftermath; have lessons been learned?
Recall the sequence of events. In the month of November, an unknown person
developed a crack that exploited that now famous kernel flaw and found his
way into a Debian developer's machine. Although it's not known if the
attack was focused on the developer's machine in particular, it was quickly
understood by the attacker that this PC presented a means to accessing the
Debian servers. He installed the requisite tools that took over the
machine and sniffed out the passwords. The attacker then obtained the
password that enabled him to compromise a Debian project server. In quick
succession, he penetrated a number of machines which spanned North-America
and Europe.
It must be understood that up to this point the attack had not been
detected. The machines were penetrated
and had been successfully subverted. The attacks were executed in such a
manner that none of the installed security mechanisms caught the
activity. So why didn't the archives get compromised? And how was it that
the attack, was even discovered?
The hand-crafted kernel exploit was not perfect. According to a group of
Debian contributors who were interviewed at a recent Linux User's Group
meeting (LUG), the exploit worked on all of the Intel machines but failed
against one Sparc system, which is where the archives happen to reside. Another
crack imperfection was that it generated strange messages in the log files
which led to the attack's discovery. It turns out that one of the system
administrators became uneasy as he was looking through the log files of
one of his machines. He quickly understood that the messages were not
normal and
the other machines were checked out in short order. This is how the attack
and its point of entry (the developer's compromised machine) were
discovered.
What are the lessons learned?
- Crackers can make bad code: the existence of those log messages
indicates a lack of professionalism and sloppiness that eventually led to
the attack's discovery.
- The bio-diversity of mixed environments defeats mono-culture
weaknesses: it's easy to criticize the fragility attributed by the
dominance of a Microsoft centric work environment. But we seemed to have
missed the fact that a Linux-only environment is monoculture too. Things
could have been worse if it wasn't for the inherent differences between
Intel and Sun System architectures.
- Good people make a difference: a sharp brain and active curiosity are
a great combination. Given the time and resources, all exploits can be
caught.
Has anything been learned from this event that can help us formulate a more
proactive policy? That answer depends on how much we, the open source
community, are willing to work to eliminate these violations. These kinds
of people can exploit a hundred machines before they stumble over one that
can really hurt us. And that's the irony, for every attack that is noticed
there are ten more that are unseen. By increasing the diversity of our
systems and the alertness of our administration, we improve our chances of
detecting and shutting down this sort of attack before it does real
damage.
Comments (17 posted)
Discontinued SuSE Linux Distributions
SuSE has announced an end of life for SuSE Linux 7.3. Vulnerabilities
found after December 15, 2003 will not be fixed for SuSE Linux 7.3.
Full Story (comments: none)
New vulnerabilities
cvs: unauthorized file creation
| Package(s): | cvs |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | December 9, 2003 |
Updated: | December 17, 2003 |
| Description: |
Stable CVS 1.11.10 has
been released, fixing a security issue with no known exploits (as of
this writing) that could cause previous versions of CVS to attempt to
create files and directories in the filesystem root. This release also
fixes several issues relevant to case insensitive filesystems and some
other bugs. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
FreeRADIUS: Denial of service vulnerability
| Package(s): | FreeRADIUS |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0967
|
| Created: | December 10, 2003 |
Updated: | December 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
Versions of FreeRADIUS through 0.9.2 have a vulnerability wherein a remote attacker can cause the daemon to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
rsync - remotely exploitable heap overflow
| Package(s): | rsync |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0962
|
| Created: | December 4, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
An advisory has gone out warning of a
remotely exploitable heap overflow vulnerability in rsync versions 2.5.6
and prior. If you are running an rsync server, you will want to apply a
distributor patch or upgrade to 2.5.7 in the near future. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
2.4 kernel - several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | 2.4 kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0461
CAN-2003-0462
CAN-2003-0464
CAN-2003-0476
CAN-2003-0501
CAN-2003-0550
CAN-2003-0551
CAN-2003-0552
|
| Created: | July 21, 2003 |
Updated: | December 23, 2003 |
| Description: |
Several security issues have been discovered affecting the Linux kernel:
-
CAN-2003-0461: /proc/tty/driver/serial reveals the exact character
counts for serial links. This could be used by a local attacker to infer
password lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password entry.
-
CAN-2003-0462: Paul Starzetz discovered a file read race condition
existing in the execve() system call, which could cause a local crash.
-
CAN-2003-0464: A recent change in the RPC code set the reuse flag on
newly-created sockets. Olaf Kirch noticed that his could allow normal
users to bind to UDP ports used for services such as nfsd.
-
CAN-2003-0476: The execve system call in Linux 2.4.x records the file
descriptor of the executable process in the file table of the calling
process, allowing local users to gain read access to restricted file
descriptors.
-
CAN-2003-0501: The /proc filesystem in Linux allows local users to
obtain sensitive information by opening various entries in /proc/self
before executing a setuid program. This causes the program to fail to
change the ownership and permissions of already opened entries.
-
CAN-2003-0550: The STP protocol is known to have no security, which
could allow attackers to alter the bridge topology. STP is now turned
off by default.
-
CAN-2003-0551: STP input processing was lax in its length checking,
which could lead to a denial of service.
-
CAN-2003-0552: Jerry Kreuscher discovered that the Forwarding table
could be spoofed by sending forged packets with bogus source addresses
the same as the local host.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache: buffer overflows in mod_alias, mod_rewrite
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0542
CAN-2003-0789
|
| Created: | October 28, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
André Malo discovered
buffer overflows in the mod_alias and mod_rewrite modules of the Apache
webserver. These occurred if a regular expression with more than 9
capturing parenthesis was configured. To exploit this, an attacker would
need to be able to locally create a carefully crafted configuration file
(.htaccess or httpd.conf).
CAN-2003-0542
Another buffer overflow in Apache 2.0.47 and earlier in mod_cgid's
mishandling of CGI redirect paths could result in CGI output going to the
wrong client when a threaded MPM is used.
CAN-2003-0789. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
apache2: Denial of Service vulnerability
| Package(s): | apache2 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | March 25, 2004 |
| Description: |
A problem was discovered in Apache2 where CGI scripts that write more than
4k to the standard error stream will hang the script's execution. This problem can lead to a
denial of service situation. See this bug
report for additional details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
bind: cache poisoning
| Package(s): | bind |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0914
|
| Created: | November 26, 2003 |
Updated: | February 19, 2004 |
| Description: |
A cache poisoning vulnerability in BIND may be exploited causing a
temporary denial of service until the bad record expires from the cache. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
CUPS: denial of service
| Package(s): | CUPS |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0788
|
| Created: | November 3, 2003 |
Updated: | March 4, 2004 |
| Description: |
Paul Mitcheson reported a situation where the CUPS Internet Printing
Protocol (IPP) implementation in CUPS versions prior to 1.1.19 would get
into a busy loop. This could result in a denial of service. In order to
exploit this bug an attacker would need to have the ability to make a TCP
connection to the IPP port (by default 631).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
ethereal: multiple remote and local vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | ethereal |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0925
CAN-2003-0926
CAN-2003-0927
|
| Created: | November 10, 2003 |
Updated: | December 17, 2003 |
| Description: |
Multiple vulnerabilities have been found in
ethereal versions below 0.9.16. Remote attackers can craft
packets, and local users can build corrupt trace files,
resulting denial of service and remote code execution. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Filename disclosure vulnerability in fam
| Package(s): | fam |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-0875
|
| Created: | August 19, 2002 |
Updated: | January 5, 2005 |
| Description: |
"fam" (file alteration monitor) watches files and directories for changes and lets interested applications know when something happens. This package has a flaw in its group handling that blocks some legitimate operations while, at the same time, exposing the names of files that should otherwise be invisible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fetchmail may crash on specially crafted message
| Package(s): | fetchmail |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0792
|
| Created: | October 16, 2003 |
Updated: | April 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
A bug was discovered in fetchmail 6.2.4 where a specially crafted email
message can cause fetchmail to crash.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fileutils/wu-ftpd: denial of service
| Package(s): | fileutils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0854
|
| Created: | October 22, 2003 |
Updated: | March 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
There is, it seems, an integer overflow vulnerability in "ls" which can be exploited via wu-ftpd to create a denial of service situation. See this advisory from Georgi Guninski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: DNS stub resolvers contain buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1146
|
| Created: | November 7, 2002 |
Updated: | February 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
DNS stub resolvers from multiple vendors contain a buffer overflow
vulnerability. The impact of this vulnerability appears to be limited to
denial of service. (See CERT Vulnerability Note
VU#738331)
The BIND 4 and BIND 8.2.x stub resolver libraries, and other libraries such
as glibc 2.2.5 and earlier, libc, and libresolv, uses the maximum buffer
size instead of the actual size when processing a DNS response, which
causes the stub resolvers to read past the actual boundary ("read buffer
overflow"), allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service
(crash).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
GnuPG: ElGamal signing keys compromised
| Package(s): | gnupg |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0971
|
| Created: | November 28, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
A severe vulnerability was discovered in GnuPG by Phong Nguyen relating to
ElGamal sign+encrypt keys. This
email message from Werner Koch contains more information. "Phong
Nguyen identified a severe bug in the way GnuPG creates and uses ElGamal
keys for signing. This is a significant security failure which can lead to
a compromise of almost all ElGamal keys used for signing. Note that this
is a real world vulnerability which will reveal your private key within a
few seconds." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash
| Package(s): | gtkhtml |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0133
CAN-2003-0541
|
| Created: | April 14, 2003 |
Updated: | April 18, 2005 |
| Description: |
GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.
GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug
when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed
messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
iproute: local denial of service
| Package(s): | iproute net-tools |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0856
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | December 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
The iproute utility is susceptible to spoofed netlink messages sent by local users, with the result that denial of service attacks are possible. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
KDE: Two issues in KDM
| Package(s): | kde, xfree86 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0690
CAN-2003-0692
|
| Created: | September 16, 2003 |
Updated: | December 19, 2003 |
| Description: |
According to this advisory two issues have
been discovered in KDM:
- CAN-2003-0690: Privilege escalation with specific PAM modules. The XDM display manager that ships with XFree86 prior to 4.3 is also vulnerable.
- CAN-2003-0692: Session cookies generated by KDM are potentially insecure
All versions of KDM as distributed with KDE up to and including KDE 3.1.3
are affected. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: local root exploit in 2.4.22
| Package(s): | kernel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0961
|
| Created: | December 1, 2003 |
Updated: | April 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in the Linux kernel versions 2.4.22 and
previous. A flaw in bounds checking in the do_brk() function can allow a
local attacker to gain root privileges. This vulnerability is known to be
exploitable.
The 2.4.23 kernel contains the fix. For more details on how this vulnerability works, see this LWN article. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
kernel-utils: setuid vulnerability
| Package(s): | kernel-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0019
|
| Created: | February 7, 2003 |
Updated: | January 21, 2005 |
| Description: |
The kernel-utils package contains several utilities that can be used to
control the kernel or machine hardware. In Red Hat Linux 8.0 this package
contains user mode linux (UML) utilities.
The uml_net utility in kernel-utils packages with Red Hat Linux 8.0 was
incorrectly shipped setuid root. This could allow local users to control
certain network interfaces, add and remove arp entries and routes, and put
interfaces in and out of promiscuous mode.
All users of the kernel-utils package should update to these packages that
contain a version of uml_net that is not setuid root.
Alternatively, as a work-around to this vulnerability issue the following
command as root:
chmod -s /usr/bin/uml_net |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libnids: remotely exploitable buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libnids |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0850
|
| Created: | October 29, 2003 |
Updated: | January 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
libnids (a NIDS plugin which emulates the Linux 2.0 IP stack) contains a buffer overflow vulnerability which can be exploited remotely. Version 1.18 fixes the problem. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libpng, libpng3: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libpng, libpng3 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1363
|
| Created: | December 19, 2002 |
Updated: | July 14, 2004 |
| Description: |
Glenn Randers-Pehrson discovered a problem in connection with 16-bit
samples from libpng, an interface for reading and writing PNG
(Portable Network Graphics) format files. The starting offsets for
the loops are calculated incorrectly which causes a buffer overrun
beyond the beginning of the row buffer. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mikmod: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | mikmod |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0427
|
| Created: | June 16, 2003 |
Updated: | June 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Ingo Saitz discovered a bug in mikmod whereby a long filename inside
an archive file can overflow a buffer when the archive is being read
by mikmod. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mpg123: heap overflow
| Package(s): | mpg123 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0865
|
| Created: | November 12, 2003 |
Updated: | February 19, 2004 |
| Description: |
Versions of mpg123 through 0.59s contain a heap overflow which may be exploited remotely (by a hostile server). See this advisory for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mplayer: remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability
| Package(s): | mplayer |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0835
|
| Created: | September 29, 2003 |
Updated: | April 6, 2004 |
| Description: |
A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability was found in
MPlayer. A malicious host can craft a harmful ASX header, and trick MPlayer
into executing arbitrary code upon parsing that header. Read the full advisory
for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Nessus NASL scripting engine security issues
| Package(s): | nessus |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 27, 2003 |
Updated: | August 12, 2004 |
| Description: |
Some some vulnerabilities exsist in the Nessus NASL scripting engine. To
exploit these flaws, an attacker would need to have a valid Nessus account
as well as the ability to upload arbitrary Nessus plugins in the Nessus
server (this option is disabled by default) or he/she would need to trick a
user somehow into running a specially crafted nasl script. Read the full
advisory for additional information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Net-SNMP: security bugs in versions before 5.0.9
| Package(s): | Net-SNMP |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0935
|
| Created: | December 2, 2003 |
Updated: | February 13, 2004 |
| Description: |
The Net-SNMP project includes various Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) tools. A security issue in Net-SNMP versions before 5.0.9 could
allow an existing user/community to gain access to data in MIB objects that
were explicitly excluded from their view.
Version 5.0.9 of Net-SNMP is not vulnerable to this issue. In addition,
Net-SNMP 5.0.9 fixes a number of other minor bugs. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
nfs-utils xlog() off-by-one bug
| Package(s): | nfs-utils |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0252
|
| Created: | July 14, 2003 |
Updated: | March 8, 2004 |
| Description: |
Linux NFS utils package contains remotely exploitable off-by-one bug.
A local or remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending
specially crafted request to rpc.mountd daemon. See this BugTraq post for more details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openssh: timing attack leads to information disclosure
| Package(s): | openssh |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0190
|
| Created: | May 2, 2003 |
Updated: | November 30, 2004 |
| Description: |
From the advisory:
"During a pen-test we stumbled across a nasty bug in OpenSSH-portable
with PAM support enabled (via the --with-pam configure script switch). This
bug allows a remote attacker to identify valid users on vulnerable systems,
through a simple timing attack. The vulnerability is easy to exploit and
may have high severity, if combined with poor password policies and other
security problems that allow local privilege escalation." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Pan: denial of service
| Package(s): | Pan |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0855
|
| Created: | November 25, 2003 |
Updated: | December 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
Pan is a Gnome/GTK+ newsreader. A bug in Pan versions prior to 0.13.4 can
cause Pan to crash when parsing an article header containing a very long
author email address. This bug causes a crash (denial of service) but is
not further exploitable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
postfix: denial of service vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | postfix |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0468
CAN-2003-0540
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | May 27, 2004 |
| Description: |
The postfix MTA, versions through 1.1.12 (but not 2.0) is subject to two remotely exploitable denial of service vulnerabilities; see this advisory from Michal Zalewski for details. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
proftpd: remote root shell
| Package(s): | proftpd |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0831
|
| Created: | September 24, 2003 |
Updated: | January 2, 2004 |
| Description: |
The ASCII translation mechanism in ProFTPD 1.2.8 contains a vulnerability which will provide a remote attacker with a root shell - if the attacker is able to download a specially-crafted file. See this ISS advisory for more information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (2 posted)
Multiple-use vulnerability in Safe.pm
| Package(s): | Safe.pm |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1323
|
| Created: | October 9, 2002 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
usePerl has a
description of a vulnerability in the Safe.pm Perl module. It seems
that if a Safe compartment is used more than once, it ceases to be safe.
The problem is fixed in Safe 2.08. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
sane-backends: several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | sane-backends |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0773
CAN-2003-0774
CAN-2003-0775
CAN-2003-0776
CAN-2003-0777
CAN-2003-0778
|
| Created: | September 11, 2003 |
Updated: | February 20, 2004 |
| Description: |
Alexander Hvostov, Julien Blache and Aurelien Jarno discovered several
security-related problems in the sane-backends package, which contains
an API library for scanners including a scanning daemon (in the
package libsane) that can be remotely exploited. These problems allow
a remote attacker to cause a segfault fault and/or consume arbitrary
amounts of memory. The attack is successful, even if the attacker's
computer isn't listed in saned.conf.
You are only vulnerable if you actually run saned e.g. in xinetd or
inetd. If the entries in the configuration file of xinetd or inetd
respectively are commented out or do not exist, you are safe.
Try "telnet localhost 6566" on the server that may run saned. If you
get "connection refused" saned is not running and you are safe.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the
following problems:
-
CAN-2003-0773: saned checks the identity (IP address) of the remote
host only after the first communication took place (SANE_NET_INIT). So
everyone can send that RPC, even if the remote host is not allowed to
scan (not listed in saned.conf).
-
CAN-2003-0774: saned lacks error checking nearly everywhere in the
code. So connection drops are detected very late. If the drop of the
connection isn't detected, the access to the internal wire buffer leaves
the limits of the allocated memory. So random memory "after" the wire
buffer is read which will be followed by a segmentation fault.
-
CAN-2003-0775: If saned expects strings, it mallocs the memory
necessary to store the complete string after it receives the size of the
string. If the connection was dropped before transmitting the size,
malloc will reserve an arbitrary size of memory. Depending on that size
and the amount of memory available either malloc fails (->saned quits
nicely) or a huge amount of memory is allocated. Swapping and OOM
measures may occur depending on the kernel.
-
CAN-2003-0776: saned doesn't check the validity of the RPC numbers
it gets before getting the parameters.
-
CAN-2003-0777: If debug messages are enabled and a connection is
dropped, non-null-terminated strings may be printed and segmentation
faults may occur.
-
CAN-2003-0778: It's possible to allocate an arbitrary amount of
memory on the server running saned even if the connection isn't dropped.
At the moment this can not easily be fixed according to the author.
Better limit the total amount of memory saned may use (ulimit).
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
screen: privilege escalation
| Package(s): | screen |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0972
|
| Created: | November 28, 2003 |
Updated: | March 3, 2004 |
| Description: |
According to
this advisory a buffer overflow in GNU screen allows privilege
escalation for local users. Usually screen is installed either setgid-utmp
or setuid-root.
It also has some potential for remote attacks or getting control of another
user's screen. The problem is that you have to transfer around 2-3 gigabytes
of data to user's screen to exploit this vulnerability. 4.0.1, 3.9.15 and
older versions are vulnerable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
stunnel: file descriptor leak
| Package(s): | stunnel |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0740
|
| Created: | November 26, 2003 |
Updated: | December 3, 2003 |
| Description: |
A vulnerability was discovered in stunnel versions 3.24 and earlier, as
well as 4.00, by Steve Grubb. It was found that stunnel leaks a critical
file descriptor that can be used to hijack stunnel's services. See this
advisory for more information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
File overwrite vulnerability in tar and unzip
| Package(s): | tar unzip |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2001-1267
CAN-2001-1268
CAN-2001-1269
CAN-2002-0399
|
| Created: | October 1, 2002 |
Updated: | April 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
The tar utility does not properly filter file names containing
"../", meaning that a hostile archive can, if unpacked by an
unsuspecting user, overwrite any file that is writable by that user. GNU
tar versions 1.13.19 and earlier are vulnerable; unzip through version 5.42
has the same vulnerability. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Multiple vendor telnetd vulnerability
| Package(s): | telnet Telnet netkit-telnet-ssl kerberos telnetd netkit-telnet nkitb/nkitserv/telnetd krb5 |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | May 20, 2002 |
Updated: | October 5, 2004 |
| Description: |
This vulnerability,
originally thought to be confined to BSD-derived systems, was first covered
in the July 26th Security
Summary. It is now known that Linux telnet daemons are vulnerable as
well.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
vim - modeline vulnerability
| Package(s): | vim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2002-1377
|
| Created: | January 16, 2003 |
Updated: | February 10, 2004 |
| Description: |
VIM allows a user to set the modeline differently for each edited text file
by placing special comments in the files. Georgi Guninski found that these
comments can be carefully crafted in order to call external programs. This
could allow an attacker to create a text file such that when it is opened
arbitrary commands are executed. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (4 posted)
wget: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | wget |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-1565
|
| Created: | August 5, 2003 |
Updated: | December 10, 2003 |
| Description: |
The wget utility contains a buffer overflow which, when exploited with an over-long URL, can enable arbitrary code execution. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
zebra: denial of service vulnerability
| Package(s): | zebra |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0795
CAN-2003-0858
|
| Created: | November 13, 2003 |
Updated: | January 7, 2004 |
| Description: |
Zebra an open source implementation of TCP/IP routing software.
Jonny Robertson reported that Zebra can be remotely crashed if a Zebra
password has been enabled and a remote attacker can connect to the Zebra
telnet management port. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
(cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0795 to this issue.
Herbert Xu reported that Zebra can accept spoofed messages sent on the
kernel netlink interface by other users on the local machine. This could
lead to a local denial of service attack. The Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0858 to
this issue. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Resources
Patchmanagement.org
Patchmanagement.org has been launched as a moderated mailing list where
interested parties can talk about patch management.
Full Story (comments: none)
A FAQ on the OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 validation effort
The Open Source Software Institute has posted
a FAQ describing the
current OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 validation effort. This work, which is
sponsored by HP and the Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support
program of the DoD Military Health System, seeks to have the OpenSSL
cryptographic modules certified as complying with the FIPS 140-2 standard.
At that point, it would be possible for vendors to create applications
which carry the same validation. See the document for lots of details.
Comments (none posted)
Events
Black Hat Briefings Amsterdam Call for Papers
The 2004 version of the Black Hat Briefings will be held in Amsterdam on
May 17 to 20. The call for papers is out now, with a submission
deadline of March 25.
Full Story (comments: none)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Kernel development
Release status
Kernel release status
The current development kernel remains 2.6.0-test11; Linus seems to
be waiting for Andrew Morton to return from vacation and pick up the
baton. Linus has, however, accepted a few dozen small bugfixes into his
BitKeeper repository.
The current stable kernel is 2.4.23; Marcelo has started off the
2.4.24 process with 2.4.24-pre1. This
prepatch includes the XFS filesystem (see below) along with a fair number
of networking and architecture patches.
Comments (1 posted)
Kernel development news
2.4, XFS, and DM
As reported last week, many users had requested that the XFS filesystem be
added to the 2.4 kernel despite Marcelo's stated intent to go into a
maintenance-only mode. Those users h